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I INTRODUCTION AND TERMS OF REFERENCE
1 Background to the study
Economic crises have plagued countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia since the early 1980s. International
donors and financial institutions, led by the Jnternational Monetary Fund (JMF) and the World Bank, responded
by requiring certain policy changes as a condition of further lending. These conditions are now formalised in
the various Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) currently being followed by many Third World Countries.
While there are many studies of the impacts of SAPs, the majority consider macro-economic impacts only; few
have evaluated impacts at the sectoral or micro levels. It is at this level that CIDA, ICOD and IDRC decided
that this study should be focused. The fishery sector was chosen because, in most Third World countries, fish
are an important source of animal protein for large numbers of people, and fish products contribute significantly
to foreign exchange earnings.
2 Terms of Reference and Approach to the Study
The detailed terms of reference are to be found in Appendix I. The overall objective of the study is to evaluate
the impact of structural adjustment programs on the fishery sector of Third World countries, with specific
reference to Senegal, The Philippines and Chile. The study begins by outlining the importance of the fishery
sector in the world economy and by reviewing the development of the sector in recent years. Specific attention
is paid to problems facing the fisheries sector in Third World countries. This is followed by a review of what
structural adjustment policies are designed to achieve, the policy instruments involved and the debates
concerning their desirability and efficacy. The possible implications of structural adjustment programs for the
fisheries sector are then analyzed in schematic terms and this analysis provides the framework for the three case
studies.
Each case study begins with a review of macro economic developments in recent years, a description of the
contents of structural adjustment programs, and an assessment of their accomplishments. There follows an
overview of the structure and importance of the fisheries sector, and a preliminary assessment of how structural
adjustment programs might have influenced developments in that sector. Finally, suggestions are made for
further research in this area.
The report concludes by drawing together the main findings of each case study on how structural adjustment
policies might have affected the fisheries sector.
Given the tight deadlines in which this study had to be completed and the limited resources available, it was
intended that it would draw only upon secondary sources of information, complemented by short visits to each
country both for data collection and interviews with knowledgeable persons. Each Canadian researcher had a
local contact in the field to assist in collecting information and in making contacts.
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The intention is that this preliminary evaluation will be followed up by more focused research in the field,
drawing more extensively on local expertise, on the areas identified for further study.
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IL SUMMARY OF FINDINGS -
THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN FISHERIES
Structural Adustment Programs (SAPs) are usually introduced as a way of handling the pressures of an increasingly
adverse balance on the external account; bankers and other lenders seek the imprimateur of the IMF/World Bank
before easing repayment terms/advancing new funds. The major foci of SAPs are the external balance, and the
linked internal balances between both savings and investment and between government revenues and government
expenditures, as a prelude to growth in real income. As the role of the market is paramount in SAPs, a corollary -
which critics would argue is the main objective - is to integrate l'hird World more closely into the world market
economy. The major policy areas and instruments used in SAPs are:
restraining demand: by increasing interest rates; tightening credit; restraining wages; reducing
government spending by cutting services; employment and subsidies; increasing tax collections;
and, where imports exceed exports, devaluation;
getting prices right: ending price controls and subsidies, removing import controls and lowering
tariffs (so that "world prices rule"); ending state monopolies; and devaluing "overvalued"
currencies;
institutional/sector reforms: removing institutional restrictions on the freedom of capital to invest
in any sector; privatization; reducing and simplifying the role of the public sector in day to day
business decisions of the country and so on.
In the last few years the Bank has recognized the social impact of adjustment and has attempted to work in measures
for job creation for those most affected, and provisions for redundancy payments, retraining etc. to mitigate these
adverse impacts
In section IV of this report we analyze in detail how the fishery sector of an economy could react to SAP measures;
here we note some of the major effects seen in the countries we visited.
SENEGAL
Fish production has increased strongly since 1982, which coincides with the introduction of reform
programs.
Most of the increase was accounted for by artisanal fishers, whose numbers also increased steadily after
1984. By 1989 they accounted for 71 percent of total production.
Since 1983 there has been a steady increase in the dollar value of fish exports, accounted for mainly by
the industrial fishery. Fish now earns about 28 percent of total export revenue.
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The expansion of artisanal production may be related to structural adjustment through easing of foreign
exchange constraints and restored economic growth but other factors played a role e.g. easing of
competition with industrial fishers in the early 1980s and provision of credit for motors.
Export promotion was essentially through subsidies and tax exemptions. Since the artisanal sector was
producing essentially for local consumption they were not, until recently, affected much by these incentives.
Recently, however, the increased production of fish seems to be reaching natural limits. Some species are
already recognized as being overfished, but given the poor data and the known problem of illegal fishing,
it is likely that limits are being reached or exceeded for other species.
Cutbacks in government spending due to structural adjustment have undermined the ability of the state to
monitor and police the fisheries code.
Resource pressure fmds expression in stagnant or declining productivity, especially in the industrial sector,
and in growing competition between the two sectors. Industrial processors are, reportedly, increasing their
purchases from artisanal fishers.
Fish consumption per capita is high but varies greatly from region to region. It is also reportedly falling.
The real value of the artisanal catch per ton fell steadily from 1982 to 1988 due, perhaps, to expanded
supply, and the real value of catch per canoe has fallen since 1985. The net returns to artisanal fishing
appear to have fallen substantially but are still high.
The industrial fleet is old and in poor repair. Real returns appear to have fallen significantly due, it would
appear, to low productivity and relatively low fish prices. Fuel and interest costs are often held responsible,
but this is unlikely.
The processing sector is contracting and suffers from low capacity utilization, high unit wage costs and lack
of capital. The export subsidy is crucial to their continued existence but appears not to have been paid since
1989.
The most recent structural adjustment loan, SAL (IV) focuses on raising export incentives and
"liberalizing" labour markets, both of which ought to benefit canners. Workers are, understandably,
resisting.
The state has privatized two companies and ceased direct investment in fisheries. There are plans for new
credit/guarantee institutions which are badly needed in the industrial sector. Embryonic credit schemes,
with state assistance, are now in place in the artisanal sector.
The main concern is that if current adjustment efforts succeed in raising exports further, there will be
additional pressure on the resource base and on local fish markets.
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Further research on the impact of structural adjustment should focus on:
the implications for current consumption of recent export promotion initiatives;
the distribution of income in the fisheries sector;
the impact of reform on fisheries communities as a whole.
Government is likely to support this research. Limited local research capacity exists but there is some scope
for foreign funded joint-research.
CHILE
The fishing industry was growing steadily prior to 1973, assisted by government incentives, but has grown
rapidly since then. Structural adjustment initiatives have been implemented since that date.
Export promotion has been a key feature of Chile's adjustment program and has also characterized the
fisheries industry.
Fisheries exports consist mainly of fishmeal and fresh, frozen and canned fish. Their combined value has
risen almost 10 fold since 1976 to over $800 million, while tonnage has risen 5 fold to in excess of 1.1
million.
Local consumption of fish per capita is very low and fell during the stabilization phase of the adjustment
program, as programs to distribute fish free to the poor were cancelled and as real wages fell sharply.
Initial government efforts focused on the development of the northern pelagic industry for fishmeal exports,
and were highly successful.
As anchovy stocks dwindled due to exploitation and, mainly, El Niflo, they were replaced by sardine and
mackerel, the output of which rose rapidly. By 1987 there were signs, however, of ovez-exploitation.
Since the mid 1980s, exports of demersal species and mulloscs have grown rapidly as a result of programs
to promote non-traditional exports.
The artisanal sector was also encouraged by credits from 1DB, by rising unemployment and by settlement
in the south. The catch from the south has grown in importance as that of the north has declined.
Harvest levels have fallen since 1988 suggesting, as in Senegal, over-exploitation of the resource.
Seaweed exports have risen strongly since the early 1980s, again due to export promotion. In addition, high
levels of unemployment have attracted migrants from elsewhere in Chile to this industry.
Recently, artisanal seaweed producers have come into competition with industrial seaweed and salmon
producers.
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Aquaculture is growing rapidly under export promotion schemes.
The main impacts of structural adjustment have, therefore, been on increased production for export.
There is strong evidence that production now exceeds sustainable yield for most commercially important
species.
Government restraint measures post 1973 led to cutbacks in fisheries management which have not yet been
corrected. Lack of enforcement is, therefore, a major problem.
The industrial pelagic fishery has also resisted efforts to improve fisheries management.
Export promotion in other sectors has led to industrial pollution which is also hurting fish stocks.
Real incomes of artisanal fishers not affected by resource depletion have probably risen since 1975, but
since there is evidence of traders' margins rising significantly, the picture is not clear.
1DB credits may have led to concentration of ownership in the artisanal sector.
Cost structures in both fishing and processing are hard to come by but are such that they respond well to
export incentives. No data exists on artisanal costs for fish for local consumption but the real value of the
catch has increased significantly since 1975.
Rapid settlement in the south, and relatively low artisanal incomes, have led to poor living conditions.
Incomes of long established fishers in this region have fallen due to competition for the resource.
Govermnent services are inadequate.
Further research on the impact of structural adjustment should focus on:
the cost and earning structures of fishing and processing;
ownership and income distribution patterns;
strategies of adaptation to changes in the resource, markets, technology, etc.
identification of restraints on incomes of fishers, traders and processors,
including women.
Government is likely to support such research. ICLARM has expressed an interest in co-operating with
IDRC/CIDA if Canadian funds are forthcoming.
THE PHILIPPINES
1. The Philippines has been implementing structural adjustment programs since 1979, interrupted significantly
by political upheavals, drought, earthquake and volcanic eruption. Success in rectifying basic imbalances
has been mixed but on the whole limited.
7
Fishproduction has increased by 40 percent by volume since 1981 and 24 percent by value. However, once
inflation is allowed for, the increase in value is only 17 percent.
Per capita consumption of fish is high and most production is for domestic consumption. Nevertheless,
export earnings from fish increased steadily over the last decade to $500 million or to 6 percent of total
exports, stimulated by devaluation.
Most exports are of canned fish but exports of shrimp/prawns have expanded rapidly since 1985 as a result
of investment in their farming.
Fish production increased in all years except 1983-86 which were years of political upheaval and IMF
austerity.
Fish consumption per capita stabilized, on average during the 1980s, but survey evidence suggests reduced
consumption for all but fishermen, due to the increasing price of fish relative to other sources of protein.
But population growth in excess of 2.5 percent per annum at that time implied rising total consumption of
fish.
Productivity has been declining in both municipal and commercial fishing but may have risen in
aquaculture.
The number of municipal boats rose sharply during the 1980s. So too did the number of motorized boats,
assisted by World Bank credits. This has allowed increased effort but also import dependence and pressure
on resources.
Aquaculture investment and production has risen steadily over the decade.
Productivity of municipal marine fishing, and the real value of the catch, have fallen steadily over the
decade.
Municipal fishers are quite poor and rely on non-fish activities or credit from merchants during the off-
season.
Seaweed farming, mariculture, for export has risen rapidly since the mid 1980s.
The catch of the commercial maritime sector, which caters to both local markets and canners, is relatively
stagnant, due to the age of the ships and the decline in fish stocks. It will not be able to supply the
expanded capacity for tuna canning; as a result the now seasonal dependence on imported tuna will be
increased.
Excess processing capacity is a problem, due in part to negative real interest rates prior to adjustment.
Enhanced production levels and industrial and residential pollution are putting severe pressure on the fish
stocks of the Philippines. Poor fishing practices, such as the use of dynamite, and the destruction of
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mangrove swamps for aquaculture, are also contributing to the damage. This is affecting the catch and the
efforts of municipal fishers in particular.
The real value of production has risen over the period in aquaculture. It has fallen steadily in the
municipal marine sector and, from 1986 in the commercial and municipal inland sector.
The real value of fish production per ton has fallen consistently in all sectors except aquaculture and the
municipal inland fisheries which concentrate on high value species, often for export.
Devaluation and subsidy removal has raised the price of gas significantly, probably reducing the net returns
of municipal fishermen.
Returns to aquaculture probably rose significantly to 1988 but since then world competition have reduced
dollar prices for prawns and devaluation has failed to offset this - meanwhile input prices have risen.
Devaluation and increased tuna supply have encouraged the over-expansion of tuna canning capacity which,
in a very internationally competitive industry with a high import content, has probably squeezed margins.
Seaweed farms seem to have benefited unambiguously from exchange rate changes since their import
content is low and world prices firm.
Municipal fishers do not have access to formal credit. Those sections of the industry which do, complain
about high interest rates.
Further research on the impact of structural adjustment should focus on:
- how best to manage the fishery so as to reduce pressure on fish stocks as
demand from local consumption and exports increases;
the cost and earning structures of fishing and processing;
ownership and income distribution patterns.
Government is likely to support this research. Local expertize is available for joint research projects if
foreign funding is forthcoming.
CONCLUSIONS
Fish production and employment has grown strongly in all countries since the beginning of adjustment
programs, and especially in Chile and Senegal.
In Senegal and the Philippines, growth has been fuelled by the domestic market.
Export growth and diversification has occurred in all three and has been the driving force of production
in Chile.
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In all three countries this growth is putting pressure on the resource base. Productivity is, as a result,
stagnant or declining.
Pressure is also coming from industrial pollution.
Funds for monitoring and policing resource use have been cut back under adjustment programs.
Attributing causation is difficult but adjustment measures have been critical in Chile. Production responded
to export incentives and the number of fishers rose in response to unemployment elsewhere in the economy.
Austerity also reduced local fish consumption in the years after 1973.
In Senegal and the Philippines adjustment programs may have assisted local consumption by restoring the
growth of total national income and easing foreign input constraints.
Other factors, such as small loan schemes, were also important in raising the output of the artisanal fishery
of each country.
Export incentives were most restrained in Senegal due to the fixed exchange rate system and the
cumbersomeness of the alternative measures put in place.
There are signs, however, that conflict over resource use between export and local markets is growing in
Senegal.
Efforts to promote exports further can only heighten the pressure on the resource base in all three
countries.
The age of the commercial fleet is a problem in Senegal and the Philippines but not in Chile where the
profitability of fish for export has facilitated and encouraged new capital investment.
Credit is a problem in all sectors in Senegal, not addressed and possibly worsened by adjustment measures.
There are complaints about high interest in the Philippines, where they may be valid, and in Senegal where
they do not seem to be valid.
Austerity measures reduced fish consumption in Chile 1973-76 and in the Philippines 1983-86.
Further research is needed, as elaborated in the country case studies.
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ifi AN OVERVIEW OF THE WORLD FISHERIES ECONOMY
The world's fisheries are an important source of food, employment and income in all coastal nations. Increasingly,
fish is an important earner of foreign exchange for many developing countries. Yet despite the importance of the
fisheries sector in many countries, fisheries resources are being damaged due to over-fishing, pollution and habitat
distruction. These problems, although evidenced the world over, are particularily severe in developing countries
where there are often insufficient resources (both monetary and human) to properly manage fisheries and regulations
offer inadequate protection to fisheries and fisheries habitat from pollution.
This chapter presents an overview of fisheries in terms of their relative importance in developed and developing
countries. Aggregate data is presented on fish consumption, and fishery based income, employment and trade in
developed and developing countries. Also examined are the important trends in fisheries in both country groups.
The analysis suggests that both the developed and developing countries are facing many of the same fisheries issues,
but because the significance of fisheries tends to be greatest in the poorest regions of the world, it is in these areas
that these issues are most urgent.
A country's fishing industry can include inland fisheries, inshore and offshore marine fisheries, and fresh, brackish
or salt water aquaculture. The fisheries sector can be divided further by type of gear used, the size of vessels, and
the species harvested. Other distinctions can be made based on the ownership and the level of capital investment
in vessels and equipment. Each of these characteristics has an impact on fishing costs, markets and consequent
prices for production, income distribution, and the socioeconomic impacts of the industry. On a global scale
however, such detailed distinctions are impossible. Instead, the world's fisheries are most often discussed in terms
of three main sectors: aquaculture, industrial fisheries, and artisanal fisheries. The main features of each are
described below.
Aquaculture refers to the cultivation of fish, crustaceans, seaweeds and algae. Techniques range from the rearing
of fish in near-natural environments without any supplemental feeding, to high-cost systems where fish are reared
in artificial environments and are totally dependent on artificial feed. Total world production of fish has grown about
40 percent since the mid-1980s and is currently estimated at about 14 million tonnes (FAO 1991 & 1989). Most of
this production is in Asia where aquaculture is often integrated with agriculture and fish is an important source of
food. In Africa attempts to increase fish production through aquaculture have not been as successful, while in Latin
America most aquaculture production is focused on high-value species for export. In many developed countries, the
need to heat the rearing environment adds to the costs of production, making it necessary to concentrate on high-
value luxury species.
Industrial Fisheries are large-scale fisheries using capital intensive technology (eg. large boats, modern and efficient
gear, on-board processing capacity, etc). Boats and equipment used in this sector are often owned by vertically
integrated corporations and fishing is usually carried out in offshore waters. Large-scale fisheries are responsible
for the greatest portion of the catch of developed countries. In the developing countries, industrial fisheries are less
important, especially in terms of supplying the local food fish markets, but can be important in the supply of fish
for processing into fish meal or for export.
Artisanal Fisheries are small-scale and generally use labour-intensive technology. Catches from this sector dominate
Third World fisheries and are particularly important in the supply of food fish for local markets. The FAO estimates
that artisanal fisheries supply 80 percent of the fish consumed in Africa, 60-70 percent in Asia, and up to 50 percent
in Latin America [Regier, 1982, p. 3]. Almost all inland fisheries and most near-shore marine fisheries can be
classified as artisanal. The technology used ranges from gleaning fish and seaweeds by hand to the operation of
small trawlers with mechanized net lifting equipment. Also included in the artisanal fisheries is the low cost, low
technology aquaculture common in Asia.
The distinction between artisanal and industrial fisheries is not always clear. In most countries, not only are there
small-scale and large-scale fishing operations, but there are also many fishers employing gears that are characteristic
of both. These uintermediatescalew operations are usually classified as small or large-scale by government agencies
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for administrative purposes, with the result that a vessel which is termed artisanal or small-scale in one country
might be considered large-scale or industrial if operating in another country.
As with fish harvesting, the structure of the processing sector can vary from the labour intensive artisanal processing
sectors, which dominate in the Third World, to large capital intensive industrial processing plants. The market
systems can also vary. Fish is often simply sold directly to consumers by artisanal fishers on the beach, or it can
be sold to processors or fish mongers who later sell it at local markets. In many industrial fisheries, fish is delivered
to large processing plants, and payment is based on previously negotiated contracts.
1. FISH AS FOOD
Fish is a nutritious food, high in protein and containing the vitamins A, B and D, as well as calcium, iron,
phosphorus, iodine and fluoride. It can make an important contribution to the nutritional status of people in the
Third World because it is high in the amino acids lysine and sulphur which may be missing in cereal-dominated diets
[Kent, 1987, p. 29].
Fish consumption patterns differ significantly between developed and developing countries. Table ifi 1 shows that
although the supply of fish per person in the developing countries has almost doubled since the early 1960s, it is
still only a third of the average supply available per person in the developed countries. Despite this, fish is a much
more important component of diet in the poorer countries, accounting for an average of 20 percent of the (meagre)
supplies of animal protein available (Table III 2) compared to 13 percent in developed countries.
Table III 1. Average per Capita Supply of Fish and Seafood
in Developed and Developing Countries.
Source: FAO Food Balance Sheets.
The average daily requirement for protein has been estimated by the United Nations' Department of
International Economic and Social Affairs Statistical OffIce (1977) to be 38.7 grams. Table III 2 shows the
average daily supply of protein available in both developed and developing countries is well above this required
level. However, averages hide important inequalities in the distribution of food supplies. FAO estimates indicate
that food production is sufficient to adequately feed the world's population [FAO Food Balance Sheets, 1984-86
average], yet an estimated 20 to 30 percent suffer from severe malnutrition, and in some places even starvation
[McGoodwin, 1990, p. 2, quoting World Bank Atlas].
Another important issue is the distribution of food within households. In many developing countries, the
allocation of food tends to favour adult males. There is also some indication that the distribution of animal food
products may be even more skewed in this direction [Kent, 1987, p. 35]. The availability of fish for food is
therefore of higher significance for women and children, especially when viewed in light of the susceptibility of
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Source: FAO Food Balance Sheets.
While the averages presented in Table III 2 do indicate a greater importance of fish in the diets of people in
developing countries, they also hide some critical details. There are some island and coastal states, for example,
that depend on fish for up to 90 percent of their total protein consumption [Labon, 1988, p. 5]. It is also
important to recognize that because of the large populations in the Third World, the significance of fish in the
diet takes on an even greater role. It has been estimated that in Asia alone, more than a billion people depend
on fish for their primary source of protein [CIDA, 1986, P. 3] and in total, more than a half of the world's
population depend on fish as their only source of animal protein [McGoodwin, 1991, p. 3].
2 THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF FISHERIES
2.1 Contribution of Fisheries to GDP
Estimates of the contributions made by fisheries to the Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) of some of the major
fish producing nations of the developed and the developing world are presented in Table ifi 3. These estimat4es
were based on information presented in Country Fishery Profiles that have been prepared by the FAO on
selected countries since the 1970s. The FAO's choice of countries was intended to provide representation of
nations of various sizes, stages of economic development, and geographical regions [FAO, 1972]. The countries
selected for inclusion in Table III 3 are the major fish producing countries of the developed and the developing
worlds for which Fishery Country Profiles had been prepared in the last ten years.
The data presented in Table III 3 indicates that the economic significance of the fisheries sector in a country's
economy is more closely (and inversely) correlated with its level of economic development than with its rank in
fish production. With the exception of Iceland, fisheries contribute less than one percent to the economies of the
developed countries. Of the developing countries, the contribution of fisheries is greater than one percent for all
but one, and greater than two percent for six of the ten. This range corresponds with an FAO estimate that the
average fisheries share of GDP is three percent in the developing countries [Josupeit, 1984, p. 1].
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Table III 2. Average per Capita Supply of Protein by Source
in Developed and Developing Countries
(Three Year Average 1986-1988)
Developed Developing
Countries Countries
102.9 gin 59.8 gin
59.4 gin 13.2 gin
58% 22%
7.6 gin 2.6 gin
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Table III 3 Estimated Contribution of Fisheries
to the Gross Domeatic Products of
Selected Developing and Developed Countries
Fisheries GDP cslculat.d the setimat.d gross value ,f fish production rsportad in PAO Fishery Cotaitry Profiles, less 20 percent to accotsn
for fishing costs. Twenty percent is FAOe estimate of the svsrag. cost of fishing inputs for all cotaitriss, but the FAO also notes that input
costs can vary sigisficantly with the sophistication of th, industry IFAO, 1972. p. 21.
2 SOt,ce; FAO Fishsry Statistics Yarbook, 1989. Val. 89.
The estimated contributions of fisheries to GDP are limited to the fish production sector. The value-added by
the processing and marketing sectors can easily more than double the total contribution of fisheries to GDP,
depending on the degree of processing involved in creating the fish products finally consumed.
2.2 Employment in Fisheries
Table Ill 4 shows the employment in fisheries for the same countries represented in Table III 3. For some of
these countries, the employment estimates only included the number of people involved in fish harvesting
activities. We estimated employment in the processing and marketing sectors of these countries to be equal to
the numbers employed in fish production. This likely underestimates employment in the developing countries
because they are dominated by artisanal fishers which have been estimated to provide work for two or three
shore-based workers [Thomson, 1980, p. 4].
To compare the relative importance of fisheries as a source of employment, the number of people working in
the fisheries sector are given as a percentage of the country's total labour force. This measure exhibits a pattern
similar to that of the contribution of fisheries to GDP. The importance of the fisheries sector in providing































Table III 4 Estimated Employment in the Fisheries Sector
of Selected Developing and Developed Countries
Labo,, oqcs date from: Yearbook of Lsbot, Statistics. 40th issue. 1089-00. International Labot, Office, Geneva.
2
Employment in proceasinQ and msrkstin data ste not eveilabl.; we estimated it to be equal to the ntsnb.r employed in fish production
activities. Whether tM over or under-estimates the employment in tho sector d.psnds on the level of indetrisluzation in ths country's
fisheries sector. A,tissnsl fisherie, have been istimat.d to crest, 2 to 3 on-shore jabs per fisher (Thomson, 1080, p.41 whil. a hihly
iriduetrial sector may provide only I lob for .v.ry 3 fishers leg. Chile).
The data presented in Tables ifi 3 and 1114 indicate that fishing dominates the economies of only a handful of
countries, but hides the fact that both developed and developing countries have coastal regions that are almost
entirely dependent on fishing Communities in these regions tend to be among the most economically
disadvantaged because of their remote locations and limited opportunities for alternative employment. In much
of the Third World, the dependence on fisheries in these communities is especially critical because migration to
other areas is unlikely to provide better employment options. Most cities are already over-crowded, due in large
measure from the migration of unemployed agricultural workers. In fact, in times of economic recession the
migration of people is often into fishing communities, as there is a tendency for artisanal fisheries to absorb
surplus labour [McGoodwin, 1990, p. 10].
As with the distribution of fish for food, there are also inequalities in the distribution of incomes generated by
fisheries. Women play a vital role in fisheries, most often in the processing and marketing of fish caught by
artisanal fishers, yet the distribution of incomes within fishing communities generally favour men [Madhu,
1989, p. 3].
Gender inequalities in Third World fisheries have been perpetuated by fisheries development efforts which have
often over-looked the needs of women involved in processing and marketing [King, 19891. Until recently fishery
development funds were usually aimed at increasing artisanal harvest levels through the provision of more
effective fishing equipment. As men dominate the harvesting sector, they received any increases in incomes that
resulted from these projects. Because in many societies there is a clear division between the use of men's and
women's incomes, with the women's being used for food and other basic necessities, such programs may not







Japan 431.9 43192 1.4
USA 223.0 70.9 0.3
Denmark 14.5 10.4 0.9
Norway 28.0 200.0 11.2
Canada 81.5 25.8 0.9
Iceland 6.6 9.8 14.5
France 44.4 33.8 0.5
Poland 17.8 20.0 0.2
Italy 50.0 6.8 0.2
Netherlands 4.4 15.0 0.3
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
Chile 44.6 13.7 1.4
Peru 31.2 69.0 1.6
India 2100.0 2100.02 0.7
Korea 172.8 172.82 2.3
Indonesia 3115.0 3115.02 4.1
Thailand 300.0 93.5 1.6
Philippines 980.0 30.0 5.0
Bangladesh 1100.0 1100.02 7.1
Tanzania 171.0 171.02 6.0
Senegal 36.0 72.0 3.6
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have increased the nutritional well-being of women and children [Hamilton, 1984, p. 77]. Overgeneralization on
the issue of gender inequality is to be avoided, however, as in some countires e.g. in West Africa, fish
mammies (women) often finance the activities of fisherm and buy their catch at concessionary prices.
The focus of fisheries development on production sometimes had other negative effects. In West Africa for
example, fisheries development was successful in increasing production, but, because the processing sector
could not keep up with the increased supply of fish, it also led to increases in post-harvest losses [United
Nations, 1983]. It was demonstrated that development strategies aimed at improving post-catch efficiency would
benefit a wider number of people through increased prices for fishers, improved incomes for processors, and
possible increases in local employment [Bailey, 1980]. Recent improvements in artisanal fishing have included
the processing sector, often resulting in increased incomes for women.
3 FISH AS A SOURCE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
World trade in fisheries products has been increasing at a pace faster than the increase in world catches.
Between 1979 and 1989, the proportion of the world's catch that was traded interntionally rose from 32.8 to
38.5 percent, and the amount of fish traded increased from 21 to 38 million tonnes [FAO, 1989 and 1986].
Figures III 1 and III 2 show the growth in the value of the fish exports and imports of developed and developing
countries since 1978. With the exception of the fish imports of the developing countries, trade in both country
groups increased dramatically in the late-1980s. As can be seen from Table 11 5, fish trade also increased in
relation to all trade during this period. This is especially true for the developing countries where fish is now
well over two percent of their total exports.
Table III 5 Fish as a Percent of the Value of
Total Merchandise Trade,









Sources: FAO Fishery Statistics Yearbook, Vol. 69 and FAO Trade
Yearbook, Vol. 43.
The rapid growth in fish exports relative to imports means that fish is making an increased net positive
contribution to the balance of payments in the developing countries. However, this contribution must be
weighted against the cost of the imported inputs required to produce fish for export and not counted here as
"imports of fish". In much of the Third World the export market is supplied by the industrial fisheries sector.
These fisheries use technologically advanced vessels and equipment which tend to be imported. In addition, one
of the major inputs of industrial fisheries is fuel, which for many developing countries also has to be imported.
These costs could significantly diminish the foreign exchange earnings of fisheries in the Third World. Further,
intensive aquaculture in Third World Countries relies on imported inputs e.g. fishmeal, in the Philippines,
where, some commentators say, fish ponds consume, not produce, fish.
1984 0.64 0.97 1.44 0.50
1985 0.66 1.01 1.6]. 0.54
1986 0.75 1.20 2.31 0.67
1987 0.78 1.30 2.39 0.71
1988 0.77 1.31 2.40 0.75
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An even more important cost to weigh against the foreign exchange earnings of the fisheries sectors of
developing countries is the effect of fish exports on local food supplies. Only because the fish catches of
developing countries increased very rapidly in the past 10 years (see Figure HI 3), and because traded species
tend to be those with a high commercial value (eg. tuna and cnistaceans), were higher exports values achieved
without a reduction in the average per capita supply of fish for food in the developing countries (Table III!).
However, for many of the poorest countries, food shortages are a continuing problem. Without the increased
exports, fish could be playing a more important role in domestic food supplies.
Increasing foreign exchange earnings through fish exports can have other negative effects. Fisheries
development aimed at the production of high-value species for export often means the development of a new
industrial fishery, which can interfere with the traditional fishing areas of the artisanal fishers. Many developing
countries have attempted to reduce these user conflicts by designating the inshore waters for the exclusive use of
artisanal fishers. However, these designations are often ignored by the industrial fleets, and without adequate
monitoring and enforcement programs, governments are often powerless to stop them.
Even if a project is designed to increase the production of the export species by the artisanal sector, because of
the consequent reallocation of productive resources, domestic supplies of fish can be reduced and available only
at higher prices [Kent,p. 41]. The impacts may be particularly severe for women as such projects tend to divert
fish from the artisanal processing sectors which are often dominated by women [Nauen, 1989, p. 15].
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4 TRENDS IN WORLD FISHERIES
The post-war period was one of unprecedented growth in the world's fisheries. Between 1950 and 1970 the
world's catch increased from about 20 to 65 million tonnes (Figure II 4). Much of this growth resulted from
the development of more effective fish harvesting technology such as on-board freezing capability, mechanical
gear-hauling, and the use of synthetic fibre for nets [Robinson, 1984, p. 3]. Harvests in the artisanal fisheries
also grew as the population of coastal villages in developing countries increased [Thomson, 1980, p. 3].
By the mid 1970s the world fish catches appeared to be levelling off at around 70 million tonnes per annum.
Around the same time the anchovy stocks off the west coast of South America collapsed and the harvests of
major species such as Atlantic Herring, South African Pilchard and Atlantic Cod dropped [Robinson, 1984, p.
7]. The limits of the oceans' resources appeared to be approaching. This concern prompted a review of how the
world's oceans were being managed that eventually resulted an extension of the jurisdiction of coastal countries
to a 200-nautical-mile limit. This new uLaw of the SeaN was adopted by over 100 countries in 1982 and as a







The new international management regime presented great opportunities for coastal countries to increase the
benefits they derived from the oceans. But it also meant greater fisheries management costs if these new
benefits were to be realized. Establishing an appropriate and fair management program requires biological,
social and economic research, consultation with the user groups and communities that will be affected, and the
19
establishment of legal, administrative and enforcement frameworks. After a management program is established,
there are the ongoing costs of biological stock assessments, monitoring of fish harvests and fishing effort, and
enforcement of the fishing regulations (which are particularly high for small island nations or countries with
long coastlines). Developing countries have the greatest difficulty in establishing and maintaining good
management regimes, not only because of the monetary costs involved, but also because of the shortage of
skilled biologists, economists and administrators in many of these countries [FAO, 1984, p. 15].
Since the mid 1980s, the world fish catches have once again been increasing at a rapid rate (Figure III 4). This
is largely the result of increasing diversification in the world's industrial fisheries. To increase their harvests,
industrial fleets began to fish in previously unexploited waters and using even more effective fishing technology
[McGoodwin, 1990, p.2]. This has meant that any increases in harvests by the industrial fisheries has come
about only through increases in average cost per unit of catch.
Events of the last ten years have also led to an increase in the fishing costs in artisanal fisheries. The sections
above demonstrate the importance of these fisheries as a source of employment and food in much of the Third
World. Yet for years it was assumed that as development progressed, artisanal fisheries would gradually be
replaced by modem, efficient and capital intensive fisheries. It was only in the early 1980s that it began to be
recognized that artisanal fisheries are in most cases, a more appropriate mode of production for poor countries.
It has been estimated that they provide almost 20 times as many jobs as industrial fisheries and at approximately
one percent of the capital cost [Thomson, 1980, p. 3].
This recognition meant that developing country governments and international and national foreign aid agencies
began to direct more funds to the development of artisanal fisheries. Many of these projects aimed to increase
production by providing more modem equipment, most commonly motors, to artisanal fishers. The result was
an increase in harvest, but again at a higher per unit cost. This development, coupled with increasing demands
for fish due to population growth, and the development of industrial fisheries in the Third World, has resulted in
fish harvests that have grown at an even faster pace than the fish harvests of the developed countries
(Figure III 3).
Despite the recent increase in the world's fish catches, it is clear that they cannot increase indefinitely. This has
raised concerns that the world's fish supply will not be able to meet the demand of an ever-increasing world
population. This is of particular concern to the Third World as the price of fish is likely to increase as demand
increases relative to supply and fishing costs continue to rise. These gloomy prospects suggest an number of
important issues for the future:
Fisheries management must continue to improve. More resources need to be directed into
research and enforcement to ensure current harvest levels are sustained.
Currently, over 30 percent of the world's fish harvest is used for non-food purposes, up from
about 26 percent ten years ago [FAO Fisheries Statistics Yearbook, Vol.57 and Vol. 69]. As
food becomes increasingly scarce in the future, this trend must be reversed.
It has been estimated that industrial shrimp trawlers destroy anywhere from 6 to 16 million
tonnes of fish as by-catch each year [Lindquist, 1988]. This practise is encouraged by the
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relative values of shrimp and the by-catch species. Regulations to change it are unlikely to be
successful because of prohibitive enforcement costs.
Post-harvest losses continue to be a problem in the Third World. Factors contributing to this
include the tropical climates of many developing countries, the continued use of traditional but
inefficient processing techniques, the lack of refrigeration, and the inadequacies of
transportation systems.
Artisanal fisheries development projects will have to shift their focus from helping fishers
increase the ability to increase harvests in fisheries that are already over-capitalized, to helping
the developing countries improve their management capabilities, reduce post-harvest losses,
improve the utilization of the catch, and increase their aquaculture production.
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P/ STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE FISHERIES SECTOR
This section examines the objectives and content of structural adjustment programs, and the rationale for their
adoption. It also looks briefly at some of the criticisms which have been levelled against them, and what this might
mean for the design of alternative programs. It then reviews the performance of countries which have adopted them.
The latter half of the section explores the different ways in which structural adjustment programs might be expected
to affect the fisheries sector of third world countries and the people and communities involved in that sector.
OBJECTiVES OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
Structural adjustment is now the policy orthodoxy in most third world countries, but it is the subject of much debate.
Its proponents would argue that its objectives are to restore economic growth in a context of both external and
internal balance. Indeed, they would go further and hold that balance externally and internally are a requirement
for growth to be sustained over any length of time, and that growth itself is necessary if income distribution is to
be made more equitable and if poverty is to be addressed. By internal balance is meant the reduction of inflation,
the eradication of fiscal deficits, and the closing of gaps between savings and investment.
Critics of structural adjustment, on the other hand, would argue that the main objective is to integrate the economies
of the third world more closely into the world economy, and more specifically, into those of the industrialised
capitalist world. They maintain that this will limit the economic options facing third world countries and perpetuate,
at best, a form of dependent development in which the fruits of limited and uncertain growth will be shared very
unevenly.
These competing views are at one level simply a continuation of a long-standing debate about the nature, potential
and beneficiaries of the development process historically (including, of course, the purpose and efficacy of foreign
aid in that process). But disputes about the nature of structural adjustment are also compounded by the difficulty
of conducting empirical evaluation in this area free of ideological or even 'scientific' bias. This debate will be an
on-going one, not easily resolved, but a closer look at the policies and instruments will help explain the competing
points of view.
TUE MAIN POLICY DIRECTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
The main pressure for structural adjustment in the third world is the economic, social and political crisis brought
on, ostensibly, by an acute shortage of foreign exchange. The chronic dependence of most third world countries
on imported goods, a reflection of colonial economic policies emphasising domestic production for export, and post-
colonial policies emphasising import-substitution industrialisation with little local value-added, renders them
particularly susceptible to foreign exchange scarcity. The precise cause of this scarcity is, again, often the subject
of debate. Some argue that domestic policy weaknesses are responsible, namely excessive state expenditures and
excessive state intervention in the economy, leading to inflation, over-valued exchange rates and resulting perverse
incentives for imports, exports and capital flows. Others argue that it is the outcome of adverse global trends and
an inadequate system globally to deal with these trends, grafted onto an economic structure that is too externally
oriented in the first place.
Whatever the underlying causes, the fact is that, once in crisis, access to additional foreign exchange, in the form
of loans, debt-rescheduling or forgiveness, increased foreign private investment or further foreign aid, is now almost
always subject to the recipient government adopting an orthodox structural adjustment program. This is because the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (IBRD) are the only significant source of new loans for
most third world countries and they will lend only if economic policy is shaped to their liking in the form of an
approved structural adjustment program. Furthermore, other possible sources of external finance, such as banks,
aid agencies and export credit agencies, are increasingly tying their assistance, in the form of new flows or reduced
or delayed debt servicing, to the prior adoption of an IMFIIBRD structural adjustment program. This policy
conditionality is seen as a sensible precaution by creditors/donors to ensure sound use of their funds. By critics it
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is seen as a new form of dependency, an encroachment on national sovereignty, a form of 'heteronomy' or political
domination, since the ostensible freedom not to accept the finds, and therefore, the conditionality, is imaginary
given the lack of options for escaping the foreign exchange crisis.
2.1 Policies and Internal Impacts
The nature of orthodox adjustment policies is not static, but rather has changed over time in the light of experience
and, it must be stressed, in response to some of the earlier critiques. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the emphasis
was on a combination of stabilisation or demand restraint and on 'getting prices right'. By the mid 1980s it was
clear that a longer time horizon had to be built into these programs and that this required, among other things, more
money on easier terms, and longer repayment periods. It also meant not just moving from one to three year or
longer periods for policy formulation and implementation, but also a qualitative shift in policy emphasis. In recent
years the international institutions have emphasised the need for institutional reforms, for human resource
development, for more thoroughly detailed sectoral programs and policies, for assessing and dealing with some of
the social impacts of adjustment and poverty and, most recently, have issued strong statements on the need for
democracy and for reducing third world expenditures on arms.
Demand restraint is a major and on-going feature of adjustment programs; it figures most prominently in the early
days of adjustment when the need to address large imbalances is most pressing. It takes the form of a general
tightening of access to credit by both the public and private sectors, and a raising of real interest rates to reflect and
reinforce the resulting monetary contraction. This is designed to squeeze effective demand, thereby easing pressure
on import demand and on domestic resources. Reducing the credit requirements of government usually entails
cutting back real government spending, by diminishing the quality or quantity of services, by laying off staff, and
by reducing subsidies to consumers, producers, transporters, and state-owned enterprises. Raising taxes and
introducing user fees for state services are also common demand restraint features of adjustment programs. Wage
restraint, in effect leading to sharp falls in real wages if inflation is high, is also usually part of the policy package.
Finally, if devaluation is a feature of policy reform, this too can effectively reduce demand in the economy when
expenditures on imports are greatly in excess of receipts from exports, since the rise in price of foreign currency
will result in more local currency being withdrawn from circulation to finance the foreign exchange gap.
The main impact of devaluation, however, is on 'getting prices right' and it is only one, albeit a major one, of
several policy instruments designed to accomplish this. Along with the abolition or gradual erosion of the
administrative setting of prices and interest rates, changes in the exchange rate are designed to abolish black markets
and the rents which accrue to bureaucrats, black marketeers and others fortunate enough to be able to access
resources under conditions of scarcity. By introducing a price for foreign currency which more accurately reflects
its scarcity, it is argued, a more efficient allocation of resources and division of labour is achieved, which ought
to encourage those exporting goods, and make it less attractive for those using foreign exchange to import goods.
The gradual abolition of import controls and licensing and the rationalisation of protective import tariffs is designed
to reinforce exchange rate realignment.
Liberalisation of prices goes well beyond the exchange rate to encompass, as we have seen above, interest rate
reform and the reduction or abolition of subsidies and domestic price controls. The idea again is to allow market
forces a bigger role in setting prices and, hence, in resource allocation. The most common form of subsidies are
those on food which, according to the orthodoxy, result either in lower than optimal prices for the growing of food
or, where the subsidy does not affect producer prices, in final consumer product prices which are lower than those
which would be set by the market. Resource allocation or efficiency considerations, as well as the need to restrain
aggregate demand, lie behind subsidy removal. Similar justifications are used for reducing state intervention in the
formation of domestic prices generally, through price control and state monopolies over production or distribution
of goods.
Institutional reform has always been a feature of adjustment packages, but this aspect has been given greater
emphasis in recent years. Privatisation and reduced state ownership generally, have long characterised adjustment
policy, but the international financial institutions (IFIs) have experienced difficulty in persuading governments to
reduce state ownership as quickly as they would like. Of growing concern for the IFIs is the slowness of private
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foreign investment and of domestic savings to respond to reform, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Recent reform
packages have, therefore, contained measures to try to address these difficulties more directly. The institutional basis
of stubbornly high rates of inflation is also occupying the attention of the IFIs. Public sector management, human
resource development, tax policy and administration, financial sector reform and fairly detailed programs for reform
of key sectors of the economy, are now much more prominent than they used to be. These are all, transparently,
policy initiatives which can only be implemented successfiilly over the long haul, which is why it can be argued that
structural adjustment policy has now become synonymous with 'development' policy.
2.2 Critiques
A common critique of structural adjustment programs throughout much of the 1970s was that they caused great
hardship for certain sectors of the community, that they worsened income distribution, and that they were insensitive
to the suffering they caused to the poor and others. These critiques were never accepted by the IFIs, and the IMF
maintains to this day that the distributional impact of programs lies entirely within the policy domain of the
government receiving IMF credits. This is disingenuous as the Fund pronounces directly on wages, salaries, taxes,
producer and consumer prices. It has, however, offered in recent years to assist governments in assessing
distributional impacts. The World Bank has gone much further. In a number of countries it has set up living
standard surveys which will, over time, allow for a reasonably clear analysis of the social impact of policy reform.
The IBRD has also built on to the end of its programs provisions for 'mitigating' some of the social impacts of
adjustment. These take a variety of forms, but include employment creation projects or public works expenditures
for those laid off, redundancy payments, retraining incentives, and grants for ex-employees to set up small
businesses. Special measures are taken to bolster access to preventive health care (in the form, for instance, of funds
for purchasing essential drugs or subsidies for the poor), and to provide supplies to educational and social welfare.
Some programs provide food for work, targeted food subsidies, or nutritional programs aimed at the poor.
There are clear limits, however, to what can be accomplished in these efforts to 'mitigate' the impact of adjustment
or to alleviate poverty, be it induced by adjustment or not. The very objective of adjustment is radical redistribution
of incomes through the radical reorientation of the direction of economic policy.
In recent years the IFIs have begun stressing the need for recipients of assistance to introduce democratic, multi-
party political structures and to reduce expenditures on the military. There is no doubt that pressures from donors
contributed to political reform in Zambia, and the eventual ousting through the ballot box of UNIP which had ruled
since independence. The main pressure came, however, from ordinary Zambians, tired of economic crisis and the
government's attempts to deal with it by abolishing food subsidies. What remains to be seen, therefore, is whether
a democratically elected Zambian government can survive the implementation of the kind of drastic austerity being
demanded by the IFIs.
Before turning to look at how structural adjustment policies might affect the fisheries sector, it might be worth while
reviewing, very briefly, some of the main criticisms of the orthodoxy and the kind of alternative approach to which
they might give rise.
The main criticisms are that adjustment programs erode national sovereignty and push third world economies in a
particular ideological direction, which is both market oriented and private enterprise oriented. The result is to
undermine efforts at national self-reliance and, ironically, even at building a national private industrial sector, since
the orthodoxy presses for, and rewards, greater international integration. Critics argue that adjustment measures are
very blunt and give across-the-board price incentives to export promotion, without due regard for non-price
constraints on non-traditional exports such as manufactures. On the other hand, primary exports do tend to respond
well to price incentives, so much so that for some beverage commodities (coffee, cocoa and tea) and cotton, global
overproduction has resulted with consequent sharp falls in world export prices. Primary export growth has also been
associated with environmental damage as forests are cleared and mining operations expanded.
Often, adjustment programs fail to deal explicitly with food production, the assumption being that if prices are right,
the output will be there or the foreign exchange will be there to permit the purchase of food imports. Little regard
is paid to the possible impact of export promotion on domestic food supplies, or on the many non-price constraints,
beyond transport, impeding an expansion of food production. Gender issues are important here as reorientation of
24
production entails reorientation of family labour, often, it is claimed, at the expense of women. Critics also argue
that the emphasis on export promotion is based on short-run or static notions of efficiency and comparative
advantage, and is designed to re-integrate the third world into the global capitalist economy on traditional lines, with
them acting mainly as hewers of wood or drawers of water. This serves at the same time, of course, to underscore
the legitimacy of past debt obligations and to bind debtors even further with debt through structural adjustment
loans.
2.3 Atternative Programs
Alternative adjustment programs would put explicit emphasis on food security, would be more selective in promoting
exports, more sensitive to constraints on labour supply, especially to the burdens on women, and more mindful of
possible environmental implications. They would avoid large cuts in income or employment, and would be more
circumspect in reducing state involvement in the economy and in relying on uncontrolled market forces. The major
problem with this type of approach is that it will not receive support from the IFIs or official donors, and hence
has only been attempted in conditions of acute foreign exchange scarcity and, accordingly, with poor results.
2.4 The Record
At the same time, the record of orthodox programs is at best chequered. Jn the 1970s, middle income third world
countries which were export or oil producers, tended to do well after adjustment programs were introduced. For
poorer countries, the record of those with programs was not better than that of those without, and in some areas
was much worse.
The experience of the 1980s does not remove the ambiguity. In only a half of the countries with IMF/IBRD
adjustment programs did growth improve relative to countries without such programs. For nearly two thirds of
adjusting countries, the ratio of investment to GDP actually deteriorated, while for only a half of all such countries
did inflation and external debt burdens (debt/exports, debt servicing/exports) improve [IBRD, 1988, p.24]. Again,
improvements were greatest among exporters of manufactures, which showed improvements in seven of nine areas,
excepting inflation and investment. Differences were much less pronounced in poorer countries, and in highly
indebted poor countries the record of those without IMFIIBRD programs was actually slightly better than those with.
What remains unclear is what the record of those with programs would have been without a program. Furthermore,
the IMF/IBRD would argue that the poor performance of some countries with programs was due to inadequate
implementation by governments. It is apparent, though, that the difficulties involved in assessing performance, and
especially the counterfactual and the likely long-term effects of different approaches, renders it impossible to settle
the debate definitively by reference to empirical research. For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to note the
existence of the criticisms in expmining the adjustment record of the three countries under review since each of them
has been implementing orthodox, IMFIIBRD programs, in the period in question.
3 THE LIKELY IMPACT OF ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS ON THE FISHERIES SECTOR
A major gap in the literature, albeit one which is gradually being addressed, is the impact of structural adjustment
programs at the microeconomic or sectoral level. The fisheries sector is particularly neglected, in spite of its relative
importance in some countries, regions and localities in which adjustment programs are being implemented. Yet,
ultimately, the adjustment process can only be properly understood, with all its complex ramifications, by reference
to its workings at these levels. Conceptually, one can of course sketch out how it might possibly work in any given
sector, and this is the purpose of this section. How closely reality conforms to this sketch is a matter for empirical
research, although one should not underestimate the problems involved in collecting the data needed to test
theoretical hypotheses, especially in the artisanal fisheries sector.
On the demand side, one can hypothesise that adjustment programs are likely to affect both the absolute amount of
demand and its composition. To begin with, the austerity inherent in the earlier stabilisation phase is likely to
depress local commercial demand for fish, as urban incomes in particular are squeezed, and especially so if it entails
removing subsidies on consumer prices. On the other hand, direct consumption of fish by those working in the
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industry may rise, fall or remain unchanged in response to falling commercial sales, depending on how producers
react. They could keep production unchanged and either consume the increased surplus or try to offload even more
than previously at lower prices in an effort to recoup lost cash income. Alternatively, they could reduce output in
line with demand. Theory tells us little about the inter-relationship between own and commercial demand, but on
the purely commercial side, with less than completely elastic or inelastic supply, there will be both price and
production falls. Direct consumption of fish can be expected to rise also if more people enter the fishing sector in
response to declining opportunities elsewhere.
After the stabilisation phase has passed, and if the reforms are successful in restoring growth, then one can expect
local commercial demand for fish to rise.
There will be substitution effects of adjustment programs too. Local commercial and direct demand for fish will be
affected by changes in the relative prices of other forms of protein. The demand for the production of fish for export
can be expected to increase in response to devaluation and/or other export incentives, the degree to which it does
so depending on the elasticity of demand for different types of fish and the importance of non-price bathers to trade.
The ability to meet increases in demand depends first and foremost on the resource base, and it will be critical to
ascertain the impact of macro policy changes on the ability of fish stocks to reproduce themselves. Thereafter, the
supply response will be a function of the extent to which surplus capacity can be brought into use, including that
in labour effort, and the rate at which new capacity can be added. It will also depend, importantly, on the degree
to which exports are met from fish previously consumed locally. If the species exported are not usually consumed
by the local population, on account of price or taste, increased exports must come from greater effort or expanded
capacity. It would also be expected that new varieties of fish or fish products might be exported in response to price
and other incentives, as 'non-traditional' exports. Where products previously consumed locally are diverted to the
export market, new, cheaper, varieties of fish may enter into the local diet including, possibly, cheaper varieties
imported from abroad.
Supply will be affected by changes in the prices of inputs occasioned by adjustment policies. Devaluation will tend
to raise the official price of imports but the practical effect of this will depend upon the extent to which the fishers
were already buying on the black market, and on whether foreign suppliers respond by lowering foreign currency
prices (as the Japanese did in response to devaluation of the US dollar). Tariff and tax reform may also help offset
devaluation-induced cost increases. Real wages can be expected to fall in the earlier stages of adjustment, the
importance of this depending, of course, on the extent to which wage employment characterises the industry. The
local costs of inputs other than labour will also generally rise in line with the inflation rate, but at a lower rate than
import costs unless the black market and tariff reductions are significant. Where substitution is important, local
prices of fish will tend to keep pace with what can be earned in the export market. Interest costs of credit in the
formal sector, where available, will also tend to rise.
Where changes in the relative prices of inputs are significant, one would expect producers to respond by changing
technology, the relative use of capital and labour, and possibly the balance between local and imported goods. Of
particular importance would be any changes in total employment, in all segments of the industry from catching to
processing to marketing of the fish, as well as in the production of inputs. There may well also be significant shifts
in the gender composition of the labour force, in response to changes in supply and/or in industrial structure.
The ability of the fisheries sector to respond to increased demand may depend upon the accessibility of credit, in
terms of availability and cost, for the expansion of fixed or working capital. Credit restraint might frustrate the
attempt to expand production. Likewise, expansion may require access to foreign exchange. This might be
influenced by the abolition of import licensing, the introduction of retention schemes or the increased availability
of foreign aid or credit consequent upon the adoption of adjustment programs. In this connection, it will be
instructive to ascertain what has happened to investment in this sector since, as we have seen (section 2.4), there
appears to be a tendency for the overall rate of investment to fall under structural adjustment.
Adjustment programs are likely to alter the returns to different kinds of fishery, depending on their cost and market
structure. This may, in turn, lead to changes in industrial structure, in the relative importance of different types of
fisheries and especially in favour of those catering to the external market. It may favour foreign over local
ownership as the value of local assets is reduced in foreign exchange terms and as the availability of foreign capital
26
shifts the balance of corporate purchasing power. There may be reductions in the influence of state enterprises and
of state regulation. The relative influence of producers versus processors versus merchants may also change, and
this may have significance in terms of gender too.
Restraint on govermnent spending may adversely affect the ability of the state to regulate the fisheries sector, to
provide advice, extension services, subsidies, resource management training and credit. Such difficulties may or
may not be countered by the introduction of sectoral credits from aid agencies.
On the social side, structural adjustment programs might, in theory, adversely affect the diets of the local population
by making fish less affordable. The overall impact on fisheries communities will be a combination of positive
influences in terms of greater export opportunities, and negative influences in terms of greater competition from
industrial or foreign fleets for the limited resource, more people moving into artisanal fishing, and restraint on
health, education and other services provided by the state.
Finally, one can expect greater pressure on the resource base from adjustment programs. Greater demand for fish,
more people and firms fishing and a reduced ability to police the fisheries can be expected to lead to (further) over-
fishing. Enhanced export incentives may also put more pressure on sensitive coastal environments, through
competing resource use, pollution and greater coastal traffic. Questions of property rights may arise and their
resolution may have critical importance for those inhabiting or drawing their living from the coastline.
Clearly, it will be difficult to shed light on these many complex issues in an exercise built on reviewing available
information from secondary sources. On-the-spot observation over a period of time would be essential to provide
definitive answers. Even then, evaluating the impact of economic reform is never an easy matter, given the difficulty
of assigning causation in a situation in which more than merely macro policy is changing, and of ascertaining the
counterfactual ie what would have happened in the absence of an adjustment program. Nonetheless, this framework
will be useful in surveying what is known, what is ambiguous, and what must be the object of further research and,
inevitably, this will vary greatly from country to country, given the enormous variation in the quantity and quality
of published information.
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V CASE STUDY: SENEGAL
Senegal is located on the extreme west coast of Africa and has a land mass of 196,000 square kms. Of the
estimated 7.7 million people, 80 percent live along its 700 kms of coastline. As a member of the West Africa
Monetary Union, it shares the common currency CFA franc (FCFA) which is guaranteed by the French.
On independence in 1960, Senegal was relatively advanced compared to other West African States, with good
infrastructure, a diversified industrial sector and a pooi of educated personnel. It was, however, overwhelmingly
dependent on one commodity, groundnuts, for its export earnings.
Since Independence the government has been successful in diversifying the economy and its export base, so that
fish, phosphates, petroleum products (based on imported crude oil) and cotton now contribute significantly to
export earnings, accounting for over 45 percent of the total.
The principal domestic food item is millet, but the country is quite dependent upon imports of higher income
foods such as rice, wheat, etc. which accounted for almost one third of imports in 1985. Senegal relies heavily
on imports for capital goods, intermediate industrial inputs and, of course, petroleum. The availability of foreign
exchange and the weather are the two dominant influences on the performance of the economy.
1 THE ECONOMY IN THE 1970s
In the early 1970s an export boom in groundnuts and phosphates let to a rapid increase in growth of incomes
per capita. With the exception of 1973, when the economy was buffeted both by bad weather and the increase in
the price of oil, the economy expanded strongly to 1976.
Indeed, it is clear that it overexpanded, as domestic credit and money supply were allowed to rise rapidly as a
percentage of GDP and as inflation rose from 3.9 percent per annum in 1971 to almost 32 percent per annum in
1975. This was fuelled in part, by an almost 40 percent increase in real wages in that year as workers sought to
reverse several years of erosion in their living standards.
With a fixed exchange rate, the rapid increase in domestic inflation, at a rate far higher than that of industrial
country trading partners, led to the appreciation of the real exchange rate and, accordingly, a decline in
Senegal's competitiveness. This, combined with drought and a fall in the world price of groundnuts of 37
percent, resulted in an enormous drop in export earnings, from $667 million in 1977 to $402 million in 1978,
or by 40 percent. Imports, however, continued to rise so that the negative trade balance which had been reduced
to just over $100 million by 1977, reached $460 million by 1981. The gap was financed by borrowing from
both the private and public sectors abroad, and by increased flows of foreign aid. Foreign debt rose from
somewhere in the region of $150 million in 1970 to $1.5 billion by 1980. Foreign aid was in the region of $300
million per annum by the end of the 1970s and domestic savings were negative.



























2 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS AND THEIR IMPACT
In 1980 Senegal entered into a three year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with the IMF for SDR 184.8 million
and also obtained a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) from the World Bank. (This was a joint IDA credit for
SRD $22.9 million and World Bank loan for $30 million.) The aim of SAL I was to increase public savings,
raise the productivity of investments and the efficiency of the parastatal sector, improve incentives for
production and export, constrain urban consumption and reform agricultural institutions and policy.
The macroeconomic aims of the EFF and the SAL I were to achieve a 4 percent p.a. growth, to reduce the
current account deficit from 15.6 percent GDP to 6.7 percent by 1985, to raise net public savings from 15
percent of public investment to 25 percent, and to raise the rate of investment from 16 to 18 percent of GDP.
While some progress was made in terms of raising incentives and efficiency and reducing price distortions, both
the EFF and the SAL agreements were cancelled because the macro economic targets were not met and because
the pace of reform in agriculture was considered deficient. The main causes of the macro failure were disastrous
weather and groundnut/food harvests in 1980-8 1 and completely over-optimistic forecasts of world prices,
especially those for groundnuts. Since the government had raised local groundnut prices considerably in line
with these forecasts, when world prices fell the budget went into massive deficit. The consensus is that SAL 1
tried to do too much in too short a time. Furthermore, no provision was made for contingencies. In any event,
Senegal could still, at that time, obtain some concessional funds without conditionality so the commitment to the
program was, at best, lukewarm.
Under pressure from creditors, especially France, however, Senegal reopened negotiations with the IMF and
successfully completed a standby arrangement in 198 1/82 and negotiated another in 1982/83. This latter
collapsed under political pressure as the 1983 elections were nearing. Relations with the Fund were restored
after the elections and Senegal has had a series of arrangements with the IMF since then. The macro economy
went from boom to bust between 1982 and 1984 as exports rose sharply and then dropped. Inflation began to
rise, GDP fell and the fiscal deficit deteriorated to over 8 percent of GDP. At this point a new agreement for a
SAl was reached with the IBRD for $70 million, followed in 1987 by SAL Ill (SDR 40 million) and in 1990
by SAL IV ($84.4 million).
Senegal can be said, therefore, to have been implementing stabilization programs since 1983 but these were
dwarfed by fluctuations induced by the weather and world markets. Structural adjustment proper did not begin
until 1985 when the government launched its PAML (Medium to Long Term Adjustment Plan).
The objectives of SAL II were to raise GDP growth to 3.4 percent per annum between 1986-90, to achieve
export growth of 5.1 percent per annum, to raise the ratio of domestic savings to GDP from 1 percent to 10.7
percent, and the investment ratio from 13 to 17.3 percent GDP. The debt service ratio was to be reduced to 20
percent by 1990 from an estimated 31 percent in 1987 and the share of external debt in GDP to 66 percent (it
was 106 percent in 1985).
SAL II contained 46 wide-ranging conditions but focused mainly on accelerating growth and improving public
sector management. Unusual in structural adjustment agreements at that time, rather than stressing agricultural
reform generally [see IBRD 1988, esp p. 49 and 50], explicit emphasis was put on improving food self
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sufficiency. This was to be achieved by greater incentives to produce cereals, increasing the prices of imported
food, liberalising food marketing and improving production potential.
Returns to groundnut producers were also to be increased, the marketing of inputs and output was to be
liberalized, and government financial support reduced. In the industrial sector, price controls were to be
eliminated and tariffs and subsidies reduced and rationalized. In the state sector the budget process was to be
reformed, state enterprises rationalized or privatised and steps taken to reduce spending and to raise revenue.
SAP II was considered to be successflul, although it is generally acknowledged that the external environment -
especially favourable weather conditions but also reduced oil import prices - was very propitious, making it
difficult to assess the precise contribution of the program to improved economic performance Nonetheless,
growth targets were exceeded over the three year period, the rate of inflation was cut back to 4.3 percent per
annum, the fiscal deficit was reduced from over 8 percent to 2.6 percent GDP, largely by cutting back
government spending, and the current account balance of payments was also reduced significantly as a
percentage of GDP.
SAP III was designed to consolidate these achievements and had the objectives of bringing inflation down to 3.4
percent per annum by 1990, maintaining a growth rate of GDP of 3.9 percent per annum, and reducing the
external current account deficit to 7.3 percent of GDP. It contained a mammoth 77 provisions touching most
aspects of government policy. The principal ones were promotion of the private sector, reduction of the role of
the state in direct production activities, and measures to enhance efficiency through price and other incentives.
Accomplishments under SAL III were mixed. Growth was strong in 1988 but bad weather resulted in a fall in
GDP in 1989. The rate of inflation has fallen almost to zero and the current account imbalance in dollar terms
was about $100 million per annum less in 1989 than at the beginning of the adjustment programs.
SAL IV was introduced in 1990 and is putting greater emphasis on export promotion and labour market reform.
What about the social impact of adjustment? Pre-adjustment progress in several areas appears to have been
maintained. Infant mortality rates have improved steadily from 167 per 1,000 live births in 1968 to 120 in 1975
and 87 in 1990. Nevertheless, infant-juvenile (before age five) mortality rates remain exceptionally high at 189
per 1,000 [UNDP, 1991]. The death rate has improved since 1981 from 18.5 to 14 per 1,000 in 1990. During
this same time period the birth rate has dropped from 46.1 per 1,000 to 44 and the literacy rate has almost
tripled from 12 percent of the population to 32 percent in 1986 [Ibid].
How then, did the extreme austerity of the program in Senegal show itself? Where were the effects of the
cutbacks felt the most? Berg (1990] argues that they did not fall especially heavily on the poor because the
imposed conditions forced an increase in the efficiency of resource use and therefore actually benefitted the
poor. What he neglects to consider is that the increased efficiency of resource use forced primary schools to
introduce mixed grade classes and double shifts, cutting class time in half for most of the students and, in health
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In both health care and education, expenditures had been steady from 1980 to 1984 but successive annual cuts
have seen expenditure levels on education in 1989 fall to 75 percent of the 1984 levels. Per capita expenditures
on health fell to 60 percent of the 1979-8 1 levels which were in turn 30 percent lower than the 1970 levels. In















There has been no increase in formal employment since the early 1980s and in recent years there have been
attempts to lay off public sector employees. Formal employment, at 200,000 or so, is in any case quite small.
An estimated 45,000 or so new entrants join the urban labour market each year with few prospects. In 1988,
there were riots prompted by the adjustment program and this led rapidly to a $50 million job creation program
in 1989, designed to create 60,000 - 70,000 jobs by 1992. Real wages have fallen significantly over the last ten
years, the minimum wage has been unchanged since 1985, and urban incomes are estimated to have fallen by 13
percent since 1980.
In his critical assessment of the reform program in Senegal, Berg argues that there has been little structural or
institutional reform to suggest stronger growth might result in future. At the same time there is growing
scepticism about the wisdom and efficacy of market oriented reform. He puts the indifferent record of
implementation down to excessive foreign assistance, now totalling some $600 million per annum. This is about
the same as export earnings; it finances all the state capital budget and is not much less than total government
revenues. Foreign debt has also continued to rise, to $4.1 billion or 93 percent of GDP in 1989. This easy
access to foreign resources, according to Berg, prevents more serious efforts at structural reform. It also
mortgages the future.
3 THE FISHERIES SECTOR
Senegal enjoys a rich fisheries resource by virtue of its long coastline (over 700 kilometres), its location on an
important continental shelf and at the confluence of major, nutrient-rich, sea currents. It has good port and
repair facilities and a population long-skilled in fishing.
As a result fishing is extremely important in the economy of Senegal, in terms of foreign exchange earning,
employment and consumption. In 1988 fish exports were the largest single earner of foreign exchange, bringing
in $183 million or 30 percent of total commodity export earnings. An estimated 175,000 people earn their
living, directly or indirectly, from the fishing industry and fish is an important source of protein in the daily diet
of the people of Senegal. The fisheries sector has also been one of the most rapidly growing since independence
and Senegal is now Africa's third most important fish producer.
There are two main fishing seasons, the less productive May to November season when warm water currents
from the Gulf of Guinea move towards Senegal reducing the catches and from November to April when the up-
welling of cold water currents, rich in nutrient salts, bring with them an abundance of fish stocks.
The fishing industry can be split clearly between the artisanal, or small scale, sector and the industrial sector.
Aquaculture, including shrimp and oyster farming, has had little success in Senegal and is immaterial in terms
of production volumes.
3.1 The Artisanal Sector
The artisanal fishery accounts for 70 percent of the total fish catch, 52 percent of the commercial value of fish
harvests, and employs directly almost 48,000 fishers. The catching of fish is essentially a male occupation,
while traditional processing and marketing, thought to employ perhaps another 150,000 people, is undertaken
essentially by women [UNECA 1984].
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3.1.1 Catching Fish
The means of production include motorized and non-motorized pirogues equipped withhandlines, a variety of
traditional nets or with (expensive) modem ring-nets. In general artisanal fishers own their boat and equipment
directly except in the case of the ring-nets which are likely to be owned by a fish buyer or a retired civil
servant. In the latter case the ring-net owner controls the fishers catch and gets 33 percent of the value of the
catch to cover the use of the ring-net. Artisanal fishing is restricted to, and has a monopoly of fishing in, a zone
located within 6 miles of shore.
The average total artisanal catch for 1987 to 1989 was 238,000 MT, a significant increase over the 1981-86
average of 156,000 MT, but still significantly lower than the 1974-76 average of 272,000 MT. The catch is
expected to stabilize at current levels. Most of the fish caught in this sector are sardines and other coastal
pelagic species such as mackerel, but about 16 percent are demersal (sole, mullet, turbot, etc.). Long term
growth has been achieved through the motorization program. From 1972 to 1988 CAMP (Centre Assistance a la
Motorization des Pirogues) financed a total of 6,705 motors and parts for them. As well, the introduction of the
ring-nets resulted in a greater catch with much of the additional supply absorbed by the traditional processors
and the fish meal plants.
Despite these recent innovations, the artisanal sector continues to be characterized by relatively simple
technology and high value added (11 billion FCFA in 1987 or 314,000 per fisher). The cost of creating a job is
22 times lower than in the industrial sector and is estimated at 200,000 FCFA [CNPSP, 1989].
The majority of artisanal fishers are located in the regions of Zuiguincho, (33 percent), Thiès, close to Dakar
(26 percent), and Dakar itself (25 percent). Thiès, however, accounts for two thirds of the catch and Dakar for
17 percent by volume and 34 percent and 43 percent respectively by value, suggesting a much higher average
value of fish landed in Dakar [ONUDI, 1990 p. 12].
3.1.2 Processing the Catch
Artisanal processing includes drying, salting and drying, searing and more recently, smoking. The techniques
used remain little changed since the 1950s. The sector is characterized by the lack of effective preservation
methods and storage facilities, hence it is subject to climatic conditions, insects and theft. Storage facilities, for
example, would enable the processors to store their finished product until the rainy season and thereby
command better prices. Some attempts have been made to set up cold storage depots, with foreign assistance,
but these have been plagued by high operating costs and maintenance difficulties [ONUDI, 1990, p. 30] and by
inadequate revenue sources, [Brainerd, 1984], raising serious questions about their viability.
The margins of processors are generally slim and hence they do not have the financial resources to shift to other
technologies. The vast majority of processors are women who, in turn, hire a small, predominantly male work
force on a daily basis. In the past the processor was often a fisher's wife who would take responsibility for
selling her husband's catch and processing whatever could not be sold fresh. With the advent of the more
expensive ring-nets, buyers often own the fishers' catch, selling whatever they can fresh and then in turn selling
what remains back to the fishermen's wives for processing. Fish traders sell the fish in local markets, go door
to door, or sell to state-approved fish mongers (some of whom are also women) for distribution inland.
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In recent years the processors and fishermen have begun to organize into GIEs (Groupement d'Intrêt
Economique) in order to access credit through the CNCAS, (la Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole SénCgalais).
Women processors have quickly proven to be the best clients with a near perfect repayment record.
3.2 The IndustriaJ Sector
The industrial sector accounts for 30 percent of recorded fish production by volume, for 52 percent of the value
of fish landed, and for almost all the exports of fish from Senegal. It employs about 10,000 people directly.
The industrial fishing fleet consisted of 220 trawlers, 59 tuna vessels and 9 sardine boats in 1989. The majority
of these were owned by Senegalese but 81 trawlers were foreign owned. The average age of the domestic fleet
was 22 years.
In 1989 a total of 102,000 tonnes of fish were caught by the industrial sector. Of this, trawlers landed 55,000
tonnes (54 percent), sardine boats 13,200 (13 percent) and tuna boats 33,636 (33 percent). The trawler catch
consists essentially of demersal species (white shrimp, hake, sole, etc.) and also of cephalopods (cuttlefish,
squid and octopus).
The industrial sector consists also of processing plants, fish meal plants and refrigerated storage units. This
sector is plagued by numerous problems including lack of adequate supply, high proportion of low value fish,
absence of credit facilities, high labour costs, high input costs, an aging fleet, low value added and plants
operating with excess capacity and requiring major upgrading.
The processing facilities in 1987 included 40 shrimp and fresh fish processing plants, 2 tuna processing plants, 2
fish meal plants and 3 refrigerated storage units. Indications are that a minimum of ten processing plants have
closed down since 1983 and those that remain are all operating at 40 to 50 percent of their rated capacities.
Production costs continue to rise while export prices remain static or are dropping. Employment levels have
steadily dropped since the 1980s. A typical processing plant would have a ratio of women to men ranging from
1:1 to 2:1 depending on the size of the plant.
Exporters are on their own when it comes to selling their product; there is no common marketing board or
group effort. Exporters are not allowed to retain any of their foreign currency earnings; all must be converted
domestically. Almost all of the industrial catch is destined for export markets.
Fish imports consist of a small amount of canned low value mackerel from Thailand (about 300 tonnes valued at
less than $500,000) for domestic consumption but the overwhelming majority of imports (98%) are for fish
processing and take the form of fresh and frozen tuna. In 1987, the tuna processing plants purchased two thirds
of their raw materials from foreign vessels. These vessels are either owned by members of the EEC who pay a
flat fee (3.25 billion FCFA in 1986-87) in addition to the fee based on reported volumes and boat size (261
million FCFA in 1986-87) paid by all foreign vessels. As well, EEC members contribute research grants (90
million FCFA) while all foreign vessels combined spend 1.5 billion FCFA in salaries and 800 million FCFA in
repair and maintenance costs in Senegal.
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3.3 Fish as Food
Millet, rice, fish and groundnuts are the basic foods in Senegal. The "thi6bou dienne" (rice and fish) is a
national dish eaten daily by the majority of the population. The 1989 per capita consumption of fish was 28 kg
nationally with wide fluctuations depending on geographical location - 39 kg in Dakar and 0.2 kg in Kolda in
the Southern interior [Republique du Senegal, August 1991, p. 25]. In the interior, rice is substituted by millet
(and nidbé) while lower fish consumption is made up by consuming more cereals and vegetables. In general,
very little meat, fruit, vegetables and milk products are consumed. A study by Mathilde (1988) has shown that
80 percent of all animal protein consumed in Senegal comes from fish and this seems to be due to traditional
eating habits, proximity to good fishing areas and difficulties with cattle farming due to long term drought.
3.4 The Interconnections Between Sectors
The structure of the whole industry is captured neatly, in all its complexity, in Chart V 1 by Foucault and
Chabond. The first column reflects the relative importance of artisanal fishers, sardine boats, trawlers with ice-
boxes, the more modern freezer trawlers, and local and foreign tuna boats.
The artisanal catch reaches the market by three routes: a small amount goes directly, 27 percent goes through
artisanal and then wholesale processors, and the bulk is marketed in the form of fresh fish by wholesalers. Just
short of 20,000 tonnes of the artisanal and sardine boat catch, or 8 percent, passes through factories for
filletings, freezing and export, but on the whole, the artisanal sector is tightly integrated into the local market.
All of the catch of freezer trawlers and two thirds of the catch of ice box trawlers is exported directly without
further processing. The other third of the ice box trawler catch joins the off-take of the artisanal sector for
filleting and freezing in local factories before export.
Tuna boats channel their catch through local factories for canning and then export.
Just over one half of all exports by weight (including almost all tuna and fresh fish) are exported to Europe, 38
percent to Africa and 9 percent to Asia. Fresh and frozen fish account for about 44 percent of exports by value
(two thirds by weight), crustaceans and mulluscs for 36 percent (13 percent by weight) and canned fish for 17
percent (16 percent).
3.5 Development of the Fisheries Sector to 1982
Artisanal fishing output peaked in 1975 at 278,400 tonnes and the number of fishers at 49,000 in 1976.
Thereafter, production and the number of fishers declined sharply to 141,000 tonnes in 1982 and to 32,000
fishers in 1981. These represented falls of almost 50 percent and 32 percent respectively, with the average catch
per fisher falling by 23 percent (see Table V 2).
The output of industrial fishing follows a different pattern, peaking in 1981 at 161,625 tonnes, up by some
90,000 tonnes since the mid 1970s. This increase was the result, however, of increased catches by foreign ships
and the catches of Senegalese boats, in comparison, declined steadily between 1977 and 1980.
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Table V 2 Fish Production in Senegal, 1973 - 1982
Source: Department of Oceanography and Maritime Fisheries.
Production patterns are closely interrelated. Foreign fleets over-fished pelagic species and out competed local
fishers, both artisanal and industrial. Increased energy costs and outmoded equipment impeded local fishers,
especially the industrial ones, while artisanal fishers confronted difficulties in obtaining wood for canoes and
spare parts and supplies for motors. They also faced a deteriorating local market as real incomes fell. Indeed,
per capita consumption of fish in Senegal is estimated to have fallen by 25 percent between 1977 and 1982
[ONUDI, 1990, p. 35]. The artisanal catch fell steadily as a percentage of the total, from 75 percent in 1973 to
55 percent in 1980.
Because it is the industrial sector which essentially supplies fish for export, net foreign exchange earnings from
fish continued to rise to 1982, as shown in Table V 3.
Net exports rose by $84 million (163 percent) over this period. Imports of fish represent fish such as tuna
purchased by local canners from foreign boats for canning and re-export. These fell sharply in 1982 as local
production rose.
The industrial infrastructure was developed over a number of years through combined government, foreign and
financial institution investment most of which came to an abrupt end in the early 1980s. From 1973 to 1975
three refrigeration units were installed, in 1978 a fish meal plant, from 1978 to 1983 five more refrigeration
units, and between 1981 and 1983 three buying centres. All these investments were made with foreign money
largely from Japan, Denmark, Canada and France.
Proport ions






1973 76,558 227,261 303,819 25% 75% 100%
1974 84,225 262,813 347,038 24% 76% 100%
1975 74,168 278,433 352,601. 21% 79% 100%
1976 74,211 276,259 350,470 21% 79% 100%
1977 52,073 77,811 211,082 340,966 15% 23% 62% 100%
1978 51,657 74,909 225,850 352,416 15% 21% 64% 100%
1979 48,273 66,082 187,769 302,124 16% 22% 62% 100%
1980 43,636 117,989 196,807 358,432 12% 33% 55% 100%
1981 52,359 28,430 147,723 228,512 23% 12% 65% 100%

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table V 3 Exports and Imports of Fish and Fish Products 1977-1983
In 1982 a number of bilateral agreements expired and, thereafter, recorded landings of fish by the industrial
sector and export earnings, fell sharply. Thus, by the early 1980s, as adjustment efforts were being attempted,
both sectors of the fishing industry, industrial and artisanal, were experiencing severe problems.
A word of warning is in order here, though. Data quality for the 1970s is acknowledged to be poor. More
recent data is felt to be more reliable but this means that trend developments over the two decades must be
treated cautiously.
4 DEVELOPMENT OF THE FISHERIES SECTOR UNDER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
4.1 General
Between 1981 and 1989 fish production in Senegal increased by over 50 percent so that at the end of the decade
production was approaching the levels attained in the latter half of the 1970s (Table V 4). Growth rates were
high in all years and especially 1984, 1986 and 1987. By the end of the decade, however, production growth
had slowed down.
Output grew much faster in the artisanal sector than in the industrial sector, so that over the period the artisanal
catch increased by 65 percent, the industrial by only 26 percent. Most of the industrial growth was accounted
for by foreign ships, while the output of local industrial vessels rose sharply in 1982 and 1983, but has fallen
steadily, by 25 percent, since then. The net result of this is that the share of the catch accounted for by artisanal
fishers rose from 57 percent in 1983 to 71 percent in 1989, while that by local industrial fishers fell from 31
percent to 17 percent.
YEAR EXPORTS IMPORTS NET EXPORTS
in millions of dollars
1977 63.4 11.9 51.5
1978 75.5 15.6 59.9
1979 93.1 12.4 80.7
1980 103.7 20.6 83.1
1981 105.7 23.2 82.5
1982 148.0 13.1 134.9
1983 138.0 21.1 116.9
Source: FAO Fisheries Yearbook, 1987.
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Table V 4 Fish Production in Senegal, 1982 - 1989
Proportions
YEAR INDUSTRIAL ARTISANAL TOTAL INDUSTRIAL ARTISANAL TOTAL
foreign domestic foreign
000 tonnes growth percentages
p.a.



















1991 1982 1983 1994 1985 1986 1987 1998 1989
A,t1.anaI Indtr-II
Fish and fish products were also the most rapidly growing export commodities, rising from $106 million in
1981 to between $330 million and $361 million in 1989. Net export earnings in dollars rose perhaps as much as
fourfold over this period (Table V 5). As a result, while fish accounted for 19 percent of commodity exports at
the beginning of the decade, at the end they accounted for about 30 percent. There is some question about how











28,430 147,723 228,512 6.3% 23% 12% 65% 100%
35,800 140,731 242,755 6.3% 27% 15% 58% 100%
30,788 143,180 251,181 3.5% 31% 12% 57% 100%
38,091 164,408 267,834 6.7% 24% 14% 61% 100%
40,302 168,751 277,461 3.6% 25% 15% 61% 100%
36,392 202,137 297,060 7.1% 20% 12% 68% 100%
42,316 231,810 331,098 11.5% 17% 13% 70% 100%
53,298 237,020 335,759 1.5% 14% 16% 71% 100%
43,822 243,507 345,387 2.9% 17% 13% 71% 100%
of FCFA 100,513 million published by the Ministry of Fisheries in Senegal [August 1991] and is somewhat
lower. This does not detract significantly from the growing contribution of the fisheries sector to foreign
exchange earnings but it is more in keeping with interviews held in Senegal suggesting that export prices had
fallen in the last two or three years.
Table V 5 Exports and Imports of Fish and Fish Products 1981-89
* FAO estimate.
** Our estimate.
The share of the fishing industry in GDP has risen from 2.0 percent in 1982 to 2.4 percent in 1988. These
figures do not cover fish processing or marketing however, and hence grossly understate the importance of the
fisheries sector. Using estimates by Brendel, Chaboud and Foucault (1991), value added by the whole sector in
1987 was close to FCFA1 17,000 million which was approximately 8.6 percent of GDP in that year. This was
broken down as follows:
It can be seen that marketing and transport of fish dominated value added in this sector, accounting for 42
percent of the total, direct production for 28 percent, inputs for 18.5 percent and processing for only 2.7
percent.
4.2 The Artisanal Sector
In explaining trends in the industry, one must be cautious because of the poor quality of the data. In the
artisanal sector, for instance, there are sharp fluctuations in numbers of canoes employed and at least three
incompatible time series for the Fleet (Republique du Senegal, August 1991, p. 14; ONUDI, 1990, p. 15; and
CNPSF, 1989, p. 6). In what follows the latest time series is used except for non-motorized canoes in 1984 and
1985 for which the figures appear unreliable. They show a sharp rise in 1984 followed by a drop of almost 45
percent in 1985, said to be caused by ageing of canoes and problems in securing wood locally to replace them.
This was not accompanied, however, by any fall in number of people fishing; on the contrary, the numbers are
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YEAR EXPORTS IMPORTS NET EXPORTS
1981 105.7 23.2 82.5
1982 148.0 13.1 134.9
1983 138.0 21.1 116.9
1984 142.1 16.5 125.6
1985 166.2 19.5 146.7
1986 259.1 18.6 240.5
1987 318.0 18.9 299.1
1988 325.1* 36.2 288.9*
1989 360.6** 36.6* 324.0*
1989 330.6** 36.6* 294.O**
Source: FAO Fisheries Yearbook, vol 69, 1990.
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reported to have risen (Table V 7). For these years, therefore, we use the ONUDI figures which seem more
reasonable. All of the time series data for artisanal canoes suggest, however, that the number of motorized
canoes fell sharply between 1982 and 1986. This was the time when the availability of motors, spare parts and
supplies became a critical problem as export and import volumes fell and as external debt servicing grew more
burdensome. Shortages of suitable wood, which has had to be imported from increasingly further afield,
reduced the supply of both motorized and non-motorized canoes.
Since 1985, however, a steady increase is reported in numbers of canoes, in the number and percentage of those
motorized, and in the commercial value of the catch. The number of artisanal fishers has risen in all years since
1984 except 1988 and is now approaching the peak reached in 1976 (49,000).
Productivity per canoe and per fisher both fell significantly in the early 1980s, reflecting the problems discussed
in the previous section. Since 1983, however, there has been a steady increase in both, to 1988.
This appears to be the result of a number of factors. The intense competition with the industrial sector eased
after the early 1980s and during the decade the inshore fishing limit, within which industrial fishers are not
allowed to operate, was raised from 3 to 6 miles from shore. The number of motorized canoes rose by one third
between the early and the late 1980s, enabling more intensive fishing and longer expeditions, reportedly not
confined to the inshore limit. Earlier problems of spare parts and supplies were resolved both by ingenuity on
the part of fishers in securing them in neighbouring countries, and by CAMP becoming more organized. The
wood supply problem seems also to have been solved. Finally, the more widespread use of purse seine or ring
nets has also been an important contributory factor.
Table V 6 Direct and Indirect Contribution
1987
to GDP by the Fisheries Sector,
CFA m % GDP
Artisanal fishing 21,252 1.55
Trawlers 7,745 0.56
Tuna boats 4,325 0.31
Fresh fish marketing, wholesale 14,391 1.05
Processed fish marketing 7,799 0.57
Artisanal processing 1,184 0.09
Filleting, freezing &
canning factories 1,947 0.14
Export marketing 12,380 0.90
Supplies & services 13,141 0.95
Retailers 13,133 0 95
Transport 2,186 0.16




Table V 7 The Artisanal Fishery: Boats, Motors, Fishers and Value of Output
1980-1989.
Source: ONUDI, 1990 and CNPSF, 1989.
Table V 8 The Artisanal Fishery: Some Measures of Productivity
commercial
output output value of
year per canoe per fisher catch
(tons) (tons) (a) per canoe (b) per fisher (C) per ton
Source: Our calculations and sources in Tables V 4 and V7.
The attractiveness of adopting motorized canoes and purse seines has been demonstrated by Brainerd [1984],














1982 15.4 4.2 1,573 431.2 101.9
1983 16.8 3.5 1,694 357.4 101.1
1984 20.1 4.1 1,925 394.9 95.6
1985 25.4 4.0 2,576 409.4 101.3
1986 26.5 4.6 2,813 491.6 106.1
1987 27.1 5.0 2,722 506.4 100.5
1988 27.5 5.2 2,765 527.4 100.6














1980 8,485 54.4 30,707
1981 9,111 54.1 31,725 --
1982 9,125 52.6 33,280 14,351
1983 8,545 62.2 40,500 14,475
1984 8,176 63.2 39,839 15,731
1985 6,640 54.9 41,770 17,100
1986 7,621 63.0 43,614 21,441
1987 8,561 68.1 46,021 23,304
1988 8,623 72.0 45,217 23,848
1989 10,005 64.2 47,761 24,935
45
3,936,000 by both motorization and the purse seine or ring net. Income per fisher increased by FCFA 39,000
per annum with motorization and by FCFA 218,000 per annum with both motorization and purse seine.
In spite of recent improvements, productivity levels remain well below those of the late 1970s however, and in
1989 appear to have dipped a little, which is one reason why observers feel the artisanal industry has probably
reached its maximum size.
It is interesting to note that the commercial value of the catch per canoe rose steadily to 1986 but has been
falling since then, suggesting diminishing returns. The commercial value per worker rose significantly (from
1983 to 1988) but fell off in 1989. These trends had less to do with the average value of the catch per tonne
than with changes in the productivity per canoe and per fisher.
There have been several studies of the cost structure and profitability of the artisanal fishing industry, from
1975/77 [Brainerd, 19841 to 1987 [ONUDI, 19901. Comparisons are fraught with danger, but Table V 9, if
valid, reveals some interesting developments in the artisanal fishing sector over the decade covered by the data.
The most striking development is that variable costs have more than doubled. Most of the increase is accounted
for by fuel, the price of which rose from 55 FCFA to 170 FCFA per litre. The use of fuel has also obviously
increased as the distance to the resource has lengthened. Wage costs increased by 16 percent and repairs and
maintenance by 93 percent.
While the average catch per boat and the landed price of fish were both higher in 1987, this was more than
offset by cost increases so that net revenue actually fell over the period. Once inflation is allowed for, the fall
was substantial, amounting to approximately two thirds. Yet profits remain high even as a percentage of total
fixed and working capital and earnings from fishing are reported to be much higher than in agriculture
[Chauveau and Samba, 19881.
These declining returns are echoed in Table V 10 for the commercial value of artisanal fish per tonne in
constant 1982 prices. These show a decline of one third over the period suggesting that the large expansion in
the output of artisanal fishermen (due largely to a 20% increase in the number of fishers between 1985 and
1989) has been responsible for a fall in the real/relative price of fish. Fishers may, indeed, have attempted to
raise their catch in recognition of this trend in order to try to stabilize their income.
Improved productivity per canoe has helped maintain the real value of the catch per canoe above 1982/84 lows.
The real value of the catch per fisher has improved since 1985 but remains well below that of 1982.
A common complaint in the artisans! sector is that it lacks ready access to credit on reasonable terms. The
absence of such facilities has been responsible for buyers and others providing such expensive capital items as
boats, motors and, especially, ring nets. This then gives these non-fishers a claim to the catch. In the case of
fishers using traditional nets, net revenue would usually be distributed as follows: one quarter-boat owner, one
quarter-motor owner, one quarter-net owner and one quarter-shared equally among the hired hands. For fishers
using ring nets (two boats and two motors are needed), net revenue would be distributed as follows: one third-
ring net owner, two fifteens-each boat owner, two fifteens-each motor owner,and two fifteens-shared equally
among the crew (normally 28 people)!
Source: 1975/77 Brainerd, 1984
1987 ONUDI, 1990.
The financing of ring nets by buyers, however, has further implications for industrial organization. Whereas
traditionally, the fisher's wife would be responsible for selling the fresh catch and processing/selling any fish
not sold fresh, the buyer now controls the catch and the fisher's wife has to buy from the buyer at a higher
price. Financing of ring nets has secured the status of buyers and has, reportedly, reduced the net earnings of
the women involved in buying and processing, although it was impossible to confirm this.
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Table V 9 Annual Production Costs and Revenues for Motorized Purse Seine











Variable Costs: 6,307 13,764
Fuel & lubricant 902 7,054
Labour 4,805 5,550
Repairs & maintenance 600 1,160
Total Costs 7,374 15,517
Total Catch 542.80 tonnes 625.00 tonnes
Average Total Cost 13.59 24.83
Average Variable Cost 11.62 22.02
Total Revenue 15,318 21,875
Average Revenue 28.22 35.00
Net Revenue 7,944 6,358
Gross return (a) on Capital Invested 199% 110%
(b) on Total Capital (fixed & working) 77% 32.5%
Real Value of Real Value
CPI FCFA per Real Commercial Catch per of catch
Year Index Tonne Value er tonne Canoe per fisher
Source: Authors' calculations.
As mentioned earlier, processors are beginning to organize into GIEs and especially since 1988 with the
establishment of several artisanal fisheries development projects. Pro-Pêche (to which CIDA contributes $14
million and the Canada-Sénégal Counterpart fund $3 million) consists of two components. ATEPAS seeks to
improve fishing and processing equipment, techniques, organization, efficiency and profitability. Servi-Pêche is
designed to encourage 1auto-development among groups, facilitating credit and encouraging savings, and by
offering a range of technical assistance. Through the efforts of Pro-Pêche/Servi-Pêche, Ia Caisse Nationale de
Cr&iit Agricole Sénégalais was persuaded to lend money to two fisheries development projects, PALMEZ and
PAPEC, in 1988. The first formal credit to this sector in over 5 years, these were guaranteed by the African
Development Bank but repayment was abysmal. Since then Pro-peche has provided guarantees and draws on its
technical assistance capacity to support the credit process. By October 1991, 262 loans had been made for
FCFA 339 million, for equipment for fishers, processors, buyers and retailers and for working capital for
processors, retailers and buyers only. The loans are for 18 to 24 months; FCFA 140 million has already been
repaid but of the FCFA 198 million outstanding, 105 million is in arrears.
Given the small size and short maturity of the loans, it is clear that they are not being used for purchasing boats
or ring nets, so they do not address the problem of long term capital. Neither do they address the very short
term, one day to one month credit needs of the industry, especially those of fishers, who continue therefore to
use informal credit supplies, usually from merchants, and reportedly often at exorbitant interest rates.
Nonetheless, the Pro-Pêche initiative is important, especially for groups of women processors. Also, as
Chaboud and Kebe [1989] have pointed out, fishers may continue to rely on informal sources of credit for
working capital, even if a suitable moderzf source is made available, for complex social reasons of stability
and reciprocity.
The government grants tax exemptions on gas and other imports used by the artisanal sector.
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Table V 10 Commercial Value of the Artisana]. Catch in Real Terms (1982)
('000 1982 FCFA)
1982 100 101.9 101.9 1,573 431.2
1983 111.6 101.1 91.4 1,518 320.3
1984 124.8 95.6 76.7 1,543 316.5
1985 140.9 101.3 71.9 1,828 290.6
1986 150.0 106.1 70.8 1,875 327.8
1987 156.5 100.5 64.3 1,739 323.6
1988 156.5 100.6 64.3 1,767 337.0
1989 153.4 102.4 66.8 1,625 340.4
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4.3 The Industrial Fishery
Since the large drop in 1980/81, industrial output has remained reasonably stable in the 100,000 ton range. The
composition of output has changed, however. Both the trawler catch and the output of tuna recovered strongly to
1985. This was explained in both cases by a significant increase in the catch per boat over 1981 levels. Since
1985 the trawler catch has fallen, even as the number of trawlers has increased, so that the average catch per
trawler has declined by one third since 1985. The pattern for tuna is not dissimilar, the number of boats being
28 percent higher in 1989 than in 1985, the catch 9 percent lower and the average catch 29 percent lower. The
tuna figures are, however, more erratic with output for the decade peaking in 1987/8 (Table V 11).
Table V 11 The IrxkstriaL Fishery: Boats, Catch wid Catch per Boat
Source: Repubtique du SenegaL, Aot 1991 and our calcuLations.
The sardine catch rose steadily from 1981 to 1983 but thereafter virtually collapsed. Output fell by 90 percent to
1987 and only three boats remained out of 20. The average catch per boat in 1986 was only one third that of
1981. Since 1987, the number of boats and output have risen but remain well below the 1980 level. Output per
boat was, however, higher in 1989 than at any other time in the decade.
In general, these figures confirm the view that the industrial fleet is plagued by old age and disrepair. A number
of factors reinforced these problems during the 1980s. The first is relatively low prices for fish [ONUDI, 1990,
p. 15]. No data is presented to substantiate this argument as no clear time series for fish prices appear to exist.
Estimates of the value of the total catch, however, show a sharp decline after 1986, especially in real terms
(Table V 12). This cannot be explained by shifts in the composition of the catch as export data shows that the
importance of higher value crustaceans and niulluscs increased over this period.
(tonnes) (nuther) (tonnes) (tonnes) (nuther) (tonnes) (tonnes) (nuther) (tonnes)
1980 121,766 192 634.2 24,407 75 325.4 15,452 17 908.9
1981 42,895 175 245.1 19,469 67 290.6 18,425 14 1,316.1
1982 52,965 186 286.8 26,158 46 568.7 22,901 19 1,205.3
1983 56,734 168 337.7 28,850 48 601.0 22,416 20 1,120.8
1984 60,774 163 372.8 34,687 58 598.1 7,965 12 663.8
1985 68,452 185 370.0 36,132 46 785.5 4,126 8 515.8
1986 60,413 179 337.5 32,385 59 548.9 2,124 5 424.8
1987 57,854 187 309.4 39,413 51 772.8 2,020 3 673.3
1988 52,738 217 243.0 41,759 66 632.7 4,242 5 848.4
1989 55,074 220 250.3 33,626 59 569.9 13,180 9 1,464.4
TrawL ers Tuna Boats Sardine Boats
Catch Boats catch per Catch Boats catch per Catch Boats catch oer
Source: Republique du Senegal 199]. and our calculations.
Table V 13 Returns to Various Types of Fishing Boats, 1987
Source: ONUDI, 1990.
Estimates of the return to various types of industrial boats in 1987 show that all types of sardine boats and all
but the most modern of trawlers would have lost money in that year. Factors held responsible for this, apart
from depressed fish prices, were the high cost of fuel and the high interest charges. Naturally, when net
revenues are low or negative, fishers will point to any costs which appear to them to be high. Yet Table V 13
shows that it was precisely those types of boats with the highest fuel and interest costs which were profitable in
1987.
Marginally lower interest rates would have made a difference between profit and loss only to freezer-type
sardine boats; a 25 percent reduction in fuel and interest costs would have wiped out losses for old trawlers, but
zero prices for fuel and credit would have been insufficient to do the same for old sardinelles. There is, in any
case, already a 30 percent subsidy in the price of fuel [American Embassy, October 1990]. It seems, therefore,
that productivity and age of boat as well as product prices might be more instrumental factors in explaining net
profitability.
For the sardine fleet, which has been virtually replaced by the artisanal catch, the problems are even more
complex. These are said to be "aging boats, the low motivation of the crews, bad management and maintenance
of the fleet, lack of access to credit, and marketing problems" [Ibid].
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Revenues 50,425 109,620 92,448 170,940 144,000 202,860
Input costs 39,647 55,514 51,564 71,820 72,472 '77,158
Fuel 6,375 13,860 16,632 41,580 16,632 29,753
Total costs 75,374 112,672 100,370 98,070 131,460 170,842.
Wages 13, 158 1.3,158 24,306 26,250 29,588 31,808
Interest 14,569 36,000 15,750 40,500 18,900 50,625
Net Profit/loss -24,948 -3,052 -7,922 23,370 12,540 32,019








Aging of the trawler fleet is also a pronounced and growing problem. In 1988, 82 percent of the fleet was over
16 years old, and one third over 25 years compared with 54 percent and 15 percent respectively in 1983. The
lack of long term credit for fleet replacement is a major problem, made worse by the recent (1988) closure of
the only institution providing any - SOFISED1T (Societe Financiere Senegalaise du Developpement Industriel et
Tounstique). Creation of credit institutions to address this problem is an important component of the 1991
Program of Action for the fisheries sector.
More recently, there have been further pressures on industrial fishers. The extension of the artisanal fishing
zone has forced fishers further from their base. Disputes with Mauritania and Gambia have made fishing in
these waters almost impossible and recent increases in fees charged by Guinea-Bissau have resulted in a drop in
the number of licenses to Senegalese-based boats from 15 to 5.
Although no figures are available, verbal reports suggest that fish prices have been rising significantly in the last
two years. This appears to be the result of competition for fish between local and export markets, and pressure
on the resource base due to increased artisanal fishing, more trawlers and more activity by foreign off-shore
fleets. These factors are difficult to quantify but it appears that the large drop in the catches of foreign ships
recorded in 1980-81 might be, to some extent, fictitious. Policing of foreign ships leaves much to be desired.
Also, there has been a shift in the composition of the trawler fleet to freezer boats which export directly rather
than off-loading in Dakar and there is uncertainty about whether this catch is recorded accurately [American
Embassy, October 19901.
Competition between fish for local consumption and fish for export is undoubtedly growing with implications
not only for the income of fishers, but also for nutrition and the resource base. It is to a consideration of these
that we now turn.
4.4 The Competition Between Food Consumption and Exports
As noted earlier, according to UNIDO, the per capita consumption of fish fell sharply in Senegal in 1983. Since
then it has reportedly fallen further, from an average of 26 kg per head to about 23 kg [ONUDI, 1990 p. 34].
This estimate is consistent with that of the FAO which shows a drop from 24.9 kg per head in 1984-86 to 21.3
kg per head in 1986-88.
We are, however, unable to reproduce these figures from data published by the government as the trend in the
artisanal catch would suggest rising consumption per capita.
Verbal reports in Senegal suggest, however, that the export effort in the last two years is cutting into fish
availability in local markets and forcing consumers to reduce their consumption at least of preferred species. It
is reported that when plant buyers enter the local market offering prices over three times those paid by local
consumers (FCFA 2000 versus 600), the species involved simply cease to be available for local consumption.
Exports rose strongly between 1986-89, by 26 percent, but, the average value per tonne fell by 11 percent. An
ongoing complaint in Senegal was that export prices had continued to fall, especially from the time of the Gulf
War. If SAL IV delivers on its promise to strengthen export incentives it can be expected that there will be
increased competition for landed fish, rising producer prices and reduced local consumption.
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4.5 Pressure on the Resource Base
There is a growing body of evidence that the fishing industry is pressing up against natural limits in certain
species and certain regions. Already by 1987 it was estimated that the artisanal sector 'was fishing about 80
percent of its limit. This included fishing 74 percent of its sardine limit, 90 percent of its prawn limit (almost
entirely in Casamance region in the south) and 41 percent of its cuttlefish limit [ONUDI, 1990, p. 101.
The industrial sector was, by comparison, barely using its inshore pelagic limit (essentially sardines), fishing
about two thirds of its tuna limit and 52 percent of its demersal limit. In the last category, however, it was
fishing 80 percent of its prawn limit and 233 percent of its cuttlefish limit.
These figures were based on an estimated output of only 261,000 tonnes in 1987, 171,800 of which was
artisanal and 89,250 of which was industrial. More recent government figures used earlier (Table V 4) are much
higher, and put total production at 331,000 tons, of which 232,000 were artisanal and 99,000 industrial. If these
figures are accurate, then the artisanal sector was probably over-fishing its sardine and prawn limits.
At the same time, if industrial catches are under-reported, as claimed, and if it is true as the Government of
Senegal claims, that selective retention of fish by foreign trawlers means that the actual catch is up to three
times that recorded [American Embassy, October 1990], then the pressure on demersal stocks is also much
greater than anticipated. Illegal fishing is a recognized problem, with ships from Korea, Japan, USSR, Eastern
Europe, China, France and Spain being the culprits. Senegal has had difficulty dealing with this. The opening of
a second naval base at Elinkine in the South in 1989 should help. The air patrol, funded by CIDA, is an
important part of the resource management system but was out of commission for eight months in 1989/90 due
to insurance problems. Policing, therefore, has been a problem.
The 1987 Fisheries Code tightens up on resource use at sea and at dockside. It set the six mile artisanal zone,
regulates net sizes, provides for inspection of boats, and provides for fines for non-compliance. But these
regulations are only as effective as the policing which is impeded by budgetary problems. Budget problems are
particularly acute. Expenditures on fisheries protection, surveillance and licensing have fallen from FCFA 194
million in 1987-88 to only FCFA 44 million in 1990-91, a drop of 77%! [M. Kebe, pers. comm. 1991].
What makes the situation even more complicated is that resource exploitation is uneven geographically. In the
Northern zone (St Louis/Dakar) pelagic resources were under-exploited by an estimated 20,000 tonnes in 1990
[Republique du Senegal, 1991]. It is in La Petite Cote zone (Dakar/Joal) that artisanal fishing is concentrated
and the actual catch is considered to exceed optimum exploitation. In the distant Casamance zone
(Kafountine/Kabrousse) the estimated under-exploitation was 40,000 - 60,000 tonnes in 1990.
In short, there appears to be pressure on sardines, cephalopods and such demersal species as white shrimp and
mullets. There is little or no scope for increasing output of these in two of the three zones, some leeway for
raising output of less popular species, and some excess capacity in Casamance but access to this is impeded by
distance and cost.
Current government policy towards the fishing sector does not appear to recognize these constraints. If the 1991
Action Plan is successful in creating a national trawler fleet, increasing the productive capability of the artisanal
fleet, and extending the market for fish, the long term effect on the fisheries resource could be disastrous.
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There are also passing references to industrial pollution having an impact on inshore fishing, but these reports
are sketchy so it is not known how great this problem is [CNPSF, 1989, p. 24].
4.6 The Industrial Processing Sector
The processing sector in Senegal underwent a severe contraction in the 1980s because of a greater incidence of
at-sea processing and because of deteriorating competitiveness of Senegalese factories. Since 1983, no less than
10 factories have closed. Of the five major factories operating in 1987, one, SADAL, has since closed down.
In the tuna canning sector, for instance, only two factories remain from the 11 operating originally [Berg, 1990,
p. 118]. The industry suffered from supply shortages caused by the greater use of canning ships, over-fishing
and competition with Côte d'Ivoire. German and British markets were lost due to poor quality control, and costs
of production were high due to poor labour productivity and high energy costs. Some French vessels also shifted
to the Indian Ocean. From being the world's second largest exporter of tuna in 1976 with 12 percent of the
world market, by 1986 Senegal had slipped to fifth place with only 6 percent. In all markets but France,
Senegalese tuna was replaced by that from Thailand. This was in spite of an export subsidy of 10 percent FOB
and duty-free entry into the EEC, while Thai tuna earns no subsidy and faces duties of 24 percent [Berg, 1990
p. 71]. Thai labour costs per unit were one half of those of Senegal while transport costs to Europe were 70
percent lower. Even neighbouring countries are more competitive. Thus, although wages in Senegal were 10
percent lower than in Cots d'Ivoire, productivity per hour was more than 50 percent lower, causing some
transfer of tuna canning [Berg, 1990, p. 12, 118].
Unit labour costs are high for a number of reasons. First of all, although processing is seasonal, more than two
thirds of the labour employed in 1987 was effectively permanent. Secondly, the throughput of fish is inadequate
so that most factories have significant excess capacity. Freezer factories for instance were operating at only 45
percent capacity in 1987 due to shortage of fresh fish [ONUDI, 1990 p. 21,22]. Canneries were operating at
about 58 percent capacity and fishmeal plants at only 25 percent.
The low level of throughput dominates the productivity picture, although Berg prefers to emphasize instead
labour laws which allow women processors to sit while working, and which, according to him, give workers
excessive time off for holidays and high mandatory payments not related to productivity [Berg, 1990, p. 118].
Workers would, of course, be appalled at these criticisms of what in the industrialized countries would be
standard working practices.
Fish processors receive favourable tax treatment in that their imported equipment, raw materials and semi-
finished inputs, which were in any case allowed in at relatively low rates, totalling 25 percent, are now, under
SAL IV, allowed in duty free. The fish export industry being considered 1un point franc1. The export subsidy
was initiated in 1981 at 10 percent of f.o.b. value and raised in 1983 to 15 percent. This was subsequently
changed, in 1986, to 25 percent of value-added causing enormous bureaucratic complications.
Berg suggest that the export subsidy has not been effective, yet calculations of pro-forma costs and revenues for
different types of factories operating in 1987 show that both freezer operations and tuna canning would make a
profit at prevailing rates of capacity utilisation Q! because of these subsidies [ONUDI, 1990, p. 59-65].
Indeed, for the former, the subsidy represented the equivalent of about one half the wage bill, and for the latter,
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more than 100 percent! A more serious problem, therefore, is the complaint that no subsidy payments have
been received by fish exporters since 1989 due to the government's fiscal problems.
This would seem to indicate a large flaw in the government's current economic policy; namely that its fiscal
situation is too tight to permit it to pursue its surrogate exchange rate policy through export subsidization.
Unless this is rectified, the adjustment program is likely to encounter serious problems and export potential 4
past export growth may be eroded.
No precise figures are available for the import content of processing. For tuna canning, this appears to be about
42 of total costs or 47 percent of pre-subsidy f.o.b. revenues [ONUDI, 1990 p. 63-67]. Most of this is tuna
imports and oil. For other factories, the import content is much less and possibly only about 10 - 15 percent of
total costs (ignoring capital costs). Net foreign exchange content of sales is, therefore, very high.
Shortage of credit to modernize plant and machinery has also been cited as a problem as have high interest
costs, but the pro-forma statements do not support this latter point (interest being only 0.3 percent of the total
costs of a freezer operation, and only 1 percent of those of a cannery) Finance for upgrading of facilities is
considered a pressing requirement, mainly because of the need to meet new EEC sanitation standards. Some
factories have already begun upgrading. Africamer, a joint Italian/Senegalese firm did so in 1987/88 and the
French/Senegalese SNCDS has begun doing so more recently. Precise information is not available, but the
Statistics Bureau reports unofficially that investment in the canning sector remained below 1985 levels to 1989.
Investment in other types of factories rose sharply 1987-88 to between 2 and 4.6 times the 1985 level (which
must, of course, have been extremely low), but fell below those levels in 1989. Total investment in all types of
factories rose from FCFA 1.5 billion to 2.99 billion between 1987 and 1988. Factories are also diversifying
production to increase throughput and stabilize and widen markets.
Direct government funding of the industry ceased in the early 1980s, and SOFISED1T (Societe Financiere
Senegalaise du Developpement Industriel et Touristique), the only institution providing credit to the sector,
albeit in limited amounts, was closed doi.
4.6 Overall Assessment Structural Adjustment and Fish
It is not possible to say with any precision what impact stnictural adjustment measures have had on the trends
observed above but a number of observations are in order.
The supply and service difficulties facing the artisanal sector seem to have ameliorated after 1986, enabling the
rapid growth in artisanal output. In so far as improvement in external balance was induced by economic policy,
one could argue that the adjustment program was beneficial to the fisheries sector. It may also be that aid
inflows to this sector, such as Canadian assistance in fisheries management or Japanese assistance for motorizing
the artisanal fishery, were to some degree dependent upon the government adopting economic reform generally.
But this is speculative. The renewal of economic growth after 1985 probably enabled absorption of the increased
artisanal production, preventing further erosion in the real value of the catch per tonne.
Duty drawbacks and export subsidies have been more important than is usually acknowledged for the industrial
sector, since without them few factories would have avoided losses. This is not to deny that their level was
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inadequate and especially after the decision to move from an f.o.b. basis to a value added basis. Indeed, this
move may have been a significant contributory factor reducing industrial sector capacity in 1987-89. On the
basis of UNIDO's pro forma cost and revenue structures for various types of factories, the change in the
subsidy base would have reduced payments to a 2,000 tonne freezing plant by FCFA 27 million, or by enough
to create losses after subsidization. Likewise, an 8,000 tonne tuna canning factory would have received almost
FCPA 500 million less, turning an after subsidy net return of FCFA 675 million into one of only FCFA 181
million. This, of course, is because of a low rate of direct value added by this sector.
Also, adding to the problems in the period 1985-88 was the fact that the exchange rate in Senegal
appreciated by up to 16 percent relative to 1980 when the subsidy was introduced (i.e. because inflation rates in
Senegal were higher than those in France). This period saw an erosion in competition, therefore, which more
than offset the subsidy which, on the value added basis, was worth no more than 3 percent of f.o.b. exports.
Of course, by 1989, the non-payment of the subsidy due to fiscal problems simply compounded problems and
demonstrated either an internal consistency in the adjustment program between exchange rate policy and fiscal
policy a failure of management by the government.
Export growth in the fisheries sector has proceeded in spite of what many observers see as quite inadequate
incentives [Berg, 1990]. This has been less critical since 1987 as the inflation rate in Senegal has fallen relative
to that in France, effectively devaluing the currency, but the general point remains valid. The result of this is
that industrial capacity has been reduced and only the most efficient processing plants have been able to invest.
SAL IV is putting much more emphasis on export incentives, has abolished taxes on inputs and, apparently,
raised export subsidies to the equivalent of 7.5 percent of the f.o.b. value of processed exports. It is, of course,
much too early to judge the effects of these measures. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that the fishing
industry has become much more competitive since the start of the adjustment program in the mid 1980s,
although we are not in a position to judge the quality of this evidence. Thus, the Statistical Bureau [CDPS,
1991] made available tables which show that the effective rate of protection for both canning and processing
factories fell sharply between 1986 and 1991, in some c"ces from in excess of 100 percent to less than zero.
The domestic resource costs (the local costs of saving or generting a unit of foreign exchange) fell from well in
excess of 1 to the 0.5 - 0.7 range, and value added in world prices rose sharply in all cases. If accurate, these
are all indications of increasing efficiency and competitiveness and would indicate that the adjustment programs
have had considerable impact. It is not clear, though, that this increasing economic efficiency is translated into
improved financial performance given the reports of the non-payment of the export subsidy.
Another major emphasis in adjustment programs since 1985 has been labour market reform designed to reduce
labour costs. Understandably, trade unions have resisted the implementation of these measures which would
reduce security, wages and the quality of working conditions. The result was that to 1990 little progress was
achieved, although SAL IV attempts to push the matter more strongly and government appears to be going
along with this.
There was some reduction of fuel costs in 1986 directly attributable to the adjustment program. Electricity costs
fell by 8 to 18 percent but there were some offsetting increases in charges with the result that net relief was not
substantial [Berg, 1990, p. 132].
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The state reduced its direct involvement in the sector by pnvatizing two companies, Senegal Seafood and
Thoniers Transoceaniques prior to 1987. No direct state investment in the industry has taken place since the
early 1980s, but the government continues to support artisanal fishing through CAMP And has a part interest in
the SNCDS tuna cannery. The adjustment program did nothing, however, to address the felt need for long term
credit by both the artisanal and industrial sectors and may, indeed, have been responsible for the closure of
SOFISEDIT. There are plans for new credit/guarantee agencies but these have been around for some years
without any apparent progress towards their realization.
High interest rates have been cited as a problem but do not appear to be a significant factor in the cost
structures examined.
Cutbacks in government spending have had important implications for the export subsidy program and may also
be partly responsible for widely voiced concerns about tardiness in processing tax rebates. They are knoi also
to have impeded the government's ability to monitor and police resource use. At the same time, the inability to
use exchange rates to shape incentives leads to fraudulent use of tax exemption schemes. It is estimated that 40 -
50 percent of tax free purchases (gas and other imports) claimed by the artisanal sector are used for purposes
other than fishing. This too may explain delays in processing applications for tax relief.
The biggest source of concern with the adjustment program is, however, what it will mean for the resource
sector if production is raised to adjustment plan levels of 410,000 tonnes. Even on the basis of existing data,
which is acknowledged to understate resource use, some species in some regions are already over-fished. There
is no monitoring of the artisanal sector and only inadequate monitoring elsewhere. A 20 percent rise in
production could well lead to serious over-fishing of certain species and it is not clear that the government has
the management capacity to avoid this.
Furthermore, if export incentives are raised, as promised, the competition between the artisanal and industrial
sectors for produce will increase. Already it appears that both ignore the zonal boundaries set for them
[Republique du Senegal, 1991, p. 58]. Any resulting increases in prices for artisanal fish will simply add to
resource pressures. The competition for fish between local and export markets, which observers claim is already
evident, will serve to put further pressure on local consumption of fish unless switches can be made easily from
preferred to other species.
Any attempts by government to grant additional incentives to the industry, either through improved direct
assistance in the form of credit or new technologies, etc., or through subsidies or effective exchange rate
depreciation, must therefore be accompanied by tighter management and regulation of the industry. Expansion
of net output must concentrate on under-fished species and reduction of waste.
5 FUTURE RESEARCH PRIORITIES
The government of Senegal is already involved in a number of research studies under its 1991 Action Plan.
Together with UNIDO it is undertaking an extensive study of the industrial fishing sector while, with the
African Development Bank, it is examining the restructuring of the industrial fishery.
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Le Centre de Recherches Océanographiques de Dakar-Thiaroye (CRODT) and the Ministry are undertaking a
comprehensive review of the economics of fisheries, examining and developing polices in the areas of
regulation, price, credit and budgetary impact, as well as social and investment policies [Republique du Senegal,
1991 p. 55-57].
Any proposals for further research ought to be developed alongside of and not in competition with these
initiatives. The focus ought to be on the implications for domestic consumption of fish of current structural and
sectoral adjustment initiatives. This would entail a careful analysis of any changes which might have taken place
since 1989 in the end uses of the artisanal catch and in the relative prices of fish for export versus that for local
consumption. It would also necessitate a careful look at whether there have been any shifts in the species
compositions of the artisanal catch either in response to export demand as a result of favoured species for
local consumption being diverted to the export market.
The second possible area for further research is that of the distribution of income within the sector broadly
defined. It would be extremely useful for policy makers to know with more precision who is benefitting from
improved incomes. In the artisanal sector this would mean knowing more about where additional fishers are
coming from and why, who owns boats and gear, who uses them and on what terms. Tracing family linkages
and incremental value added from fisher to processor, to various types of traders and transporters would also be
helpful. We need to know the extent of use of the unofficial credit market and the cost of credit. As the links
between the artisanal sector and the industrial sector grow it would be helpful to have more information on
purchase prices, mark-ups and any changes in ownership relations between the two sectors. As the resource
constraint is reached, there could be far-ranging implications on industrial structure and income distribution but
current data sources would not reveal these accurately.
The third possible area for further study would be to examine the impact of structural adjustment on fishing
communities as total communities. This would mean situating fishers, processors, traders, suppliers, etc. within
their community and assessing how policy changes had affected them relative to other members of the
community. How has the relative attractiveness of fishing changed and with what implications for the industry,
other sectors and the community as a whole? How have government cut-backs affected services, health and
education services, etc. on the ground? What has happened to poverty, to the gender division of labour, to the
cohesion of the community, to locally provided and financial services? These are all inter related issues which
require longer term research at the community level; they go beyond the narrow focus on fish and fishers but
are crucial to the well-being of the fishing community.
There are many other issues which could be examined but these seem to be the key ones, subject to their not
being addressed by the ongoing studies mentioned.
The second and third areas would require primary data collection including the interviewing of families. While
government agencies are likely to welcome and support this, they are unlikely to have the financial and material
resources to undertake the work. This would be an ideal area for input by aid donors and external research
organizations working co-operatively with local academics and consultants. Since the latter are somewhat in
short supply and in great demand primary responsibility would have to rest with the external agency.
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VI CASE STUDY: CHILE
Chile is unique among the three countries selected for study in this project because the economic policies
implemented by the military junta, which seized power in September 1973, are similar to the orthodox monetary
and fiscal policies recommended by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The Pinochet
Government's economic measures included currency devaluation, reduction of tariffs, lifting of price controls,
tightened availability of credit, reduction of public sector spending, and privatization of state enterprises. Chile has
therefore been undergoing structural adjustment for almost 20 years and provides an opportunity to analyze the long
term effects on the fisheries sector.
THE ECONOMY BEFORE 1973
During the period of 1930 to the late 1950s Chile attempted to reduce its dependency on copper exports by pursuing
an import substitution development strategy. Policy measures to encourage domestic self-sufficiency included:
erecting high tariff barriers; setting prices for both goods and factors of production; providing tax incentives for
producers of substitute goods; and direct government involvement in production and distribution activities as well
as in the allocation of credit and foreign exchange. These programs involved large public expenditures which were
financed by inflation and foreign debt. As a result, the country carried a heavy foreign debt burden while growth
in GDP was slow and there were frequent balance of payment problems [World Bank, 1979, p. 1-2].
The Alessandri Government (1958-1964) tried an alternative strategy and initially liberalized international trade.
Foreign debt and imports continued to rise, however, and the Government later responded by reversing these
policies. The Frei Government (1965-1970) focused on providing a more equitable distribution of income. It
undertook agrarian reform, increased income taxes, adjusted wages to inflation, reduced import restrictions,
established a crawling peg exchange rate, and increased public investment in housing and education. These policies
were successful in reducing inflation and both the fiscal and balance of payments deficits. There was also some
improvement in the distribution of income. Savings did not increase however, and investment was therefore financed
by foreign debt IWorld Bank, 1990, p. 3].
The Allende Government (1970-1973) believed that Chile's economic problems (economic stagnation, income
maldistribution, inflation, low employment) were the result of the concentration of ownership of land and other
assets. Their policies attempted to correct this concentration by extending the agrarian reforms of the Frei
Government and the nationalization of many sectors of the economy [World Bank, 1979, p. 61]. This involved large
increases in government spending financed by monetary expansion which eventually led to inflation despite the
establishment of price controls. Interest rates were held at negative real levels with the result that credit had to
be rationed and capital markets were destroyed. International trade was also highly regulated by quantitative import
and export restrictions, multiple exchange rates, and differential tariffs (some as high as 750%) [World Bank, 1990,
p. 4].
In the first year these programs were successful in increasing economic growth, reducing unemployment, slowing
inflation, and improving real wages and income distribution. In the next two years, however, with internal and
external political destabilization, real GDP decreased, inflation rose, there was a balance of payments crisis, and
the public sector deficit was high.
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT MEASURES AM) THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS
2.1. Summary of Structural Adjustment Policies
The military junta headed by General Pinochet seized power in September 1973. Its immediate concern was to
reverse the trends set in motion by the previous government [Foxley, 1983 p. 95]. Within the first few months of
taking office, the new government:
- removed price controls;
devalued the local currency and re-instituted a crawling peg;




In mid-1974 the world price of copper began to decline and international lenders began to withhold support. Foreign
exchange earnings dropped, but payments to foreign creditors continued, causing the Chilean economy to sink into
its worse depression since the 1930s.
The Pinochet Government's response to the recession was its "Economic Recovery Program" implemented in April
1975. The basic policies underlying this program were trade liberalization, increasing the role of the market in the
allocation of resources, and reducing the fiscal deficit to prevent the need for monetary expansion and the inflation
that was believed to accompany it. The main details of the program were the:
continued devaluation of the peso;
phased reduction of tariffs from as high as 220% for some goods to a universal 10%;
elimination of non-tariff bathers to trade;
continued privatization of public sector enterprises;
freeing of interest rates;
banning of unions and making mandatory wage indexation;
increase in tax revenues through higher income and property taxes, a 20% VAT and
tougher tax administration;
reduction of government spending by staff cuts and by making public enterprises self-
financing through user charges and cost-cutting measures.
The exchange rate was fixed at 39 pesos per $US 1.00 in June 1979 and maintained until mid-1982. Because of the
high rate of inflation in Chile relative to the United States and its other main trading partners, this policy led to a
significant appreciation of the real exchange rate [Foxley, 19&3p. 60]. Also at this time, the government liberalized
international capital flows, making borrowing abroad very easy. The effect was an increase in both imports and
foreign debt.
In 1982, a number of external factors (including high oil prices, low copper prices, increasing real interest rates,
the world debt crisis and a world-wide recession), combined with the increased foreign debt of the country (69%
of GDP by the end of 1982) to cause a reduction of capital inflows. The end result was the severe recession of 1982
and 1983.
An IMF-supported stabilization program was adopted to deal with the crisis and to appease Chile's creditors. The
program involved:
- rescheduling of all debt due in 1982/83
new bank credits of $1.3 billion
fiscal austerity
credit curtailment
an increase in tariffs to 35 percent
Because these measures had only a minimal effect, a new plan was developed in 1984, this time with the support
of both the IMF and the World Bank. Its objectives were to diversify exports, reduce foreign debt, increase savings
and investment, and strengthen the financial system [World Bank, 1990, p. 10]. The main components of the plan
included the following measures:
- currency devaluation;
export promotion through PROCHILE (a branch of the Foreign Affairs Ministry devoted
to promoting Chilean products abroad);
reopening the economy through tariff reductions;
a program to encourage nontraditional exports that included a temporary admission
system for export producers, more prompt refund of the VAT to exporters, and the
refund of indirect taxes to small exporters;
reduction of government deficit through increased taxes and reduced expenditures, and
an increase in public sector savings; and
continue downward pressure on wages.
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In addition to these, which were basically a continuation of the structural adjustment policies of the 1970s, the new
plan addressed the long term problem of economic vulnerability to the world price of copper by proposing the
establishment of the "Copper Stabilization Fund."
Subsequent phases of the adjustment program included strengthening of social programs, accelerated reprivatization
of the fmancial sector, further public sector savings, improved efficiency of the public sector's investment program
and debt reduction via a program of debt restructuring and conversion.
This plan was supported by three "Structural Adjustment Loans":
SAL I (Oct. 1985) - $1 billion - World Bank Emergency Financing Facility
- SDR 750 million - Loan
- $1.1 billion new lending from private banks
Conditions emphasised balance of payment corrections, increased exports, economic and
employment growth.
SAL II (Nov. 1985) - $250 million to reinforce SAL I.
Conditions emphasised export diversification, savings mobilization, and better targeting
of social policies.
SAL III (Dec. 1985) - $250 million.
Conditions similar to SAL II.
2.2. Macroeconomic Effects of Structural Adjustment Policies
The first series of reforms led to a number of changes in the structure of Chile's economy in the mid to late 1970s.
The most significant of these were the increased role the private sector began to play in the economy, especially
in the fmancial sector, and the complete elimination of the power of labour. As a result of these and other changes,
the following impacts were observed between 1975 and 1978:
real wages and salaries declined, probably leading to a worsening of the distribution of
income;
unemployment rose to unprecedented levels in 1975 which did not improve by the end
of the decade;
the fiscal deficit was reduced due to decreased government expenditures and increased
taxes;
inflation remained high, but decelerated significantly in 1976 - 1978 due to rising
unemployment, lower real wages, and reduced government deficit;
exports were increased and diversified; and
after 1975, GDP and GDP per capita increased (Figure VI 1).
In 1979, the exchange rate was frozen and the flow of international capital was liberalized. These two policies
played an important role in increasing imports and foreign debt.
The recession of 19 82/83 had the effect of reversing the positive and reinforcing the negative trends brought about
by the policies of the mid-1970s. GDP, real wages and imports dropped significantly, unemployment increased to
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Following the structural adjustment measures implemented in 1985, the Chilean economy went through another
period of adjustment including a second wave of privatization of public enterprises, an increase of both copper and
Nnontraditionalu exports, and an increase in production and employment in the manufacturing sector. During the
same period, Chile was favourably affected by an increase in the world price of copper, which still accounts for
about half of the total exports, and a reduction in world oil prices. The result was a 54 percent improvement in


































generally positive: real GDP increased, unemployment was reduced, inflation was slowed, savings and investment
increased, and both the balance of payments and the government deficits were reduced (see Figures VI 1 and VI
2).
Despite these positive trends, real wages and salaries did not show any significant improvement between 1985 and
1988. The gains that were made in 1988 and 1989 were diminished to some extent by the return of high inflation
in 1989. In addition, the maldistribution of income, a long-standing problem in Chile, appears to have been
exacerbated by the structural adjustment measures of the 1980s. The total income share of the wealthiest 10 percent
of the population increased from 48.5 to 56.6 percent [Ritter, 1990, Table 10].
3. THE FISHERIES SECTOR
In 1990, Chile was the world's sixth largest producer of fish and the second largest producer and exporter of
fishmeal. The country has more than 4,200 km of coastline and a productive fisheries resource fed by the nutrient-
rich cold water upwelling of the Humboldt Current. Sardine, anchovy and jack mackerel together make up approx-
imately 85 percent of Chile's total landings and are almost entirely processed into fishmeal.
Because of the limited domestic market for fishmeal, and the lack of alternative uses for sardine, anchovy and jack
mackerel (given current technology and markets), most of the fish caught in Chile is exported. Of the roughly 15
percent of the total harvest that is for direct human consumption, only about five percent remains in Chile. This is
partially due to Chile's small population (about 12 million) and an unusually low per capita fish consumption of
about five kilograms per year.
Fishmeal and fish oil (a by-product of fishmeal) together account for 82 percent of the total volume of fishery
products exported, but because of their low values, represent only 43 percent of the total foreign exchange earned
by the sector. Exports of fresh, frozen and canned fish and shellfish make up about 50 percent of the total value
of fisheries exports. Exports of seaweed, seaweed products and other fish products make up the remaining seven
percent. The total value of fishery product exports was US$ 914.7 million in 1990, or about 12 percent of Chile's
total exports.
The sector is an important source of employment, providing jobs for almost 108,000 people. Sixty-nine percent of
these people are directly involved in fish harvesting activities. There are about 58,000 artisanal fishermen, and about
14,000 working on the industrial fishing fleets. While there are virtually no women working on boats, they do make
up a significant portion of the 28,000 estimated to be employed in the industrial processing subsector. There are
also an unknown number of women employed in the processing and marketing of the artisanal harvest that serves
the domestic market, and in the baiting and cleaning of the long-line hooks used by many artisanal fishermen. An
additional 8,000 people are involved in the industrial aquaculture.
In 1989, the landed value of the fish harvest was about US$ 240 million, or roughly 0.94 percent of GDP, but
because of a drop in landings in 1990, the sector's contribution to GDP declined to 0.8 percent. These calculations
do not include the value-added by processing and marketing of fish which are estimated to increase the value of the















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.1 Structure of the Fishing Industry
3.1.1 Industrial and Artisanal Fisheries
Chile's fishing industry is divided into the industrial and the artisanal subsectors based on fishing vessel size. The
legal definition states that to be classified as artisanal, fishermen must own or work on a boat that is less than 18
meters in length and has a capacity of less than 50 gross tonnes (GT). Because of the advantages of being classified
as artisanal (eg. no income taxes, access to all coastal waters, and limited restrictions on vessel operations), there
are many boats that fall just under the maximum size restrictions and utilize modem fish capture technology such
as sonars, radios, and mechanical gear hauling equipment. However, the majority of artisan fishermen in Chile use
small open boats of about six to eight meters in length and their equipment is limited to outboard motors and either
fishing nets or long lines (Table VI 2).
The industrial fleet is comprised primarily of purse seiners with an average capacity of 318 GT. The remaining
industrial fleet includes trawlers, long liners and factory ships. The capacity of these vessels range from an average
of 200 GT for a long liner, to an average of 2,176 GT for a factory trawler.'
Seventy percent of the 58,000 artisanal fishermen live in rural fishing villages called caletas located all along the
Chilean coast. Geographically, the coastline is divided into 12 administrative regions (see Figure VI 3). Forty
percent of the artisanal fishermen are found in the Xth Region and another 20 percent are in the VIIP' Region
(Figure VI 4).
Because of the far greater fishing efficiency of the capital intensive industrial fleet, the artisanal sector is responsible
for only about eight percent of the total volume of fish landed in Chile. The artisanal harvest is made up of 68
percent fish, 24 percent mollusks, two percent crustaceans, and five percent other species, and is almost entirely
used for human consumption. Because of the much higher value of fish and shellfish used for human consumption,
the artisanal fishermen receive 40 percent of the total landed value.
65
Large boats, generally 15-18 m. in length,
approaching 50 GT, and equipped with modern
equipment.
Source: IFOP, 1989.
1 Averages calculated from IFOP data for 1989.
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The geographical distribution of the harvests of the artisanal and the industrial fleets are shown in Figure VI 5.
Although the VilIth Region is currently the most important fishing area for both fleets, the Xf Region is clearly the
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The distribution of the harvest relates to the availability of the species exploited by the two sub-sectors. The fish
resources of Chile can be classified into 3 main groups: pelagic species, demersal species and mulluscs. Pelagic
fishes are dark-fleshed and are generally found in large schools within 100 meters from the surface of the ocean
and 120 miles from shore. The three most important pelagic species are anchovy, sardine and jack mackerel, which
make up about 86 percent of the industrial harvest. Historically the largest stocks of these fish were found in the
northern regions. In 1990 however, landings in the north dropped dramatically, and Region VIII now dominates
in pelagic harvests. The current situation is illustrated in Figure VI 6, which shows how the harvests of anchovy,
sardine, jack mackerel, pacific mackerel and pacific herring are geographically distributed. Figure VI 6 also shows
the insignificance of the artisanal subsector in the pelagic fishing industry.
In the past, fishmeal plants have also been concentrated in the north, but through the 1980s the industry expanded,
and now plants are found as far south as the Vilith Region. With the recent shift in harvesting activities, this trend
is likely to continue. The industry is characterized by vertical integration and a highly concentrated level of
ownership. It has been estimated, for example, that one man who has also made significant investments in other
sectors, owns 70 percent of the industry in the north, and 20 percent in the south [Jose RaiM Cañon, pets. comm.].
An estimated 10,000 workers are employed by the pelagic industry to operate and maintain its fleet of 349 purse
seiners. Within its processing plants, many of which also produce canned products, an additional 5,000 workers
are employed [Capurro, 1991, p. 13].
Demersal species are white-fleshed finfish and crustaceans which live close to the ocean floor along the continental
shelf (a strip along the coastline about 10 miles wide). Among the economically important demersal species are
several types of hake, sea bass, and a number of species of shrimps and crabs.
Figure VI 7 shows how the demersal harvests of the industrial and artisanal sub-sectors are geographically
distributed. The industrial harvest is concentrated in the VilIth Region while the largest portion of the artisanal catch
comes from the Xth Region, followed by the Vth and then the Vilith Regions.
The industrial sector of the demersal industry concentrates on the export market and, like the fishmeal industry, is
characterized by vertical integration and a concentration of ownership. Many of the largest artisanal boats also
provide fish for the export market. The ownership of these boats vary. Some are owned by the processing plants,
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while others are owned by fishermen, but were purchased with credit provided by the processing plants. The
remainder are owned by fishermen who were able to secure their own credit or were assisted by one of two credit
program financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (1DB).
In total, about 90 percent of the demersal harvest is exported. The remaining harvest serves the domestic market
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Factory vessels (mostly from Japan, Korea and Spain) have been operating in Chilean waters for more than a decade
with demersal landings ranging between 50,000 and 70,000 tonnes per year. To gain access to the fisheries
resource, the owners of these vessels must form a "joint venture" with a local partner. Within this arrangement they
carry and display the Chilean flag which enables them to navigate and fish within Chilean waters. They are expected
to pay taxes based on their profits and abide by Chile's regulations concerning access, catch reports and crew
composition. However, there has been considerable under-reporting of catch and sales. Coupled with the use of
accelerated depreciation techniques and on-board transfers of catch, these practises have allowed this foreign-owned
fleet to pay only minimal taxes to the Chilean Government.
Mulluscs such as clams, mussels, snails, oysters and scallops live on the ocean floor and are valued species that are
harvested exclusively by artisanal fishermen, most intensively in the Xth Region (Figure VI 8). Some is sold in the
domestic markets, but most is purchased by processing plants located in the south and is canned or frozen and
exported. These plants also process and export the demersal species harvested in the region.
3.1.2 Seaweed Harvesting
Seaweed, which is both gathered and cultivated by the artisanal subsector, has become an important fisheries product
in the last ten years with a total production of over 200,000 tonnes in 1990. The seaweed is processed into agar-agar
which is used as a thickening agent in food, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals.
Chile's seaweed production is either dried and exported or processed domestically and then exported. In 1990, the
exports of seaweed and agar-agar had a total value of US$ 50 million, or about five percent of the total value of
all fish products exports. The main market was Japan, but Europe is also important.
Currently, there are about 12,000 men and women engaged in seaweed harvesting or cultivation, and over half are
located in the Xth Region. Another 30 percent are located in the Vilith Region, and the remaining 20 percent are
distributed in the north and central regions.
As the natural abundance of commercially important species of seaweed is reduced due to harvesting, culturing is
becoming a more important means of production. Fishermen are also turning to seaweed cultivation as a source of
income as the resource depletion makes it increasingly expensive to fish.
Seaweed cultivation and harvesting has provided annual incomes of approximately US$ 5000 per year in the past,
but current incomes are less than half that due to a recent drop in world prices [Fernando Berroeta, pers. comm.].
This has led to an increased awareness among fishermen's groups of the need to diversify their production, and
there is now more interest in the small-scale cultivation of oysters, mussels and scallops.
3.1.3 Aquaculture
Salmon is the most important species in Chile's aquaculture industry, but trout, turbot, sturgeon and several types
of clams are also raised. Total salmon production in 1990 was 23,313 tonnes, up 160 percent from the previous
year's production [SERNAP, 19901.
In 1988 there were 72 companies involved in salmon farming, but the industry is dominated by four large foreign-
owned companies, which together account for 50 percent of the total production [Price Waterhouse, 1991, p. 78].
These and some of the other large foreign-owned companies are vertically integrated and own hatcheries and feed
mills. The smaller operations are generally owned domestically and, likely due to a lack of capital, have not
vertically integrated their operations [Ibid, p.801.
Salmon aquaculture is concentrated in the Xb Region, especially in Puerto Montt and on the island of Chiloe. The
conditions in the southern regions are well suited to aquaculture because the many small islands and inlets provide
protection from severe weather, while the strong tides and lack of industrialization in the area contribute to a high
level of water quality. The disadvantages of operating in this part of Chile are its remote location and poor
transportation infrastructure.
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As with other fish produced in Chile, most of the salmon production is exported. In 1989, 90 percent of Chile's
salmon exports were destined for Japan or the U.S. The majority was sold whole and either fresh or frozen, which
has proven to be the most profitable.
3.2 Fisheries Management, Research, and Industry Organizations
3.2.1 The New Fishing Law
Chile has attempted protect its fisheries resources by implementing a number of regulations aimed at restricting
fishing effort and access. These have included minimum mesh size, maximum vessel size, and maximum number
of hooks. Other restrictions, such as closed fishing seasons, total annual quotas, minimum size limits, and bans on
catching females carrying eggs, limit the catch.
A new fisheries law was recently approved by the Senate of Chile that is intended to better protect the fisheries
resource. The idea of a new fisheries law was first introduced in 1985, but the pelagic fishing industry was able
to successfully lobby against it for six years. They see the new law as a threat to their historic rights of free access
that will ultimately result in their loss of resource rents.
Under the new fisheries law, artisanal fishermen will be given exclusive access to all inshore waters within five
miles of the shore. The industrial fisheries will be subject to three different access regimes that depend on the level
of stock exploitation. Over-exploited fisheries will be closed and access to under-exploited fisheries will not be
limited. Those stocks designated as fully-exploited fisheries will be subject to the following limited access regime.
A total allowable catch (TAC) will be established and five percent per year of the TAC will be allocated through
a bidding system for individual transferable quotas (ITQs). This process will carry on for up to 10 years, so that
eventually 50 percent of the TAC will be allocated.
3.2.2 Government, Fisheries Research and Industiy Organizations
Chile has three government agencies directly involved in fisheries management and research. The main regulatory
agency is the Undersecretary of Fisheries within the Ministry of the Economy (SUBSE). Its responsibility is to
establish policy and fishing regulations. The National Fisheries Service (SERNAP) enforces the regulations,
monitors the industry's harvest and fishing effort, and collects, maintains and publishes annual fishery statistics. The
government's research is carried out by the National Fisheries Development Agency (IFOP). IFOP was designed
to be an independent research body, but in reality many of its projects are carried out on the request of the
Undersecretary of Fisheries.
PROChile is the branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for promoting Chilean exports. The agency's
activities in the fisheries sector include: negotiating bilateral agreements with importing countries; establishing and
promoting consistent quality control measures for individual products; contacting and bringing potential buyers to
Chile; organizing tours for fish producers to international trade shows; running promotional campaigns; and
collecting and disseminating international market information.
Universities play an important role in fisheries research and, to some extent, in shaping fisheries management. For
example, the Fisheries School of the Catholic University of Valparaiso has successfully organized workshops that
have brought together industry, government and academics to share information and discuss fisheries management
issues. Academic institutions have also been successful in securing foreign funds for research and development
projects. One example is an artisanal fisheries development project currently being conducted by the Department
of Marine Science of the Catholic University in Concepcion with funding from IDRC. This project involves both
the development of mussel culture technology and transfer of this technology to the people of small rural fishing
communities.
So while there is no government fisheries extension services, this void is at least partially filled by universities. Also
important in this area is a non-profit organization called FUNCAP which operates a fisheries training centre in
Coronel (near Concepcion). FUNCAP has received most of its technical advice and training materials (including
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a pilot processing plant and three fishing boats), from a Japanese funding agency (JICA). Operating expenses are
covered by sales of its fish production, and funding from the Chilean and foreign governments.
One of the main industry organizations is the Fishmeal Exporters Association (CORPESCA). In addition to carrying
out market and technological research, CORPESCA also conducts its own biological research. The results of this
research is often very different from the conclusions made by academic or government research and is used to
support the industry's lobbying efforts.
The National Confederation of Artisanal Fishermen of Chile (CONAPACH) is the main organization in the artisanal
subsector. Its membership is made up of the leaders of regional Fishermen's Federations, which in turn are made
up of the leaders of the smaller fishermen's unions. The organization of CONAPACH began in 1985 and it now
represents about 20,000 fishermen or one-third of all artisanal fishermen. The low representation reflects the fact
that the federations of the southern regions, where 40 percent of the country's artisanal fishermen are located, have
not yet joined.
CONAPACH is working towards improving the prices paid to fishermen, promoting sustainable fisheries
development, and developing leadership within the fishing communities to promote community independence and
development.
3.3. Development of the Fisheries Sector
Chile's fishing industry has expanded rapidly since the end of the Second World War, when annual harvest levels
were under 50,000 tonnes, to the current harvest levels of about 6 million tonnes. In the 1960s fish made up two
percent of the country's total exports and employed about two percent of the labour force [Shapiro, 1965, p.1].
Today two percent of the labour force is still employed in fisheries, but exports from the sector now make up 12
percent of the total. The sector's growth is related to two main factors: the country's rich fisheries resource, and
a series of supportive government programs. This section looks at the development of the fishing industry in the
context of both these factors.
3.3.1 Development of the Pelagic Fisheries
Prior to the 1960s, Chile did not have a northern pelagic industry. Only after the collapse of the nitrate industry,
which had been concentrated in the north, did the government begin a program to develop the pelagic fishery and
establish a fishmeal industry.
The government invested a total of US$ 30 million in the pelagic processing industry and encouraged exports by
offering a 20 to 30 percent bonus on the value of exports to fishmeal plants in northern Chile. Development was
also encouraged by allowing the industry to import fishing vessels, gear and manufacturing equipment tariff-free
[Shapiro, 1965, p.1]. In addition, fisheries were exempt from most transfer taxes, were given preferential port
charges, and were forgiven 90 percent of the tax on real property and that part of their income distributed to their
workers, if firms pledged to reinvest at least 15 percent of their profits back into the fishery sector. These benefits
were originally set to expire in 1973, but most were extended to 1978 by the Pinochet Government [World Bank,
1979, p.202].
The government also invested in fish harvesting and boat building. Fishermen were given liberal loans for
modernizing boats and equipment [Shapiro, 1965, p.14]. Also with government assistance, Chile began to build its
own purse seiners in the 1960s.
The export promotion programs were successful, helping fishmeal exports to increase from about 5,000 tonnes in
1950 to 88,500 by 1963. Even after the government incentives for the industry expired, it continued to grow.
Exports surpassed one million tonnes in 1985, and peaked at almost 1.3 million tonnes in 1989. The value of
fishmeal exports also peaked in 1989 at US$ 507.0 million, but dropped 25 percent in 1990 (Figure VI 9).
Clearly, growth of this magnitude could not have been possible without Chile's enormous resource base, but the




stocks of northern Chile, but the harvest levels were unstable and the fishery finally collapsed in 1972 (see Figure
VI 10). But this was not simply the result of overfishing. There are periodic changes in the Humboldt Current that
cause a rise in the water temperatures. This phenomena, known as the El Niño", forces the anchovy to move to
cooler waters further off-shore and out of range of the fishing fleet, causing a significant drop in harvest levels. The
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A year after the collapse of the anchovy fishery, the Pinochet government took power and began to privatize the
fishmeal industry. Industry profits were unusually low at the time because of the reduced harvests, and many private
interests bought into the industry at bargain prices [Jose Raül Cañon, pers. comm.].
By the late 1970s the northern regions had become the most important and the most industrialized fishery of Chile.
Continued growth was possible despite the collapse of the anchovy stocks because the industry invested in larger
and more efficient vessels which enabled them to increase their landings of sardine. Total sardine landings increased
from 50,000 tonnes in 1973 to 1.6 million tonnes in 1981 while at the same time the average size of vessels
increased from about 150 to 230 cubic meters. Efficiency was also improved with the introduction of transport ships
which allowed the purse seiners to stay at sea for longer periods of time. Despite this efficiency, sardine landings
have been declining steadily since 1987 and anchovy, and jack mackerel landings dropped in 1990 (see Figure VI
10). Many researchers believe that this is a clear indication of over-fishing. IFOP estimates indicate that only seven
to 33 percent of the capacity of the north and south/central industrial fleets were being utilized in 1990.
3.3.2 Development of the Demersal and Mullusc Fisheries
Historically, these species were exploited almost exclusively by the artisanal subsector to serve the domestic market.
In addition to developing an export-orientated fishmeal industry, Chile's fishery development plan of the 1960s also
aimed to improve the diets of low income groups by increasing fish consumption and determine the extent and
abundance of the country's fishery resources through research.
The government carried out a promotional campaign to educate people on the nutritive value of fish, but it appears
to have had little success (Table VI 3). During the period of the Allende government there was some increase, but
this was probably the result of that government's program to purchase fish from artisanal fishermen to be distributed
free to the poor. The limited domestic market for fish and shellfish meant that any significant growth in the demersal
and mulluscs fisheries industries depended on the development of an export market.
Table VI 3 Average Consumption of Fish and Shellfish
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Source: ODEPA Y CHILE PESQUERO. Dic. 1983 y Ago. 1986
Research was encouraged by the establishment of a Department of Fish and Game research centre at Valparaiso
and the provision of funds to sponsor research at universities.
Year Annual per Capita Percent of Total
















The macro-economic policies of the Pinochet Government in the 1970s to encourage exports were not sufficient
to encourage exports of demersal fish and mulloscs. However, growth was encouraged in the mid-1980s when
the Government established a program to promote "non-traditional" exports, including fish for human
consumption. One of the most important components of this program was a 10 percent drawback paid to
exporters.
At the same time that the export promotion program was in place, an increase in the harvesting capacity of the
artisanal sector was aided by two credit programs funded by the 1DB. The first of these programs ran from
1983 to 1985 and provided loans totalling US$ 16 million to 1,933 artisanal fishermen. Sixty percent of these
loans went to fishermen in the northern regions, while 12 and 17 percent went to the VII] and Xth Regions
respectively. Most of this money was spent on motors, hulls and nets, and led to an increase in the artisanal
fleet of about 800 vessels.
The second credit program provided a total of US$ 8.9 million to 263 fishermen between 1986 and 1988. This
program was different from the first in that it was intended to increase the fleet of lanchas (see Table VI 2) in
order to supply the new export-orientated fish processing industry developing in the central and southern
regions. Between 1983 and 1989 the number of lanchas increased 70 percent, and most of this increase was in
the Vth, Xth and XIIth Regions.
Also at this time the government undertook measures to develop the southern fisheries. It was recognized that
there was little pollution in this region, and that the large fluctuations in the tide provided ideal conditions for
healthy populations of high quality mulluscs. Fishermen were offered an allocation of land to encourage them to
relocate to the south, and the 1DB credit program provided the funds they needed to purchase fishing
equipment. The result was an increase in the number of fishermen in the south (Regions IX, X, XI, and XII)
from 17,000 in 1983 to over 28,000. Almost 50 percent of all artisanal fishermen are now located in the south,
and 40 percent are in the Xb Region alone (see Figure VI 14).
The growing exports of fish for human consumption were also supported by the activities of PROChile. It has
helped producers to organize according to their products so that they can explore new markets more efficiently.
These organizations are also useful in developing common packaging and quality standards which has helped to
increase prices. Educating producers on the need for consistent and high quality in their products is another
function of PROChile. It has even arranged for foreign technical experts to travel to Chile and advise producers
on the best methods to assure high quality. PROChile also organizes trips for potential foreign buyers to visit
Chile, and export producers to travel to international trade shows to help establish contacts. Most of these
activities, although organized by PROChile, are funded by the industry [Rose Marie Bedecarraz, pers. comm.].
The value of canned and frozen fishery products exports, made mostly from demersal species and mulluscs, has
increased 340 percent since 1984 (Figure VI 11). Until 1988, the harvest of these species grew to meet the
growing demand of the export-orientated fish processors (Figure VI 12). The decline in harvest levels in the
past two years is believed to be an indication of over-exploitation.
3.3.3 Development of the Seaweed Industiy
The growth of the seaweed harvesting and culturing industry was mainly the result of two factors. A foreign
market for the product was established in the early 1980s, and at the same time there were very high levels of
unemployment in the country. People migrated to the coast and were able to enter the seaweed harvesting
industry because it required no investment. More recently, the growth of the industry is also the result of
decreased fish harvests, due to resource depletion, forcing some artisanal fishermen to find alternate sources of
incomes.
There is no recorded production of seaweed until 1980, when about 75,000 tonnes were produced. Since then
annual production has increased (although not steadily, see Figure VI 13), and by 1990 it had reached almost
230,000 tonnes. The industrial aquaculture sector entered the industry in 1982, and now accounts for about 15
to 20 percent of the total production.
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The culturing of seaweed and fish brings with it the need to establish property rights for the ocean's floor.
Property rights are allocated by Chile's concession system. Basically, this system allows a commercial
enterprise, either a company or a fishermen's cooperative, to gain ownership of a specified area for the purpose
of aquaculture. The bureaucratic process to obtain a concession is onerous, requiring that a map and a
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Once a concession is awarded, half of its total area must be seeded within one year, requiring a significant
investment. There is also a tax that must be paid immediately, and another which is paid every six months.
The small-scale seaweed producers can be in competition with the industrial seaweed and salmon producers for
concessions. The industrial operators have an advantage because they are not constrained by lack of human or
monetary resources. In addition, there appears to be a bias in the allocation of concessions that favours
industrial over small-scale production. In the community of Linao on the island of Chiloe, for example, an
application for a concession for the small-scale culturing of seaweed was turned down by the National Marine
Authority because the site chosen was deemed strategic." Later, a company was awarded a concession in the
same area for salmon aquaculture. Small-scale seaweed producers have expressed concern about being forced
out of the industry, especially since the new fisheries law does not differential between large and small-scale
producers.
There is little evidence of government support for seaweed culturing, yet many fishermen's organizations have
identified that this industry will continue to be an important source of income in the small rural fishing
communities. Most of the research and extension work appears to be carried out by universities, and if funding
is available, it is usually provided by a foreign aid agency.
3.3.4 Aquaculture Development
Salmon aquaculture is a relatively new industry in Chile, and since its inception in 1980, it has grown an
average of 200 percent per year. Its success has been attributed to a comparative advantage stemming from
lower labour and feed costs [Price Waterhouse, 1991, p. 89]. Other important factors are the ideal conditions in
the south and the fact that Chile's salmon are harvested when fresh salmon is not available in the northern
hemisphere. The industry has also benefitted from a great deal of government support. Fundacion Chile, a joint
industry/government organization, has played a significant role in conducting research and developing
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technology suitable for Chile. They ran their pilot operation in southern Chile with a business approach and
once it was showing a profit, it was sold to a foreign company. Other private companies were then able to enter
the industry, without having to incur the risk and expense of developing new technology.
The industry also received extensive support in developing its export markets by PROChile. Some of the most
extensive services offered by this organization were provided to the salmon producers. It was fundamental in
establishing the salmon producer's organization and in 1987, carried out a promotional campaign on their
behalf. The reasoning behind PROChile's special attention to this industry was the belief that this was a
promising industry that would attract new entrants if the risk was reduced [Rose
Marie Bedecarraz, pers. comm.].
4. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE FISHERIES SECTOR
Chile's fisheries sector has grown remarkably in the past twenty years. In this section the relationship between
this growth and the macro-economic policies pursued by the Pinochet Government is explored. Also examined
are the impacts these policies have had on the health of the fisheries resource, employment and incomes in
fisheries, the domestic demand and supply, the structure of the industry and the cost structures within the
subsectors of the industry. Finally, the socio-economic impacts of changes in the fisheries sector on the artisanal
fishing communities are discussed.
4.1 Pressure on the Fisheries Resource
The fisheries sector was seen as a good candidate for the development of an export industry because it was clear
that the resource could supply much more than what was required to meet domestic demand. Therefore, in
addition to the incentives offered by the exchange rate and open market policies of the Pinochet government,
programs directed specifically at increasing fish product exports were also implemented. The fishing industry
responded to these policies and production and exports increased.
During the same time period, the Pinochet Government undertook a plan to reduce the number of government
employees involved in fisheries management, and improve the efficiency of the remaining staff through training
and the use of more modern equipment. But the recession of 1975 led to the cancellation of the training and
modernization plan, and only in the past two years has it been reactivated.
The government's delay in investing in its fisheries management capability can be attributed to a number of
factors. Despite the limited government intervention in the industry, fish harvests continued to grow, giving the
impression fisheries management was unnecessary. Although researchers and academics were warning that
continued growth was not sustainable, they were not believed until the harvest levels began to decline. When
government officials were fmally convinced of the need for better resource management, structural rigidity
within the government did not allow for an immediate re-allocation of resources [Hector Bacigalupo, peN.
comm.].
The net result was that government resources to manage fisheries did not grow in proportion to the growth of
the industry. The shortage of resources for enforcement reduced the effectiveness of the management measures
used by Chile in the past, and have likely contributed to the over-exploited state of an estimated 70 to 80
percent of the country's commercially important stocks.
Enforcement tends to become more difficult as fishery resources are depleted and the temptation to circumvent
regulations is greater. It is therefore likely that the need for enforcement and other government interventions in
the industry will intensify. The fact that SERNAP, the fisheries monitoring and enforcement agency, has
recently hired an additional 100 people in the south suggests that the problem has already become critical in at
least one area.
Another factor contributing to over-fishing in Chilean waters was the lack of effective management measures.
The need to limit access to the resource was recognized in 1985 when the government began discussions on the
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new fisheries law. Not surprisingly, this view was not shared by the fishmeal industry. The industry carried out
their own biological research and concluded that limiting access to the resource is not only unnecessary, but also
impractical. They argued that because pelagic species are migratory, regulating the harvest will only succeed in
conserving the stocks to be caught by another country's fishing fleet once they move out of Chile's EEZ.
Further, they feel that even if one species is depleted, the Humboldt Current provides such a rich nutrient base,
it will be replaced by another species to fill the "environmental niche" [Jose Raid Cañon, pers. comm.].
Mr. Humberto Chamorro [pers. comm.], president of CONAPACH (National Confederation of the Artisanal
Fishermen of Chile), pointed out that this theory serves the industrial fishmeal industry very well. It suggests
that they should have unlimited access to the fishery and allows them to maximize their profits now. If the
fishery should collapse, the companies can simply move their investments to other sectors with higher profit
potential. Judging by their current diversified investment portfolios, these companies appear to be well prepared
for this eventuality. The view of the artisanal subsector is entirely different because they do not have the same
mobility and hope to continue to fish in the same area over the long term.
The fact that it took six years of discussions before the new fisheries law was passed attests to the lobbying
power of this large, wealthy and well-organized industry. Once the new law is implemented, the fishmeal
industry access to pelagic resources will be restricted for the first time.
The new law also contains provisions that will allow the revenues from licence fees and penalties to be spent on
fisheries management and research. However, for some fisheries it may be too late. The demersal and mullusc
stocks in the Xth Region, for example, have been seriously depleted due to over-fishing. The resulting drop in
harvest levels brought on the bankruptcies of three of the region's largest processing plants, and layoffs of
hundreds of people [Capurro, 1991, p.15]. Resource depletion is also evidenced in the declining harvests of the
northern pelagic industry since 1987. This has caused the VilIth Region to become increasingly important in the
harvest of pelagic species.
The Pinochet Government policies encouraged the growth of other export-orientated industries such as lumber
and mining, as well as fishmeal, but did not implement environmental protection laws. As a result, pollution has
been a serious and increasing problem that has had detrimental effects on the fisheries resource in some regions.
Some of the most serious problems have been experienced in the highly industrialized VhF" Region where some
fish stocks have been completely wiped out as a result of pollution.
4.2 Employment and Incomes
Since 1974 the number of artisanal fishermen has increased from an estimated 17,000 to almost 60,000 (Figure
VI 14). This growth can be attributed partially to structural adjustment policies, to the extent that they
contributed to high levels of unemployment, and partially to the prevalent perception that fishing was a good
business.
Some of the adjustments in the Chilean economy encouraged by the Pinochet Government's macroeconomic
policies contributed to unemployment. In agriculture, for example, production shifted away from wheat and
towards lumber and fruit for export, both of which were encouraged by the Pinochet Government. Because
lumber and fruit production is less labour intensive and provides mostly seasonal work, many workers were
displaced. During periods of high unemployment in the 1970s and 1980s many people migrated to the coast to
participate in the artisanal fishery, mostly as seaweed harvesters, but also as small-scale fishermen.
People also moved to coastal areas not because they were unemployed, but because they felt that fishing offered
the potential to earn higher incomes. This potential was augmented by the 1DB credit program and the high
demand for demersal fish and mulluscs during the 1980s.
Incomes in the artisanal sector are estimated to range from about USS 100-200 per month for the smallest
operators, to as much as US$ 1000 per month for some of the largest operators. As the majority of the artisanal
sector is made up of the smaller operators, average incomes are low, and as a result of resource depletion, are
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Low incomes in the artisanal subsector have long been attributed to the fishermen's lack of bargaining power.
Sales are generally made to intermediaries or processing plants, which in some regions can be the sole or one of
few buyers. Artisanal fishermen suggest that the evidence of this problem is the fact that increases in world fish
prices have not been reflected in the prices paid to artisanal fishermen [Humberto Chamorro, pers. comm.].
For the artisanal labour force as a whole, though, productivity per person increased steadily from 5.86 tonnes
per person in 1975 to 11.01 in 1989. The catch per boat also increased from 36.6 tonnes in 1980 to 42.1 in
1989. The real consumer price of fish over this period, in 1975 pesos, increased between 67 and 100 percent
IBustamante, 1989 p. 3 13J. The value of the catch per fisherman destined for the local market rose therefore,
by 160 to 180 percent in real terms. It is not clear how much of this increase was retained by the artisanal
fishermen and how much accrued to intermediaries. Some evidence suggests that margins grew faster than
producer prices in the 1984-87 period and ranged from 35 to 137 percent of the landed price of fish [Ibid, p.
315]. Overall it is likely that artisanal fishermen who were supplying the local market and who were j
affected by resource depletion, increased their real earnings over this period. But without further information on
ownership, prices, margins and input costs, we simply cannot be sure. Those supplying the export market ought
to have benefited significantly, but again the distribution of benefits is unknown.
In the industrial sector, ships crews make higher than average wages, and the captains can make very high
salaries. The processing sector is also an important source of employment, especially for women. And while
wages are not higher than what women would make in other industries, jobs in fish processing plants are of a
higher status than the alternatives available to women (eg. domestic maids).
4.3 Changes in the Structure of the Industry
The government's emphasis on encouraging exports tended to favour the growth of the industrial subsector
(Figure VI 15). Notable exceptions are the largest operators in the artisanal subsector and artisanal fishermen in
the southern regions, whose numbers have grown as a result of the growth in the export-orientated food fish
industry. This change is clearly reflected in the rapid increase in artisanal landings in the early 1980s (Figure VI
16) and the concentration of artisanal fishermen in the southern regions (Figure VI 14).
As discussed in the previous section, policies to encourage the growth of the food fish industry coincided with
the 1DB credit program. Many artisanal fishermen believe that because of the way the 1DB credit programs
were administered, the loans were not equally available to all fishermen [H. Charnorro, pers. comm.]. Those
with more information, or who were better connected with the government, or who were simply shrewder
businessmen were more successful in obtaining loans. In addition, the availability of cheap credit attracted
businessmen from other industries who only bad to obtain an artisanal fishing licence to be eligible for a loan.
They were then able to secure a loan, buy a boat, and hire fishermen to work for them. This new pattern of
ownership has not been studied, so there is no data available to measure the extent of this trend. It is clear
however, that many of the lanchas now earning high returns in the Vth and Vilith Regions were purchased with
1DB credit. Therefore, it can be said that the combination of the two programs led to a differentiation within the
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While the 1DB credit program appears to have had a major impact, the government's macro policies on credit
have had little effect on the fisheries sector. Regardless of the availability of credit, artisanal fishermen are
considered bad risks by banks and are therefore unlikely to be able to secure commercial loans at any time.
The diverse and large investment portfolio of those in the industrial subsector indicate that their growth has not
been restrained by tight credit policies.
The other major structural change in the artisanal fishery was the mass movement of fishermen to the south
(Figure VI 13). This movement was actively supported by the government to provide the raw material for the
growing export market for demersal species and mulluscs. The 1DB credit program also played a role in this
change by allowing both new and fishermen from other regions to purchase the equipment they needed to
participate in the new industry. Some especially entrepreneurial fishermen took advantage of the incentives and
organized the movement of groups of fishermen to the south, set them up to fish and paid them a share of the
profits. Again there are no data available on the extent of this pattern of ownership, but it is likely to have lead









The fishmeal sector is currently undergoing a structural shift that involves the movement of its fishing and
processing capacity south as resources in the north are being over-exploited. It is also beginning to shift towards
the production of a higher value-added product so that profit levels can be maintained even if fish harvests drop.
The organization of artisanal fishermen has also undergone major changes over the last 30 years. During the
1960s fishermen were organized under the concept of cooperativism in a process that was parallelled in many
other sectors of the economy. The growth of cooperatives continued during the three years of the Allende
Government, bolstered by the organizational assistance and the provision of inexpensive credit offered by the
government to cooperatives. When Pinochet took power, government programs to support and encourage
cooperatives were not only dropped, but as cooperativism was seen as a leftist activity, they were actively
discouraged. Fishermen's cooperatives quickly disappeared, leaving the artisanal subsector with no organization
and consequently no lobbying power, while at the same time, the industrial sector was growing, becoming more
organized, wealthy and powerful. The most dramatic effect of this imbalance of power was the success of the
industrial subsector's lobbying efforts in delaying the passing of the new fisheries law.
The current organization of artisanal fishermen began in 1985 and was an attempt to re-create the cooperative
system of the early 1970s. This was not supported by the government and in fact, they attempted to pre-empt it
by creating a government controlled fishermen's organization [H. Chamorro, pers. comm.]. This attempt failed
and the national confederation has since continued to grow.
4.4 Domestic Supply and Demand
Despite the growth in the number of artisanal fishermen in the 1970s, artisanal production remained relatively
stable until 1980 (Figure VI 16). The reasons for this are not clear. It may have been partially due to the
decrease in domestic demand that must have resulted from the abolishment of Allende's program to provide fish
to the poor and the drop in per capita incomes. It is also likely that the production figures do not reflect any
















1978 I 1900 I 1902 1904 1996 I 198O I 1990
1975 1977 1976 1981 1983 1885 1987 1889
82
Beginning in 1980, the artisanal harvest increased rapidly to fill the increased export demand. However, the
domestic market remains important, especially for the smallest operators within the artisanal subsector. As
discussed in a previous section, the market is small because of Chile's small population and its low per capita
consumption of fish. Whether or not this low domestic fish consumption, which did show a drop of about one
kilogram per capita per year between 1980 and 1981 (Table VI 3), is related to structural adjustment is not
clear. Discussions with academics generated several possible causes for low fish consumption including: poor
marketing and presentation of the products; high prices relative to substitute products (which may have been
driven up due to the demand for fish from the export market); greater availability of substitute products
resulting in lower prices (eg. industrialized chicken production began in 1980/8 1); the low status of fish relating
to traditional tastes and preferences; and lack of consistent supply and quality. It has also been suggested, that
while much was done to support the industrial subsector and the export industry, little has been done in the past
twenty years to support the artisanal fishermen serving the domestic market. As a result, this subsector
continues to suffer from inadequate access to markets due to the poor market infrastructure.
4.5 Cost Structures
Current cost data were available for selected types of artisanal and industrial vessels in the VII?' Region (Tables
VI 4 and VI 5). These indicate labour is the single greatest component of the variable costs of the artisanal
vessels and the industrial purse seiners. The industrial trawlers have a relatively low labour cost, but fuel and
oil make up about 50 percent of their variable costs.
Fuel and oil are the main imported inputs for all types of vessels. Although historical data was not available on
the cost structures of vessels, it is likely that the prices of fuel and oil, and therefore their portion of total
variable costs, have increased as the exchange rate was adjusted by the Pinochet Government. Yet in the
artisanal subsector, they still make up only seven to 13 percent of the total variable costs. In the industrial
subsector fuel and oil make up a much greater portion of variable costs (about 30 to 50 percent), but as the
production of these vessels is sold in foreign markets, the increased expense is likely offset by the increased
revenues.
Data on the cost structures of the processing industry were unavailable, but discussions with industry
representatives revealed that a distinction can be made between the input costs of those serving the domestic
market and those involved in fish meal manufacturing and fish processing for export markets. Plants competing
on the world market are the largest and most capital intensive. Some of their capital equipment is imported, but
again, because they are selling on the world market, higher revenues offset the higher cost of this equipment.
Those plants serving the local market are not in competition with the exporting firms and can therefore afford to
be smaller and less capital intensive. Most of their capital equipment is either domestically produced or
purchased second hand from other plants. As capital, labour and fish are the main inputs of the industry, they
are less directly affected by the exchange rate policy.
The main impact of structural adjustment on the fish processing plants serving the domestic markets is related to
the fishery resource. Fluctuations in the supply of raw material can lead to over-capitalization as they attempt
to build the capacity to deal with the peak periods, or an inability to provide a consistent level of supply to their
customers.
4.6 Socio-economic Impacts
Almost immediately after seizing power in 1973, Pinochet abolished the previous government's program to
purchase fish from artisanal fishermen to distribute to the poor. This had a direct negative effect on the poor,
while at the same time reduced fishermen's incomes. But most of the socio-economic impacts of structural
adjustment were indirect, relating to its role in the depletion of fisheries resources and the structural changes in
the fishing industry discussed in the previous sections. Many fishing communities are now facing economic
problems associated with declining stocks due to overfishing and pollution from industrial development and
Source: Field data and secondary data from CORFO and IFOP
TabLe VI 5 Cost Structures of Various Types of Industrial Vessels, VIII Region,
Decener, 1990.
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inadequate access to markets due to poor market infrastructure and monopoly among the intermediaries. In
addition to these economic problems, rural fishing communities, especially in the south, have not had access to
the same level of health care and education enjoyed by Chileans in urban areas.
Table VI 4 Cost Structures of Various Types of ArtisanaL VesseLs, VIII Region, Decea**r, 1990.
Source: Field data and secondary data from CORFO and IFO
As fishermen moved to the south during the 1980s, many fishing camps were established throughout the islands
in the region. Since then, these camps have become permanent homes for the fishermen and their families, but
the living standards have improved very little. The problem has been difficult to address because the families
are scattered throughout the islands, making the provision of services such as housing, education and health
care, by the state difficult and costly.
Other social problems are related to the nature of the fishery which requires that fishermen follow the resource.
Fishermen are away from home for extended periods, leaving their families dependent on the incomes that the
women are able to earn by collecting mussels on the beach, selling crafts, and raising sheep and poultry.

















Gross Revenues 28,800 100 18,720 100 26,000 100 16,848 100 14,580 100
Variable Costs
FueL & Oil 939 3 1,178 6 1,504 6 1,221 7 1,221 8
Labour 9,720 34 6,106 33 8,109 34 6,628 39 5,267 36
ALL Other 2,498 9 2,486 13 3,434 14 2,810 17 2,810 19
Total Variable 13,157 46 9,770 52 13,047 54 10,659 63 9,299 64
Costs
Return to Boat 15,643 54 8,950 48 10,953 46 6,189 37 5,281 36














Gross Revenues 794,970 100 593,505 100 337,590 100 481,800 100
VariabLe Costs
FueL & OiL 92,079 12 75,899 13 53,129 16 52,451 11
Labour 168,201 21 123,551 21 65,934 20 23,407 5
All Other 84,609 11 52,060 9 33,525 10 29.133 6
TotaL VariabLe 344,888 43 251,509 42 152,588 45 104,990 22
Costs
Return to Boat 450,082 57 341,996 58 185,002 55 376,810 78
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Incomes are generally low for the artisanal fishermen in the south, yet both living and fishing costs are very
high. This is partially due to transportation costs, but it is also related to their lack of bargaining power. As
fishermen in the south organize, they are beginning to realize that their incomes will be improved by working
together, combining their production and bargaining with buyers as a unit instead of being forced to accept
whatever price offered to them individually.
Many of the people who moved to the south (and other coastal areas) to harvest seaweed also live in very poor
conditions. They too established themselves in camps which have since become permanent homes without any
significant improvements in living conditions. Recently, their welfare has be further reduced because of the drop
in seaweed prices.
With the increased interest in the culturing of seaweed these people face an additional problem. Traditionally,
they have had exclusive rights to certain harvesting areas simply on the basis of their occupation of the beach.
They have not applied for the concessions because of the costs involved and because it would mean they would
have to pay taxes. With the concession system, the possibility now exists for the legal rights for these areas to
be awarded to other interests.
The increased fishing in the south has clearly been detrimental to those who were fishing in the area before
1980. On the island of Chiloe for example, people historically combined fishing with farming, and in the 1980s
added seaweed harvesting to their economic activities. These people are now facing problems in all three areas
of economic activity. In farming, their tradition has been to divide the family farm among the sons, with the
result that the average size of farms shrinks with each generation. Now most farms are only big enough to
provide food for the family's own use, leaving no surplus for sale. Due to the largely unregulated harvests of
both the artisanal and the industrial subsectors in the waters surrounding the island throughout the 1980s, the
fishery is now so seriously depleted that many fishermen do not even bother to go fishing. And finally, the
recent drop in the world price for seaweed has had devastating effects on income levels in some communities on
Chiloe. This is particularly disturbing because seaweed harvesting or cultivation has been seen as an ideal
replacement for fishing.
The combination of events in the south is expected to lead to a migration of fishermen into the cities and there
is some indication that this has already started. The concern of course, is the limited employment opportunities
available to them in the cities. Most fishermen have a relatively low education level, and little experience in
other industries. The current challenge, therefore it to keep people in the rural areas by diversifying the
southern economy.
Generally, and with the exception of the largest artisanal fishermen, incomes and living standards for the
average artisanal fisherman have not improved much in the last 20 years. Periodic booms have allowed many
fishermen to increase their consumption of consumer goods (eg. televisions, radios, stereos) giving them some
sense that things are getting better; but income levels remain low, housing is still poor, their children are not
getting better educated, and they still have no social security. In addition, many of the poorest conununities
suffer from same social problems, such as alcoholism and domestic violence, that tend to plague the poor in
North America.
S. LESSONS/ISSUES FOR FURThER STUDY
There is no doubt that the structural adjustment policies of the Pinochet Government have had an effect on the
fisheries sector of Chile. It is difficult however, to separate the impact of these macroeconomic policies from
those of the fisheries development programs implemented during the same time period. Together they stimulated
significant growth and change within the sector, which over time has led to a depletion of the resource base.
The quantitative analysis possible in this study was limited by the availability of reliable historical data,
especially economic data. While this precluded the precise measurement of the effects of structural adjustment
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on the fisheries sector, it does suggest that future study should focus on gaining a better understanding of the
economics of the industry and the relation between the economic, biological and regulatory factors that will
dictate future growth and change in the industry. Areas of future research should include:
identification of the cost and earnings structures for harvesting and processing
activities according to different vessel and gear types, species and products,
geographical area, and season.
determination of the ownership patterns, including the extent of foreign ownership,
within the various subsectors of the harvesting and processing industries.
determination of incomes and income distribution within the artisanal sector, including
the incomes of women helping fishermen and involved in marketing and processing
activities;
analysis of the strategies adopted under varying conditions by the various subsectors
of the industry (eg. responses to changes in resource abundance, markets, new
products and technologies).
identification of factors restricting incomes for fishermen, women, intermediaries, and
processors in the artisanal subsector; the domestic market for fish; the supply of fish
and fishery products; rents to boat and plant owners; and the development of the
infrastructure for processing, transport, storage and marketing.
The fisheries sector will continue to change. Chile's macroeconomic policies will continue to encourage exports
while, at the same time, harvest levels will be restricted due to the reduced resource base and the new fisheries
law. The recommended research will provide the knowledge required to understand how the various subsectors
within the industry will adapt to these conflicting pressures. It will also identify the economic variables that
should be tracked on an ongoing basis. The current fisheries statistics published by SERNAP are limited to
production data. At a minimum, prices paid to fishermen and processors should be included in the data base,
but ideally, periodic studies should be conducted to identify changes in costs and earning structures throughout
the industry.
In some of the areas identified e.g. (a) and (e), Senegal is well ahead of Chile, because fish is perhaps more
central to the economy of Senegal in relative terms. Nonetheless, each of the areas of research need is likely to
obtain government support and should useful policy lessons emerge from the research one can speculate that the
current government might be quite open to embracing them. Certainly, Chile has the required expertise on the
ground to undertake the necessary research and the ICLARM representative for Latin America and the
Caribbean has expressed interest in co-operating with IDRC/CIDA in part two of this project if it proceeds.
Source: SERNAP
Notes: (1) Pelagic species landings estimated by sLmning the landings of anchovy, pacific
mackerel, jack mackerel, sardines, and pacific herring.
(2) Demersal finfish Landings estimated by subtracting estimated pelagic landings from




Table A. Change in the Regional Distribution of
Artisanal Fishermen
Sources: 1975 - INDAP; 1979 & 1983 - SERNAP; 1989 - IFOP
TabLe B. Landings of Major Species Groups by Region and Subsector, 1990
Region Pelagic Species1 DemersaL Species2 MolLoscs All Species
Industrial Artisanal Industrial ArtisanaL Industrial
(tonnes)
ArtisanaL IndustriaL Artisanal
I 1,300,494 14,698 2,925 2,021 0 3,992 1,303,419 21,224
II 563,056 3,655 0 2,260 0 3,659 563,056 9,748
III 212,598 10,108 1,873 4,181 0 1,663 214,471 16,337
IV 99,009 25,820 5,806 6,187 0 2,682 104,815 36,144
V 153,158 16,320 11,823 12,558 7 1,556 164,988 30,707
VI 0 2 0 519 0 509 0 1,068
VII 351 259 1,993 4,991 0 1,970 2,344 8,065
VIII 2,150,622 136,689 145,975 9,526 0 4,141 2,296,597 151,151
IX 0 9 0 2,083 0 372 0 2,474
x 61 8,862 10,393 22,120 0 72,686 10,454 116,747
XI 10 7 12,282 5,175 0 1,839 12,292 9,133
XII 0 0 2,856 5,474 0 6,797 2,856 12,377
Total 4,479,359 216,429 195,926 77,095 7 101,866 4,675,292 415,175
Region 1975 1979 1983 1989
715 798 1131 1413
II 1100 1856 1923 1752
III 230 1198 1292 889
IV 1750 3746 4519 3257
V 3457 4116 3886 7281
VI 300 1179 1314 1525
Vii 351 1145 1249 1743
VIII 3525 11013 11194 11888
ix 310 660 890 1091
X 4662 7228 13965 22702
XI 452 914 1032 1356
XII 330 1426 1236 3099
Total 17182 35279 43631 57996
Source: SERNAP
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TabLe C. Landings Trend of Major PeLagic
Species
Sources: 1971-1982 FAO; 1983-1990 SERNAP
TabLe D. Landings Trend of Defnersatm Species and
MuLLuscs
DemersaL Demersal.







1971 961 158 175
1972 368 87 132
1973 192 122 188
1974 383 194 399
1975 240 261 165
1976 434 342 327
1977 19 341 621
1978 229 587 733
1979 51 598 1,619
1980 103 562 1,773
1981 325 1,061 1,620
1982 106 1,494 1,780
1983 8 865 2,823
1984 71 1,426 2,572
1985 143 1,457 2,887
1986 1,463 1,184 2,585
1987 336 1,770 2,203
1988 912 2,138 1,526
1989 1,688 2,390 1,590
1990 845 2,472 900
1981 142,431 15,538 69,220
1982 129,503 14,794 66,293
1983 127,830 33,305 71,457
1984 144,248 28,610 88,532
1985 135,566 20,857 89,102
1986 157,376 26,455 100,378
1987 274,032 30,506 107,967
1988 407,365 33,357 120,803
1989 514,180 24,248 110,474




Sources: 1976-1983: FAO Fsheres Statistics Yearbook,
1984-1990: C. Capurro, 1990.
Table E. Main Fishery Product Exports
Fresh, Frozen and
Canned Fish Fishmeat
Tonnes 1000 USS Tonnes 1000 USS
1976 12,012 26,747 198,283 63,532
1977 25,575 34,722 204,207 78,345
1978 22, 093 44,921 277,438 105,445
1979 40,057 61,052 387,181 142,677
1980 64,658 85,387 465,097 202,988
1981 66,845 102,002 455,812 198,004
1982 70,836 104,655 772,719 254,806
1983 69,218 104,738 755,074 307,571
1984 68,782 106,400 781,023 275,500
1985 64,569 117,500 1,112,698 278,900
1986 89,384 161,600 1,089,881 314,900
1987 107,480 236,500 1,095,838 358,300
1988 137,198 314,700 926,155 458,800
1989 177,455 353,500 1,293,559 507,000
1990 188,230 468,200 986,736 379,700
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VII CASE STUDY: PHILIPPINES
The Philippines is a nation of more than 7,100 islands stretched over 2,000 miles (from 5° N to 21° N) in the
South China Sea. The islands have a combined area of 300,000 square km; the claimed Economic Exclusion
Zone (EEZ) of 2.5 million square km is eight times as large. The population of over 62 million (1991 estimate)
is primarily rural, with about 10 million people in the five cities of Metro Manila and less than a million in the
next largest city.
Urbanization is primarily a post World War II phenomenon, reflecting a shift in economic activity from
agriculture, forestry and fishing to manufacturing (assembly) and commerce. These shifts have been brought
about by an active Government - controlling prices of agricultural outputs and inputs; protecting manufacturing
by tariffs and trade restrictions; making direct investments in capital intensive projects; extending loans (many
of which had to be written off later) through state controlled banks; subsidizing fuel and power and so on -
allied closely to land owning and other wealthy private groups, seen at its most extreme in the "crony
capitalism" of the Marcos era. Investment expenditures, substantially in excess of domestic savings, were
fmanced by local borrowing at controlled interest rates, by commercial and Government guaranteed foreign
loans and by trade credits. The Philippines habitually runs a deficit on current account with imports of oil and
oil products a significant item.
1 THE ECONOMY BEFORE SAPS
GDP grew at an average annual rate of 5 percent during the 1960s and even more rapidly in the 1970s. This
was "above average" for middle income oil importing countries but below rates achieved by the Philippines'
ASEAN neighbours. Growth slowed in the early 1980s and GDP fell after 1984, not recovering to its 1983 level
until 1989. During the 1960s and 1970s the Philippines population grew rapidly by international standards but
more slowly than GDP, allowing per capita income to rise to $US 680 by 1980 (valued at 1985 rates of
exchange). Population continued to grow during the 1980s at over 2.5 percent per annum, hence the slowdown
and decline in GDP reduced per capita incomes after 1981 to the levels of the early 1970s. In the last few years
there has been some improvement, but current per capita income remains well below its 1981 peak. (Figure VII
1).
The impact of reductions in per capita GDP on the poorer sections of the population has been heightened by the
maldistribution of income - over half of total family income is in the hands of the 20 percent of the population
with the highest incomes. (Data are summarized in Table VII 1.)
About 50 percent of the estimated population of the Philippines is aged 19 years or younger. The number of
people entering the labour force grew continuously throughout the 1970s and 80s because of this age structure
and because participation rates rose from below 60 percent in 1975 to around 65 percent by 1990. But many of
these new labour force participants did not find jobs and the rate of unemployment rose almost without check
through-out the late 1970s and early 1980s. The figures under-state unemployment. "Under-employment and
unemployment are serious problems; one out of five (persons employed) is officially estimated to be under-
employed and over one third of the employed are estimated to be wanting additional work." [EIU, 1990, P. 12]
Nearly half the workforce is employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing, another 21 percent are in the service
industries (fmance, government, community, social and private), and 19 percent are in transport and commerce.
While data series on legal minimum wages are published regularly, data on average wages paid are not.
Minimum wage levels are set for industry and plantation employment, and other agricultural work. Non-
plantation agricultural wages rose from P 4.75 a day in 1972 to P 20.95 a day in 1983. However, "...many
(employees) are excluded from minimum wage provisions - (those in) the public sector, export oriented and













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The rate of inflation accelerated in the early 1970's but stabilized at around 9 percent per annum between 1975
and 1979. This pattern was repeated in the early 80's before prices jumped 50 percent with the SAP measures
of 1984 and a further 23 percent in 1985. The pattern of containment followed by rapid growth was then
repeated. The food, beverage and tobacco segment of the index rose marginally less than the all items CPI. The




Changes in GOP & per- Capita GOP
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Even though there have been occasional increases in minimum wages, real wages have been in decline since
the 1960s reflecting the large numbers seeking work, the associated weakness of the trade union movement and,
in the early and mid 1980s, slackening job opportunities as the economy stagnated and then contracted. The
situation deteriorated sharply after the 1983 payments crisis. [Ibid, p. 13] In 1987 the real value of
agricultural (non-plantation) wages was P10.30 (US$0.50) a day, the same level as in 1972.
There is widespread recognition that the rapid growth of the 1970s was accompanied by growing levels of
poverty and under-employment. Despite this, national surveys show improvements in broad indicators of health.
Source: Kent, 1987
As a lag between a slowdown/decline in economic activity and decline in indicators of health of the population
can be expected, it is likely that these (dramatic) improvements did not continue in the latter part of the 1980s.
Indeed, later studies might show these figures to have been ephemeral.
TABLE VII 2 Indicators of Health
1970 1980 1985
crude death rate (# /1000 pop'n) 11.8 8.7 5.4
infant mortality rate (#11000 births) 45.5 40.2 32.7
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Daily per capita available food supply, calorie and protein and
daily per capita food consumption, calorie and protein intakes and
recommended daily allowances (RDA), Philippines, 1970-81.
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Regalado and Gonzales plot apparent per capita available food supply in 1972 to 1981 (from food balance sheet
data) against food consumption trends based on Ministry of Agriculture and Food consumption survey data.
Their results, reproduced as Figure VII 2, show an increasing divergence between food availability and food
consumption, with consumption increasingly falling below recommended daily allowances.
Through-out the 1970s and early 80s the Philippines had substantial internal (investment greater than savings)
and external (imports greater than exports) imbalances (Figure VII 3). These imbalances were financed by
borrowing abroad, by domestic credit, and by printing money. The attribution of the aggregates should be
viewed with caution as the large operating deficits of some public corporations were not formally recognized by
the National Government until the re-organization of the banking sector which took place during the SAP
process. Writing of a later period the World Bank notes "... if all transfers from the National Government to
public corporations were factored in, the deficit of the latter would be higher. Finally, the operating deficits of
the Central Bank have been rising since 1987 and are currently about as large as those of the National
Government" [World Bank, 1990 p. 36].
Credit extended by the banking sector to the public sector rose from P3.4 billion in 1971 to P46.4 billion in
1983, an average annual rate of increase of 14 percent. Credit to the private sector grew at an average rate of
16 percent per annum. All measures of the money supply grew rapidly in the period 1970 - 1983, and at rates
well in excess of monetary GDP. This accommodating monetary stance, coupled with administrative regulation
and guidance, ensured that both nominal and real interest rates remained relatively low throughout the period
increasing only with the implementation of SAP measures in 1984.
Not surprisingly Government revenues fell far short of expenditures throughout this period. For revenues, the
government relies heavily on regressive indirect taxes and duties, with very little collection of direct taxes. In
1966 income taxes were 19 percent of total revenues and had increased to only 21 percent by 1986. In the same
period revenue from indirect taxes fell from 59 percent to 57 percent of the total revenues.
The cost of borrowing also affected expenditures. Beginning in the mid 1970s, the share of expenditure going to
service government debt rose substantially and, by the end of the 1980s, debt service (interest and amortization
on an obligation basis) accounted for over 40 percent of government expenditure.
The Philippines has had a protectionist trade regime ever since import restrictions imposed by the government in
response to a balance of payments crisis in 1949 became entrenched. Tentative attempts at liberalization were
made in the early 1960s and again at the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, but they met with little success
and were aborted. In 1979 the average rate of effective protection for import competing manufactures was over
58 percent - along with numerous quantitive restrictions. The effect of these restrictions was to enrich the ruling
group (the Marcos regime used the patronage of protection for political and material ends) at the expense of
labour intensive exports and agriculture. In the 1970s, protection and other Government policies led to the
transfer of more than 5 percent of GDP out of agriculture [Jayasuriya].
The lack of incentives for exports and the demand for imports for industrialization and consumption, ensured
that the Philippines ran a deficit on current account throughout the period of 1970 to 1983. The composition of
exports changed quite dramatically over this period. Exports of agricultural and forest products accounted for 72
percent of all exports in 1971. By 1983 they accounted for only 36 percent but remained significant in value
terms. Exports of fish were less than 1 percent of all exports until 1976, accounted for 2 percent by 1980, and
became more significant thereafter. Imports are dominated by oil and oil products and capital goods. Imports of
materials for assembly and embroidery have grown rapidly. The balance of trade in fish and fish products
(excluding fish meal) was adverse until 1977 and significantly favourable (over 10 percent - in absolute terms -
of the overall trade balance) after 1984.
Merchandise terms of trade deteriorated by over 50 percent between 1971 and 1983 as a result of the oil price
increases of the 1970s and generally falling prices for agricultural commodities. Despite this, export volumes





The exchange rate was managed in conjunction with this trade regime. From a rate of P6.48 to the US$1.00 in
1971, the rate was devalued to P8.60 in 1982 and to P11.19 in 1983. These devaluations were far less than
changes in relative prices would indicate. The real rate of exchange appreciated and the competitiveness of the
Philippines deteriorated.
The push for industnalisation was sustained by borrowing abroad, both officially and on commercial terms.
Borrowing, already substantial in the early 1970s, increased markedly as oil prices increased. Most borrowing
was public and publicly guaranteed debt. By 1983 debt outstanding was equivalent to three years of exports and
debt servicing was 36 percent of exports.
Growth in GDP alone suggests that the Philippines economy performed satisfactorily through-out the 1970s and
into the early 1980s. An educated and relatively well skilled workforce, abundant natural resources and an
apparently dynamic local entrepreneurial group led many to see the Philippines as a potential South East Asian
dragon. Such a view overlooked the shaky foundations of much of the "progress" of the 1970s and the
weaknesses in policy making. These were exposed by the second oil price shock and collapse in prices for
primary commodities [Jayasuriya]. The Philippines demand for external credit increased just as the supply
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2 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES AND THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS
The IMF imposed an exchange rate devaluation on the Philippines in 1970 which, in retrospect, can be seen as
a prelude to the storms of the 1980s.
2.1 SAP Measures: "Weak", "Classic" and "Never Say Sorry"
The IMF and the World Bank have, to varying degrees, influenced Philippines economic policy since the first
US$200 million SAP loan in 1979/80. Since then there have been:
in 1983/84, a $US 302 million SAP loan and a $US 150 million Sector Adjustment
Loan (SECAL) for agricultural inputs;
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in 1986/87, a $US 300 million Sector Adjustment Loan for economic recovery;
in 1989, a $US 500 million Sector Adjustment Loan for economic recovery.
In addition the Philippines has drawn around $US 1 billion from the IMF throughout the 1980's.
The 1979/80 Bank loan conditions sought to liberalise tariffs, trade restrictions and interest rates. "Classic" IMF
and World Bank conditions were attached to the 1983/84 and 1986/87 SAPs and SECALs. They included:
cuts in Government expenditures (although not specifically directed to jobs as, the
Bank believes, "the Government bureaucracy remains small" [World Bank, 1990] a
view refuted by a visit to any Government department);
increases in Government revenues ("the most striking feature of the (tax) system is the
country's very low tax burden" [World Bank, 1988 p. 22]);
re-structuring and privatising public corporations and ending Government direct
investment in capital intensive projects;
further liberalisation of interest rates, tariffs, trade policies, the exchange rate and the
prices of agricultural inputs and outputs;
tight monetary and credit policies.
The immediate benefits from adopting these measures were to come from some relief in external debt
obligations and, over a ten year period, from a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme which transferred,
on highly concessional terms, 10.3 million hectares of farm land to 3.6 million tenant and landless farmers.
By 1988 it became clear (if not acknowledged) that the 1983/84 and 1986/87 measures had, in effect,
"corrected" the external imbalance by worsening the internal imbalance (see Figure VII 2). "After three years of
strong growth, the Philippines economy is entering a critical phase. In the absence of policy changes a reversal
in performance is a distinct possibility. Its origin is the significant rise in domestic debt and debt servicing costs
that has accompanied the adjustment effort." [World Bank, 1990 p. 35]
The prescription of the 1989/90 SAP - negotiated in March 1989 and revised in December 1989 - was more of
the same. "The programme gives top priority to fiscal adjustment (both raising revenues and cutting
expenditures).... and complementary monetary and exchange rate policies. In addition measures have been
proposed to reduce interest rates." [World Bank, 1990, p. 231
2.2 Macro Economic Impacts of SAP Measures
The macro impacts of these adjustment programs were diffused by politics and subsequent events.
For example in 1981 and 1982, a series of important trade policy reforms were implemented as part of the
conditions of the first loan in 1979/80, but the process was interrupted by the crisis that followed the
assassination of Bemgno Aquino in 1983.
Although measures to reduce tariffs on final goods are politically sensitive and have still to pass Congress
[Jayasuriya 1990, p. 17], SAPs have been effective in liberalizing trade. The conditions of the 1983/84 SAP
allowed temporary new surcharges on imports (3 percent in December 1983, 10 percent in June 1984 and 5
percent early in 1985), but pressure for trade liberalisation was sustained and by the end of 1985, substantial
changes in the trade regime had been achieved. Between 1980 and 1986 effective protection rates were halved,
the number of "banned" items fell from 1,038 to 193, and the number of "regulated" items fell to 675 from
about 1,500. The conditions of the 1986/87 loan - negotiated with the Aquino government - continued this
thrust. Between 1986 and mid-1988 1,230 items, many of them raw materials and intermediate inputs, were
deregulated.
The 1979/80 measures had little impact on interest rates; the 91 day Treasury bill rate rose from an average rate
of 12.2 percent during 1979 to an average of 14.5 percent in 1983. However, subsequent measures led to an
increase of Treasury bill rates to 37 percent in 1984 and 27 percent in 1985. Interest rates dropped in 1986 and
1987, but climbed back to almost 25 percent by 1990.
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The impacts of measures to restrain demand were immediate and severe. GDP was 9 percent lower in 1984 than
in 1983 and fell a further 7 percent in 1985. GDP per capita, already declining from its 1980 peak, fell 20
percent in two years, returning incomes to levels of the 1970s. GDP recovered to its 1983 level by 1988 and
grew 5 percent in 1989, but growth slowed in 1989 and has perhaps ceased in 1990 and 1991.
Unemployment increased from four to five or six percent between 1980 and the mid 1980s, and peaked at 11.2
percent in 1987. This was partially the result of the increased participation rates which had the effect of adding
4.5 million people to the labour force.
Exchange rate devaluations of 25 percent in 1983, 50 percent in 1984 and 12 percent in 1985, reductions in
subsidies on power and fuel oil, and increases in minimum wages, all had dramatic impacts on prices. The all
Philippines CPI rose 50 percent in 1984 and a further 23 percent in 1985. Inflation slowed dramatically in 1986,
but had crept back up to over 10 percent per annum by 1989.
The National Government's budget deficit fell between 1982 and 1983 as expenditure was contained and
revenues increased. There-after increases in revenues (substantial in 1987) were usually matched by increases in
expenditures. While the Government and IMF agreed to continue deficit inducing expenditures on infrastructure,
annual typhoons, a severe drought in 1989/90, an earthquake in July 1990 and the Mt Pinatabo disaster in 1991
imposed heavy additional demands on Government funds. As a result, the government deficit remains at high
levels.
The internal (investment/saving) imbalance, dramatically reversed in 1985 through 1988 (a consequence of
depressed demand, high interest rates and fmancial sector re-structuring), re-emerged in 1989 and 1990 as
economic activity picked up. The external (import/export) imbalance followed a similar pattern, the deficit
falling to less than 1 percent of GDP in 1986 before ballooning to SUS 4.0 billion, over 9 percent of GDP, in
1990. As external debt had been re-structured as part of the Bank's adjustment process, servicing external debt
did not become more onerous. Pressure for "broadening the scope and deepening the intensity of structural
adjustment reform efforts" [World Bank, 1990, p. (i)J came from "the significant rise in domestic debt and
domestic debt servicing costs that has accompanied the adjustment effort" [World Bank, 1990, p. 35].
The Bank appears to be tying further disbursements to the government's success in increasing its revenues and
reducing its deficit. The Manila Bulletin of November 2nd 1991 headlined the Government's need for P18.7
billion in new revenues to get the consolidated public sector deficit below the limit (of P43.2 billion) agreed
with the IMF. Other aid is tied to "counterpart" funds from the Government - funds which the Government
appears not to have. The Manila Bulletin of October 30th reported that "Billions of pesos of foreign assisted
projects, including some of the Aquino government's top 10 priority projects, will be jeopardised if new
revenues of P18.75 billion are not raised in 1992". The Finance Secretary was quoted as saying that the 1992
budget sets aside only P3.76 billion for counterpart funds. These pressures may restrain Government
expenditures on major projects, but not on responses to natural disasters. However, the IMF has agreed that the
expenditures made as a result of natural disasters will not count against conditionality criteria.
This concession recognises reality - but not the reality that the SAP measures followed (to some extent) since
1979 have not altered the structure of the Philippines economy. While the impacts of many parts of the SAP
medium term plan are still working through the system, the more controversial plans remain to be implemented.
It is not clear however, that "broadening the scope and deepening the intensity of structural adjustment reform
efforts" will be more successful.
3 FISHERIES IN THE PHILIPPINES
The fisheries sector in the Philippines accounts for about 5 percent of GDP and provides employment for over
one million people or about 5 percent of the work force. Exports of shrimps, prawns and tuna contribute
significantly to the trade balance. But perhaps the most important role of the sector is as a provider of food and
income, especially for those in the fishing villages along its thousands of kilometres of coastline, who are
engaged in "municipal" marine fishing. A marine fisherman (there are no women on the boats, continuing the
NCR 7 7,56]. 0.98
I Ilocos 13 4,134 3.06
II Cagayan Valley 8 2,713 2.86
III Central Luzon 17 5,863 2.93
IV South Tagalog 128 7,692 16.68
V Bicol 83 4,198 19.77
VI Western Visayas 140 5,439 25.81
VII Central Visayas 26 4,446 5.89
VIII Eastern Visayas 35 3,243 10.65
IX Western Mindanao 192 3,061 62.65
X Northern Mindanao 68 3,438 19.71
XI Southern Mindanao 40 4,132 9.69
XII Central Mindanao 20 2,802 7.29
777 58,722 13.24
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seafaring belief that "women are bad luck" on boats) is classified as municipal if he fishes without a boat, or
with a boat with a capacity of less than 3 gross tonnes (GT), and in waters up to 7 km offshore. Others, of
similar social status, who raise fish in rivers, ponds and lakes, are engaged in municipal inland fishing.
Commercial fishermen use boats with a capacity of over 3 GT and (are meant to) fish more than 7 km offshore.
The commercial counterpart to municipal inland fishing - raising prawns, shrimp and various fish in both
freshwater and brackish water ponds -is classified as aquaculture. Marine aquaculture (mariculture or sea
farming) of seaweed, oysters and mussels is also practised. Figure VII 4 shows the fisheries areas of the
Philippines.
The commercial catch is landed at major ports; about 30 percent at the Navotas Fish Port in Metro Manila and
at other major ports (e.g. Cebu) and the large southern island of Mindanao. From here fish goes, through
myriad channels, to fresh fish markets, to processors (mainly canners), and for export - primarily to the
premium sushi and sashami markets of Japan. Municipal marine catches are either sold at local markets or, if
the infrastructure is adequate, transported to the Malabon market in Manila. While municipal fishing is
practised in all regions, the catch is not evenly distributed on a per capita basis (see Table VII 3).
Some (aqua and man) cultured products are marketed through Navotas and other markets, although product
specific marketing and distribution channels, with local representatives of final users buying locally, are
emerging. Many of the ports, and much of the infrastructure in the marketing and distribution chain - ice
making plants, freezer capacity and road links - are decrepit and overextended. Various Bank and other foreign
aid programs have and continue to attempt to improve this situation.
3.1 Fish as Food
Fish is an important source of animal protein for many in the Philippines. In 1974-76 fish provided 22.6 percent
of all protein consumed and 62 percent of animal protein [Kent, 1987, pp. 65-71]. Since this time fish has
become more expensive relative to other forms of animal protein. As own price elasticities are negative (and
decreasing as income increases) [Regaldo and Gonzales, 1987, p. 57], the relative increase in fish prices since
1976 may have reduced consumption of fish. Data from three national surveys of nutrition confirm this
hypothesis (Table VII 4). Population growth averaged in excess of 2.5 percent per annum over this period,
however, so that j2jj fish consumption increased steadily.
Table VII 3 Municipal Landings and Population, By Region
Region Fish landed1 Population2 Fish landed
per head
'000 tonnes 'OOOs kg/head
average annual landings 1982 - 1987
2 projected (moderate declines in fertility & mortality)
Sources: fish landings: Agrodev, Table 7
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There are no official studies of the pattern of utilization of fish caught so per capita consumption may only be
estimated. Drawing on various studies, Agrodev [1988, p.53] suggest that 83 percent of production is consumed
in the Philippines (67 percent as fresh, 8 percent dried, and 8 percent processed). A 1987 survey indicated that
annual per capita consumption was 40 kgs of fish, 52 percent of all consumption of animal protein sources.
Population in 1987 was estimated at 57.4 million people who would consume, at an average of 40 kgs each, a
total of 2.3 million tomies of fish. Given that total production for 1987 was only 2.2 million tonnes and net
exports were over 35,000 tonnes, it appears that 40 kgs may overstate consumption.
Table VII 4 Fish and shellfish consumption (as purchased form)
Source: National Science Development Board
(Food & Nutrition Research Institute
Nationwide Nutrition Surveys
Some of the difference may be due to under-recording own (subsistence) consumption in municipal fishing. A
study by Japan International Co-operation Agency estimates consumption at 33 kg per head in 1988 while the
FAO's food balance sheet for 1982-84 shows average annual per capita consumption to be 35.7 kg [Agrodev
1988, p. 53]. If consumption per head is taken at 33 kg, production in 1988 is 1overstated" by 288,000 tonnes.
A lot of this may be (non-edible) seaweed which is included in the aquaculture figures.
Total fisheries sector production has increased each year since the 1950s, except for 1983-86 which were years
of political upheaval and IMF austerity. Although municipal fisheries still contribute the biggest bulk of fish
production, the contributions of the various sectors have changed because aquaculture and commercial
production have grown faster than municipal production (Table VII 5). This uneven growth indicates that
particular attention is paid to technology improvement in aquaculture (including seaweed farming), the expansion
of commercial fisheries (especially pelagic fisheries) within and outside the country, and the declining fish
stocks in municipal waters.
1978 1982 1987
(kg per capita per year)
all consumers
fresh 29.2 32.0 32.0
dried and processed 8.1 8.0 8.0
% animal protein 58.8% 56.4% 55.6%
all urban
fresh 35.8 34.0 34.0
dried and processed 6.6 8.0 8.0
% animal protein 49.0% 45.6% 47.1%
all rural
fresh 25.9 38.0 31.0
dried and processed 8.8 8.0 9.0
% animal protein 66.6% 59.9% 52.1%
among small/hired fishermen
fresh 41.2 38.3 54.4
dried and processed 7.3 8.4 8.0
% animal protein 83.6% 63.7% 81.4%
among commercial fiBhermen
fresh 33.9
dried and processed 11.3
% animal protein 73.8%
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Data for commercial fishing and for aquaculture are relatively easy to collect and are therefore likely to be more
accurate than data for municipal fisheries which is compiled from reports from hundreds of landing/weighting
stations throughout the country. Data for municipal fisheries excludes for own consumption.'
Table VII 5 FSh Prockiction by SlA3sector, 1981 - 1990, in '000 Mt and Million Pesos
TotaL CoainerciaL MunicipaL AauacuLture
InLand Marine
Year Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity VaLue
1980-1990 4.0 15.8 3.9 13.0 0.4 2.1 2.6 12.0 7.9 24.4
Source: Bureau of AgricuLturaL Statistics

















Production of Fish. by Sector
1970.1990
1970 I 1672 I 1974 I 1676 1679 1980 19'82 1984 I 1986 I 1988 190
1671 1973 1675 1577 1679 1981 1993 1985 1687 1989
0 M,flIIp.I + Co.,n,.,cIaI 0 Total
The Under Secretary for Fisheries does not believe the production figures; if per capita consumption is 40














13,954 495 4,125 229 700 710 6,254 339 2,865
15,064 426 4,355 270 828 708 6,488 392 3,393
18,982 519 4,643 375 2,077 771 7,463 445 4,799
25,650 513 6,521 299 1,572 790 10,291 478 7,266
31,297 512 7,857 260 1,920 785 12,796 495 8,724
37,331 546 9,248 265 2,640 807 14,611 471 10,832
37,243 591 9,821 245 1,891 816 14,217 561 11,314
42,110 600 10,272 232 1,960 838 14,693 599 15,213
45,094 637 11,033 222 2,206 883 16,182 629 15,673
52,178 701 12,411 237 2,564 895 16,736 671 20,467
31,891 564 8,029 263 1,834 800 11,974 508 10,055
100.00 26.41 25.18 12.33 5.75 37.47 37.55 23.79 31.53
Source: 1971: Daizell et a].
1980 - 1985: BFAR
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3.2 Productivity and Investment in Fishing
Production may be increasing because more effort - more fishermen fishing more days; more boats fishing
longer hours; gear (net types and mesh sizes) that catch more fish for the same effort etc - is being put into
fishing. There are no data on catch per unit effort (CPUE), but using Agrodev's elaborate calculations of fuel
used [p.46] and area of aquaculture ponds as measures of inputs, productivity has been declining in municipal
and commercial fishing (Table VII 6).
The rise in productivity in aquaculture may be more apparent than real as the area of ponds may not be a good
measure of inputs. Fish meal would be better (but data are not available); it is generally recognized that fish in
ponds (in the Philippines) consume rather than produce fish!




catch 000 tonnes 543 875 1,045
fuel used mn gallons 22 53 133
productivity kg/gal 25 16 8
commercial fishing
catch 000 tonnes 382 518 512
fuel used mn gallons 29 29 44
productivity kg/gal 13 18 12
aquaculture
catch 000 tonnes 98 164 495
area of ponds 000 h.a. 168 176 205
productivity kg/ha 584 928 2,418
197]. 129,793 59,875 32%
1980 262,748 105,090 29%
1985 270,419 193,976 42%
Sources: catch: Table VII 4
fuel used: Agrodev p46
areas: BFAR statistics, various year
3.2.1 Investment in Municipal Marine and Inland Fishing
The major investment required for municipal fishing is in a boat (called a banca) and in gear. A banca, a marine
ply keel with outrigger stabilisers, may be from three to five metres long, or up to nine metres if powered by a
6 to 16 HP gasoline engine. Over 40 percent of all bancas are motorised. A motorised banca with gear costs, in
1991, between P20,000 [Figures in Smith & Mines inflated by the CPu and P55,0002. The number of bancas
increased by almost 100,000 between 1980 and 1985 and by a further 30,000 - 50,000 (our estimate) between
1985 and 1990:
Table VII 7 Number of Bancas 1971 - 1990
Non %
motorised Motorised motorised
2 Discussions with H. Caleste, Chairperson, Bolinao Fisheries and Fish Dealers Association.
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Motorization (aided by a World Bank programme in the mid 1970s) has had three major implications:
it has increased the time spent actually fishing (instead of travelling to and from the
fishing site) and it allows boats of all sizes to use nets, which are more efficient than
gears used traditionally;
it linked municipal marine fishermen more firmly into the market economy,
particularly for directly (fuel, engines) or indirectly (polyester for nets) imported
inputs;
it has increased the dependence on suppliers of credit for more expensive gear and for
fuel;
it has allowed fishermen to go outside their traditional areas where conservation may
have been self-policed, and into the areas of others (i.e. it encouraged "open access"
in all fishing areas).
There are no data describing ownership of bancas, but some inferences can be made. The ICLAB.M study of
gill netters in San Miguel Bay reports that "of the 20, 11 were owner operated " [Smith & Mines, p. 37].
Discussions with the Chairperson of the Fisheries & Fish Dealers Association (BOFFIDA) in Bolinao suggested
a similar proportion. Non-owner operators in Bolinao were fish buyers/dealers. The interests of fishermen and
fish buyers are not considered as antagonistic as evidenced by their joint organization BOFFIDA who, in
addition to owning and funding bancas, funds fishing trips.
Capital may come from outside the industry as public credit schemes are notorious. The Development Bank of
the Philippines Small Foreshore and River Fishermen Program loaned P245 million over three years from 1975.
Nationwide, less than 1 percent of these loans were paid off [Smith & Mines, 1982, p. 15]. A subsequent
program (Biyayang Dagat), and the World Bank scheme for purchase of engines had similar repayment rates.
This free capital appears to have substantially increased fishing capacity without any regard to fish stocks, the
ability of the industry to replace this capital, or the distribution of benefits. The view (and caveat) of Smith and
Mines can be applied more widely:
"i6dthough there are no hard data to substantiate it, it appears that the expansion in fishing
power ... has been substantial. Because these units are now wearing out . . * the economics that
fishermen face today are quite different from the economics that prevailed (when the loan
schemes were introduced.)" [op cit, p. 15]
Over the last decade, and probably for much longer, fishing methods used by municipal fishermen have not
changed much. Both motorized and non-motorized bancas' use hook and line and gill nets; the motorized bancas
use gill nets, bag nets, ring nets, and various seines. In terms of contributions to catch, the most important type
of gear are gill nets, which accounted for 30 percent of municipal catch in 1986, followed by hook and line
which accounted for 28 percent [Agrodev, 1988, p. 38].
Inland municipal fishermen capture fish, crustaceans (primarily shrimps) and mulluscs (clams and snails) in
rivers, lakes, reservoirs and freshwater marshes. Production has declined from a peak in 1983 to around
240,000 tonnes in 1990. While the area under ponds has increased, these are used for aquaculture.
3.2.2 investment in Municipal inland Fishing and Aquaculture
Aquaculturists or fishfarmers raise fish, crustaceans, seaweeds and mulluscs in pens, cages, rafts, bamboo
poles, and other structures in open waters (marine bays, rivers, lakes, reservoirs) and in fresh and
brackishwater fishponds. Production has steadily increased from the mid 1970s to 671,000 tonnes in 1990.
Forty-three percent of total aquaculture production is seaweed, 31 percent is milkfish, and 12 percent is tilapia.
Although shrimp production was only 8 percent of total aquaculture production, the export market for prawns
spurred significant investments in the intensive and semi-intensive culture of tiger prawns in brackishwater
ponds in the 1980s.
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There are no data on ownership of the substantial investment required. Simple fish pond cost about P150,000
per hectare to develop, while the concrete ponds and powered pumps for prawn growing cost millions of pesos.
Based on the pond areas given above, and on average costs of P500,000 per hectare, investment in fish ponds
may be estimated at:
between 1971 and 1977, P2.6 billion;
between 1977 and 1985, P8.5 billion.
Many of the ponds used in aquaculture and marine inland fishing have been cut in mangroves (whose
importance for marine fishing is discussed below); others have taken land from agriculture. On the island of
Negros, ponds have replaced sugar cane, itself an export crop.
3.2.3 Investment in Commercial Fishing
Commercial fishing boats have a capacity of over three GT and (supposedly) fish less than 7 kilometres (soon to
be 15 kiloinetres) from shore. Development of the fleet is a post World War II phenomenon when wooden boats
were built in the Philippines. Since the 1970s, under pressure from Japanese and Taiwanese fleets, larger and
larger second- hand boats were imported and with them improved gear. The size and composition of the fleet in
1986 is shown in Table VII 8.
BFAR figures put the fleet's total capacity in 1989 at 152,800 GT. If an extra 1,000 vessels, nearly doubling
the gross tonnage, were added in three years, stories of difficulties of investing are as believable as many fish
tales.
The larger vessels have extended the areas fished even beyond the Philippines EEZ. In mid 1988 seven
Philippine tuna purse seiners fished the waters of Papua New Guinea and others are known to fish in waters
claimed by Malaysia and Borneo. All this fish is landed in the Philippines and counted as local production.
Table VII 8 Coemercial Fishing Fleet 1986
Source: Agrodev (from BFAR) p. 40
3.3 Employment, Income and Returns
In broad terms, fisheries in the Philippines account for 5 percent of income (GDP) and 5 percent of
employment. Data by sector are harder to come by.
3.3.1 Municipal Fisheries
About one million people derive their livelihood from municipal fishing [Agrodev, 1988, p. 65]. For most,
fishing is seasonal because of the weather and the species availability, but not all are able to find alternative
sources of income during the off season. In Zumarraga, male household members earn income from retail trade,
basket weaving and seasonal manual labour [BASIBFAR, 1989, Table 8]. In Castillo, gill netters "had no
alternative occupation during non-fishing (forced idle) days. .. when they ran out of money . .they asked boat
owners for loans .. to be repaid from future catches." [Smith & Mines, 1982, p. 31]. Generally, returns to
municipal fishermen are poor; some estimate that almost 40 percent of fishing families have incomes below the
poverty line [Agrodev, 1988, p. 65].
3 - 19 tonnes 1318 13,411 58 16
20 - 99 tonnes 794 35,189 35 42
100 - 199 tonnes 118 15,403 5 18
> 200 tonnes 53 19,504 2 23
2,283 83,507 100 100
Total
Size of vessel No. capacity of of capacity
(G.T.) no.
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While total production is rising, catches per boat are declining. Tables VII 5 and VII 6 suggest a fall per banca
of 21 percent between 1971 and 1985. Agrodev relate "rapidly declining catch rates (in some fishing regions)
between 1977 and 1986" [p. 65]. Bolinao fishermen told of current catches of 100 kg of fish in a three day trip,
about half of what they caught 5 years ago, suggesting the decline continues.
Costs and earnings vary by type of gear and boat. Table VII 9 shows estimates of the gross returns and
expenses of municipal fishing enterprises from two studies and as estimated by a fish dealer/boat owner.
The divergence of returns to crew and boat shown in the three estimates is due to divergence in catches (there
are large differences between the regions in average catch per fisherman) [Table VII 4 and Agrodev, 1988,
Appendix 6 Table 6.51 and in quality of data collection. It may also reflect a (relatively) increasing subsidy on
the price of gasoline between 1981 and 1987 when the retail price of premium gas rose 43 percent and the CPI
by 134 percent. The landed prices of fish in Bolinao were raised in 1991 to allow for increases in gas prices -
producing rough comparability with returns in Castillo in 1981.
Table VII 9 Costs and returns from municipal fishing
Bolinao1 castillo2 Zummarraaa3
P/trip % P/annum % P/annum %
gross returns 2,000 100% 32,917 100% 4,200 100%
gas/oil. 800 40% 11,985 36% 634 15%
ice 25 1% -- -- 28 1%
food 10 1% 2,899 9% 199 5%
other expenses 15 1% 2,076 6% 140 3%
850 43% 16,960 52% 1,001 24%
return to crew/ 1,150 58% 15,957 48% 3,199 76%
boat
Sources: 1 discussion with H. Ce1este Chairperson BOFFIDA
2 Smith & Mines
BAS/EFAR
A fisherman's income depends upon how net income (gross returns minus variable costs) is shared between the
owner of the boat, the owner of the gear (who may be different from the owner of the boat), and the fishermen.
There is some uncertainty as to how the system works in practice. In Bolinao it is widely believed that the boat
is counted as one person and the net return divided equally. With a three man crew this works out to P288 for a
three day trip, about P1,800 a month per crew man. Fishermen in Bolinao, however, reported the share as 50
percent to the boat with the balance equally among the crew. This implies that each member of the crew earns
P190 per trip. In Castillo gill netters used a similar fifty/fifty system, but some owners give an incentive (from
their share) to the boat's pilot. Where the owner fishes, he shares as owner and as crew. In all systems, a little
of the catch is shared for own consumption.
A share in the catch is not the only source of return to the owner. Boat owners are often also fish dealers, truck
owners, fuel suppliers and banca bankers; and each of these occupations allows a "turn". For example, fuel
purchased on credit might be paid for by selling all the catch to the supplier at 10 percent below market price;
this can imply interest rates of 30 percent per day [Smith & Mines, 1982, p. 35]. As a dealer/transporter, an
owner in Bolinao can gross P15 per kilo of fish transported to and sold at Malabon. And a local "banker" can
earn 6 percent per month! Apparently these rates are set by the local, not national, economies and change little
over time.
Source: Trono, p. 25
Fixed and variable costs are kept low by using household labour and because there is generally not a need to
invest in a motorized banca to get to and from the farm. The potential for surplus is substantial, allowing capital
for a bigger farm to be accumulated from smaller farms. A specialist in the area (Trono) relates how seaweed
farming has changed the community on Roxhas (Green Island.) Before seaweed farming was introduced 10
years ago, Green Island was a fishing outpost for the local (municipal marine) fishing village. Now the island is
covered with houses which sprout TV antenna - although there is no power supply to the area. Further, the
seaweed farmers do not fish themselves but buy from others.
3.3.3 Commercial (offshore) Fishing
There are over 3,000 boats in the commercial fishing fleet which caught over 700,000 tonnes of fish in 1990.
The major species were scad (33 percent of the catch) and tuna (about 25 percent). Both are consumed in the
domestic market, but tuna is also exported fresh and canned for export. The tuna industry has been studied for
the fishery sector program: the following draws on that study (Philippine Tuna Sector Study Hardy International
Inc.). Tuna fishing was conducted primarily by municipal fishermen until the early 1970s, when enterprising
fishing companies adapted modern seine and ring net methods to capture large schools of tuna aggregated by
payao (a fish aggregating device). In two years a number of buying companies were formed and cold storage
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3.3.2 Seaweed Farming
One of the fastest growing segments of aquaculture is mariculture; the farming of seaweed (for carrageenans,
used in the food processing industry) oysters and green mussels and so on in coastal waters. Production of
seaweed has grown from 169,000 tonnes in 1986 to nearly 300,000 tonnes in 1990. Production of oysters
declined slightly in this period while production of mussels rose slightly.
The appeal of seaweed production is its potential for good returns (see Table VII 10). The costs of a farm are
small relative to the return. Fishing line (imported monofilament) is stretched between poles driven into the
seabed. The seaweed seedlings and soft plastic ties (for tying the seaweed to the lines) are a substantial outlay.
The seaweed is harvested after two to three months. The seaweeds (there are two main varieties) are dried and
exported through processors (powdering), some of whom have local agents for buying and transportation. A
substantial amount is exported unprocessed. Trono says 'The price of dried seaweed . .(is) influenced by the
demand in the international market. (The price of) variety A is pegged at P12/kg while variety B is P10/kg
delivered to Cebu. Farm gate price for the former is about P7/kg while P10/kg for the latter.' [Trono, 1991,
p. 3].
Table VII 10 Costs & Returns to Seaweed Production
mangrove stakes 600 labour @ P50/day
plastic ties 900 other
tools/baskets 1,430
banca (small) 1,500
monofil.ament line 3,200 sales (6 crops p.a.)
drying platform 3,800 each crop 3,700 kgs (dry)
seedlings (1st yr only) 24,000 @ P7/kg = 25,900
35,430 x 6 =
Margin: sales minus variable costs 90,000
Margin: times fixed costs covered 3
155,400
Set up/fixed costs P/h.a. Variable costs P/h.a.






plants constructed. The sector expanded rapidly until the early 1980s and has been relatively stagnant since then.
The major reasons for this are:
- the decline in catch per unit effort due to a decline in fish stocks and, in average fish
sizes;
the aging of the fleet and its unsuitability for the limits (and beyond) of the Philippines
EEZ.
This slowdown in supply (a supply which at best is seasonal) adversely affected profitability of canneries and
they have lost markets to the more efficient fleets and processors of Thailand. Despite this, two new tuna
canning companies are scheduled to open in 1991, bringing the total industry capacity to approximately 190,000
tonnes. With domestic landings steady at about 75,000 tonnes and the landings of the distant water fleet (outside
the Philippines EEZ) at 50,000 tonnes, it is likely that 65,000 tonnes of tuna will have to be imported each
year.
There are no data on canners' financial positions. One study notes "a generally gloomy picture of the sector
emerged during interviews" ERDA, 1990, p. 27]. Some of that gloom is now blamed on high domestic interest
rates. But over-apitalization is also listed as a cause of gloom, and it can be argued that the low and negative
real interest rates prior to fznancial adjustment encouraged this over-capitalization.
There are no studies drawing on detailed information from fishermen or fishing fleet operators. The one cost
and earning study that we did find presented only "stylized" data [RDA, 1990]. These figures are presented in
Table VII 11.
These figures show:
the commercial tuna fleet produces gross revenues of about P2.9 billion per annum
with net revenue to owners of roughly P0.36 billion, or about 12 percent of gross
revenue;
hand liners and bag netters (mostly bancas and so not strictly part of the commercial
fishing fleet) are the most numerous and the most profitable, yielding returns of close
to 30 percent on capital costs (which are 7 times those quoted to the author);
18 large (450 - 750 UT) purse seiners fishing at the edge or beyond Philippines' EEZ
catch almost as much tuna as the bancas, but yield a far lower return on capital;
other boats in the fleet are not profitable at current capital costs and interest rates.






































medium 6.4 50 394 18 3 13 5
large 210 18 1,026 155 1 35 42
Total 1,748 2,945 3 65 100 100 100
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One factor underlying these relatively poor returns is the decline in productivity (CPUE) in past 5 to 10 years.
The apparent "success" of the large purse seiners underscores this as they are profitable only because they fish
the relatively unexploited waters beyond the Philippines' EEZ.
Another determinant of profitability is price - whether in the domestic (fresh dried or fish sauce) market;
canning for domestic consumption; canning for export; or the premium sashmirni market. As demonstrated in
Table VII 12, ex-vessel prices are lower the further the port of landing from Manila.
At the prices shown in Table VII 10, sashniimi shippers realizes a profit of PlO per kg [RDA, 1990, p. 36].
They use about one-third (60,000 tonnes) of tuna caught locally while the remainder supplies about one-half of
the weight of whole tuna canned. At the sales price quoted by local canners (US$22 per case), canners are
loosing money. Because of competition from Thailand, they are paying world prices for both locally caught and
imported tuna. Their labour costs are on par with Thailand and "they have a competitive advantage .... in that
75 percent of their raw product comes from their local fleet, while the Thai's import all their tuna" ERDA,
1990, p. 39]. Both the Philippines and Thailand must import all the tin plate and cans they require.
TABLE VII 12 1990 Average Ex-Vessel Tuna Prices kg)(Pesos per
Species
Source: RDA, 1990, p. 30
3.4 Fish in External Trade
The Philippines both exports and imports fish and fish products but overall it is a net exporter. Exports in 1990
were valued at almost US $500 million, up from $166 million in 1980. Fish now accounts for 6.1 percent of
total merchandise exports compared with only 2.9 percent in 1980. Exports of shrimps/prawns to Japan account
for US $176 million (38 percent) of the total. Over 40 percent of all fish exports go to Japan. Table VII 13
shows how the composition of exports has changed over the years.
Table VII 13 Fish Exports
Source: BFAR, various years
1980 1985 1990
Pmn % Pmn % Pmn %
Mindanao Navotas
Skipjack
300-500 gm 7.50 10.00
0.5-1.0 kg 10.00 20.00
1.1-1.8 kg 11.00 14.00
> 1.9 kg 12.75 18.20
Ye 1 lowf in
0.3-1.0 kg 11.00 20.00
1.1-1.8 kg 13.00 20.00
1.9-20 kg 18.00 22.40
> 20 kg sashimi 100.00 100.00
domestic 18.00 20.00
Bonito
under 300 gm 6.00 10.00
over 300 gm 7.50 11.20
tuna 491 39% 1,132 32% 2,861 25%
shrimps/prawns 154 12% 1,177 34% 5,436 47%
seaweed 55 4% 382 11% 1,192 10%
other 551 44% 805 23% 2,040 18%
1,251 100% 3,496 100% 11,529 100%
Exports of shrimps rose from 2,000 tonnes in 1980 to 15,000 tonnes in 1987 but have recently declined slightly.
Their importance in terms of value is even more pronounced. Exports of chilled and frozen tuna fell from
47,000 tonnes in 1980 to 11,000 tonnes in 1987, a decline that was not offset by the slight rise in exports of
canned tuna from 18,000 to 26,000 in 1987. Fluctuations by value are even more marked, reflecting the
volatility of tuna prices.
The Philippines imports fresh tuna to keep the canning industry going during the offseason in its own tuna
fishery), and as well as canned fish and fishmeal. The importance of the latter has grown with aquaculture has
grown (Table VII 14).
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The restrictions on imports after the SAP program account for the fall in fishmeal imports in 1985. "Trade
liberalization" was a major factor in the rise to 1990 levels.
Fishing boats, fishing gear and equipment used in aquaculture, polyester for net making, and tin plate for
canning are the major items imported directly for use in the fishing sector. Fuel oil is the major indirect import.
On a direct basis, fish earns about in exports for every $1 of imports.
3.5 Fish, A Renewable Resource?
There is widespread agreement among observers that the Philippines' waters are overfished. There is an
increasing awareness of the environmental damage that aquaculture does to itself, to agricultural lands, and to
coastal fisheries. There is also a growing realization that other economic activities (e g mining, waste and





Species Pmn % Pmn % Pmn %
274 100% 118 100% 1,854 100%
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practices, particularly blast fishing (using dynamite), are destructive. While there are many regulations designed
to prevent these practices and consequences, few are effectively enforced.
3.5.1 Marine Fish Stocks
Fish are attracted to the relatively shallow waters of the coastal fisheries by the quantity and variety of food
available. The principal determinants of the biomass are coral reefs, hard ground areas and mangroves. There is
no overall assessment of the extent of damage to coral reefs, but the Environmental Management Bureau notes
that" as early as 1977 the country's coral reefs (were) observed to be in progressive stages of degeneration"
[EMB, 1990, p. 48]. Coral is destroyed by natural calamities, siltation (a consequence of forestry and
agricultural practices), destructive fishing practices (blast fishing, muro-ami4, collection of corals (for
ornamental, handicraft and construction purposes), and by industrial and agricultural pollution. EMB [p. 41]
notes that "the quality of the country's coastal waters rapidly deteriorated over the past decade primarily due to
sewage and industrial effluent from urban areas, tailings from mining activities, oil from shipping operations
and agricultural runoff".
Untreated sewage and runoff in Metro Manila is discharged into Manila Bay, one of the most intensively fished
bays in the country. Red tides5 have been noted in Manila Bay along with rapidly increasing E coil counts. The
Department of Agriculture proposes to close Manila Bay to fishing before the end of 1991, a proposal expected
to be strongly resisted by commercial and municipal fishermen.
Mangroves are used for charcoal, fuel wood and in house building. They have been long threatened by the
expansion of coastal communities and are susceptible to damage from monsoon winds, storms and typhoons. In
recent years the rapid growth of aquaculture has hastened their decline as about 95 percent of the almost
300,000 hectares of fish ponds have been formed from mangrove areas. Gomez [1988] says that in the
Philippines mangrove areas have shrunk to about 25 percent of their original cover.
The impact of this loss of habitat shows up not in reduced catches, but in greater efforts to maintain volumes.
For small pelagic (surface to mid ocean swimming) fish, DaIzell et al [1987] argue that the maximum
sustainable yield was reached around 1975. The substantial additional investment in boats and gear to increase
effort since then has been both economically inefficient and destructive of fish stocks. They suggest that
"reduction of effort by about 70 percent would not lead to a reduction in catch in the long run. Rather, the catch
per effort and profitability of those fishermen left in the industry would increase appreciatively." The situation
of demersal (bottom swimming) fish stocks parallels that of pelagic stocks [Silvestre, 1988].
Anecdotal evidence, and the changing practices of commercial and municipal fishermen, reflect these pressures.
Commercial fishermen have increased the size of their boats and fish to the limits of Philippine waters and
beyond. Some even risk loosing their gear and boats by fishing without permission in the territorial waters of
other nations. A "jackpot catch" used to be a school yielding 30 to 35 tonnes but now a jackpot catch is 10 to
15 tonnes.6 Municipal fishermen now travel further from their home base to fish and spend more time fishing.
The proportion of juveniles in their catch has increased over time. Data collected by the Marine Science
Institute at Bolinao illustrate these trends (Figure VII 6). The diversity of adult fish and the number of fish seen
4 Muro-ami fishing involves groups of swimmers scaring fish toward a net by banging on brittle hard coral with
weighted lines. Commercial muro-ami fishing was officially banned in December 1988. The practice is
popular because it is very high yielding; in one study yielding almost 8 times as much fish per man hour as
the next most effective method.
5 Is a phenomenon in which floating minute marine plants with characteristic orange brown or red colour
proliferate in numbers that turn the surrounding sea red. In sheltered bays with restricted outflows these
blooms deplete all available oxygen dissolved in the water so killing fish and other types of marine life.
6 Conversation with Mannie Patore.
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as adults have both declined rapidly, particularly on the reef slope. On both the reef flat and reef slope fish
density (all sizes) is only 20 - 40 percent of the density observed on unfished coral reefs.
3.5.2 Aquaculture
Fish yields from aquaculture are relatively easier to control although economic yields, particularly from prawns,
are subject to market price fluctuations. Questions about the sustainability of aquaculture arise from its
interaction with agriculture and its impact on water tables. As use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, etc.
becomes more extensive and intensive, aquaculture ponds become polluted by runoff from the agricultural lands
[Juliano and Baylon, 1990]. Some freshwater ponds and brackishwater prawn ponds require fresh water to be
pumped from aquafiers. In many areas of the country aquafiers are being pumped out for domestic uses and for
intensive prawn farming so that water table levels fall, thus allowing the intrusion of sea water in aquifers in
coastal land areas [Saclauso, 1989]. Abandoned brackishwater aquaculture ponds cannot easily be reclaimed for
agriculture because of their salt content.
3.6 Policies and Plans
The Philippines Government is not unaware of these problems although its efforts of regulation have little, if
any, success. Over the next five years the Government's efforts are being directed by the Fisheries Sector
Program which focuses on twelve major fishing areas and responds to:
- source depletion in the coastal zone;
widespread environmental damage;
poverty among municipal fishermen;
low productivity of aquaculture; and
under utilized offshore and EEZ water.
The program is funded by the Asian Development Bank and Japan's Organization for Economic Co-operation
Fund. Many feel that the program, while well-intentioned, will be swamped by responses to much more
powerful population and economic pressures. We note below that many efforts in the past have provided short
term gains (and not necessarily to small fishermen) at the expense of sustainable increases in the well being of
those to whom the project is directed.
4 SAPS & THE FISHERIES SECTOR
This section gives an overview of how the economic policy measures implemented under various SAPs' and
SECALs' have impacted on the fisheries sector in the Philippines. The most important impact is the pressure on
fish stocks from the increasing demand for fish as food, especially among communities relying on municipal
marine fishing. Some of the secondary impacts are:
- the impact of relative price changes on real earnings of the fishing sector;
the impact of devaluation of the peso on the prices of materials imported directly by
the fisheries sector (e.g. tin plate used in canning) and imports used indirectly (e.g.
gasoline used by fishing boats and fish transporter, ice made with electricity generated
from imported diesel oil);
the impact of devaluation on (peso) prices of exported prawns /shrimps, seaweed and
canned tuna;
the impacts of interest rates on investment in commercial fishing.
4.1 Fish as Food
Fish is an important source of animal protein for most groups in the Philippines' society, but it is especially
important to municipal marine fishing people who consume little or no other animal protein. For many of these
people fishing is the primary, if not only, source of income from which to purchase rice and other necessities. It











































































































































































Two efforts (prior to SAP) to improve the technology used by municipal fisherman - the Biyayang Daga
programs for the Development Bank of the Philippines and the World Bank banca motorization project - have
compounded rather than alleviated the pressures on the fish stocks and on fishermen. The programs increased
fishing efficiency. The first program saw an increase in the size of boats and increases in the sophistication of
gear, mostly on boats and gear of commercial class vessels that then fished in municipal waters. The banca
motorization project allowed fishermen to fish outside their "home" waters without regard to the sustainability of
their catches. The projects also increased dependence upon imported inputs and so opened municipal fisherman
to feedbacks from a wider range of economic measures than in the past. These are discussed below.
4.2 Real Earnings in the Fisheries Sector
Using data on production by weight and by value in the 1992-1995 Fisheries Management and Development
Plan [Department of Agriculture, 1991] and the CPI data in Table VII 1, it is possible to estimate the real value
of production for different types of fishing activity over the period 1981-90 (Table VII 16).
Table VII 16 shows that while the real value of total production rose over the period by 17 percent, almost all
of this was explained by an increase in the real value of aquaculture production which rose by 124 percent!
Real value of production in the commercial and marine municipal fisheries fell over the period, while that of the
inland fishery increased from 1981 to 1984 and then fell. The large increases in production in the commercial
and municipal marine sectors in the last decade, of 42 percent and 26 percent respectively, have actually led to
lower gross revenues in real terms.
Table VII 17 shows that the more than doubling of nominal receipts per tonne in the commercial and municipal
marine sectors were insufficient to keep up with the general rate of inflation. In real terms the unit value of
their catches fell by one third over the period. Only the unit values of inland fishing and aquaculture rose,
reflecting their concentration on species in high demand. Overall though, there has been a steady decline in the
real unit value of fish production in the Philippines after a decade of structural adjustment.
Table VII 16 Real Value of Production by Subsector 1981-90
(millions of 1981 pesos)
Total Commercial Municthal Aquaculture
Inland Marine
Table VII 17 Nominal and Real Value of Production per Tonne 1981-90
'000 Peso
Total Commercial Inland Marine Acruaculture
Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
1981 7.87 7.87 8.82 8.82 3.06 3.06 8.33 8.33 8.45 8.45
1984 12.33 6.76 13.03 7.14 5.26 2.88 12.71 6.96 15.20 8.33
1990 20.84 6.52 18.70 5.86 10.82 3.39 17.70 5.50 30.50 9.55
1991 13,954 4,125 700 6,264 2,865
1984 14,063 3,575 862 5,642 3,984
1990 16,347 3,888 803 5,243 6,412
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Given the large increases in the number of bancas in use in the municipal sector over the period and the
declining catch per banca, one can conclude that the real value of the catch per banca has, on average, fallen by
more than the decline in real unit values of the catch.
These measurements are, of course, in terms of real gross receipts. If, however, inputs rose in price faster than
the CPI, net real returns will have fallen even further. It is to an examination of this that we now turn.
4.3 Adjustments to Prices of Inputs
Devaluations under the SAP program - by a factor of 3 between 1980 and 1990; reductions in the subsidy on fuel
oil - so that the retail price of premium gas which had been only temporarily above P5.8 per litre in the 1980's
eventually tripled within a year to P15.95 in December 1990; and other adjustments in prices of imported inputs,
affected fisherman in a variety of ways.
4.3.1 Impacts of Fuel Price lncreases on Municipal Fisherman
Table VII 8 shows that fuel and oil accounted for nearly 40 percent of the costs of municipal fisherman compared
to 15 percent when the fuel price subsidy was relatively high - as it was apparently in 1987. For a given catch rate
and landed price, returns to the crew where substantially lowered by removal of the subsidy.
While the catch rate has declined over the years, for a variety of reasons mentioned previously in this report, the
landed prices of fish have risen. In Bolinao, where maximum (retail) prices of fish in the local market are set by
the municipality, prices in 1991 were (on average) P11.5 per kilo higher than prices in 1989. We were told that
landed prices paid to fishermen rose from P12 per kilo before adjustments of fuel price to P20 per kilo. At the
Malabon market (the main wholesale market in Manila for fish from municipal fisheries), prices rose to cover this
increase in landed prices and the increased costs of transportation.
We cannot say whether the adjustment in landed price offset entirely the extra costs from reducing the subsidy on
fuel prices. If we can interpret the figures from Table VII 8 as confirming a return to the margins of 1981, then
fishermen have not been fully compensated because the real value of their earnings will be lower if they buy
anything in which fuel is a direct or indirect input.
Municipal fishermen have also seen the price of ice increase and the dependability of its supply worsen. Ice making
depends upon electric power generated from imported diesel oil, and power is increasingly in short supply.
4.3.2 Impacts on Aquaculture
While we do not have figures to illustrate the point, the costs of prawn farms would have risen since SAP measures
because they are intensive users of electric power. Of itself this may not have adversely affected profits of prawn
farmers as world prices in dollar terms rose and the 1988 devaluation would have increased their peso earnings.
However, it is reported that since 1988 prawn farmers' overall profits have suffered because dollar prices have
declined due to increasing pressure from competitors. Even with devaluation, local currency prices of prawns fell
by 14.5 percent in 1989 and were still below 1988 levels in 1990. Profitability is also reduced by low productivity
in the Philippines prawn farms relative to that of their competitors, and by problems with disease.
The cost of the imported fishmeal used for feed has risen, and this is not entirely made up by an increased sales
value because much farm reared fish is sold locally. Peso prices may have risen to partially accommodate this
increased cost in much the same way as the impacts of fuel price increases on municipal fisheries have been
accommodated, but, it is quite likely that the real incomes of those in aquaculture have decreased.
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4.3.3 Impacts on Fish Canners
The over-fishing of municipal waters appears to have driven an increasing number of municipal fishermen into
fishing for tuna, increasing the supply of whole fish to the canners. This has not been an ambiguous benefit,
although it may have made some contribution to what is now described as "over capitalization of plants" and "over
optimism regarding sustainable yields" [RDA, 1990, p. 28] in the canning industry. Supplies of locally caught tuna
are seasonal, so to operate year round, a canning factory has to import tuna during the typhoon season in the
Philippines. For sometime canners paid tariffs on fish imported for canning (the impact on cost of these probably
being offset by export credits). These tariffs have since been reduced in the last few years, but canners still describe
the world prices they are now paying for whole fish as "high" ERDA, 1990, p. 39].
Local supply from the banca fleet, while relatively plentiful (although becoming less so) is generally below export
quality because of its size and the difficulties in delivering it frest to the canneries. The canned product is sold on
the downscale local market for about PS per tin.
"Exact figures are not available but the cannery margin is believed to be quite small" ERDA, 199O,p. 36]. Export
grade canned tuna comes primarily from fish caught toward the limits or beyond the Philippines EEZ. While this
fishing appears to be quite profitable for fleet operators, canners in the Philippines' contend that their break-even
price "is close to US$22 per case. If so, they are in a deficit situation" [RDA, 1990, p. 36]. The canned tuna market
is very competitive. This mitigates the increase in export prices (in pesos) which may have been matched or
exceeded by the increased peso price paid for imported fish and for imported tin plate.
4.4 Effect of Devaluation on Export Earnings
Devaluation of the peso has increased (in pesos) the export earnings from prawns and tuna but, as suggested above,
the net benefits to these heavily import dependent industries may not have been large. However, seaweed farmers
use few imported inputs and therefore appear to have benefited virtually without qualification. Seaweed processors
used imported inputs in transport, powdering and packing, but drying is by the sun. Hence devaluation has increased
unambiguously the earnings of seaweed processors, encouraged expanded production, and led to dedicated collection
systems.
4.5 Interest Rates
While credit is pervasive throughout the fishing industry, it appears that interest rates in municipal fishing are set
by custom and the local economy and are not greatly influenced by macro economic policy (i.e. interest rates in
this informal sector are separable from interest rates in the formal economy). Those who seek bank credit, such as
fish canners and fishermen seeking to import or build larger fishing vessels, have been affected by the increase in
interest rates since 1984.
Fish canners complain of "high domestic interest rates (of 25 - 30 percent) for the purchase of local fish" [RDA,
1990, p. 28]. Two people we spoke to (MorallesIBFAR and Paterno) said that investment in commercial fishing
vessels had been adversely affected by interest rates, Paterno indicating that an import levy scheme (requiring an
importer to put up 100% of the value of any boat to be imported even though it may take a year to deliver) was
a substantial dis-incentive to investment.
5 LESSONSIISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDY
While it is beyond our terms of reference (and our competence) to independently evaluate the scientific evidence
for declining fish stocks in the coastal waters of the Philippines, we saw or heard nothing contrary to that view; the
coastal and perhaps much of the EEZ of the Philippines is over-fished. Because fish and fishing are so important
to the Philippines, projects or programs to "help" this sector must decrease pressure on fish stocks, not increase
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pressures as has been the experience with programs in the past. The fishery sector program that is to be launched
with the support of the Asian Development Bank and Japan's Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (section 3.6
above) recognizes these issues. Experience suggests that a great deal of attention to the details of implementation
and close monitoring of actual performance, with a capacity for rapid changes in the programs if the targets are not
being met, is warranted.
Such monitoring would be helped by studies that focus on the interaction between production and economic returns.
There is a great deal of information about fisheries and fishing but few studies of the economics of fishing - of the
ways in which fishing families and fishing villages respond to changes in prices of inputs/outputs and other economic
IsignalsN. ICLARM's study of the economics of fishing in San Miguel Bay could be both repeated and replicated.
Studies of fish catches and fish stocks could be complemented by studies of the economies within which fishermen
and their families operate. These sorts of studies require close observation over a long period of time.
It would also be helpful to have a clearer idea of how income is distributed by class, group and gender in this
sector. This would entail analysis of ownership of assets, of prices, margins and costs in the catching, processing
and marketing of fish.
Support for such research is likely to be forthcoming from government and the expertise exists localy for joint-
research if funding is available from overseas.
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VIE! CONCLUSIONS
The most striking finding of the three case studies is the dynamism of the fisheries sector, in particular the
substantial increases in the production of fish since the beginning of the adjustment programs. In Senegal and
the Philippines, it has been the domestic market which has fuelled this growth, while in Chile, the export
market has clearly been the driving force. In all cases, though, export earnings from fish in dollar terms have
risen strongly, stimulated by devaluation and other incentives. Employment in the fisheries has also grown
steadily in all three countries.
The most critical implication of this growth, is that it is now acknowledged to be putting pressure on the
resource base in each of the three countries. Indeed, given the uncertainty surrounding the accuracy of fishing
statistics, the degree of pressure on the resource base is likely under-estimated. Regulation of fishing activities,
especially by foreign fleets, and monitoring and policing the resource users generally, have assumed much
greater urgency. At the same time, however, state fiscal resources available for this task have been cut back as
part of adjustment policy, so that concerns are increasing that govermnents will not be equal to the task.
The evidence that growth in the industry is now pressing up against natural limits is, at this point, tentative,
impressionistic and even anecdotal. But there are so many signs, in terms of both over production and pollution,
that they cannot be ignored. Productivity is stagnant or declining in all three countries and has been for some
time in both Senegal and the Philippines.
Causation is not straightforward though. Since domestic consumption of fish is relatively insignificant in Chile,
and growing apparently only at the growth rate of population (1.3 percent per annum), one can say with some
confidence that the adjustment program has been primarily responsible for industry growth and the recently felt
pressure on the resource base. Growth was due to a combination of export incentives and the relative
attractiveness and accessibility of the industry to small producers facing poorer economic prospects elsewhere.
Falling real wages and rising unemployment were certainly factors improving the profitability of industrial
fishing and processing and stimulating the movement into artisanal fishing.
In both Senegal and the Philippines, where local per capita consumption levels of fish are 6 to 8 times those of
Chile, and where population growth rates are much higher (3.2 percent per annum and 2.7 percent per annum
respectively) most of the increased catch went to local markets. It is difficult to assess the role of macro
economic policy in the growth of local consumption but the recovery of overall GDP growth must have played
some role in the buoyancy of fish consumption in total. Likewise, the easing of foreign exchange constraints
reflected in rising volumes of imports, in Senegal in 1988-87 and the Philippines post 1986, appears to have
facilitated expanded outputs of fish. Yet other factors, less directly related to macro policy also assisted, in
particular, loan schemes for motors and other inputs.
Export promotion policies appear to have been successful in all three countries both in raising total sales and in
diversifying export products e.g. seaweed, prawns, new varieties of frozen products. There is some evidence
though that world prices of some of these products have weakened as a result of supply increase. Even in
Senegal, export earnings rose despite the claim that the restricted ability of the government to use exchange rate
policy, except through the cumbersome manipulation of import taxes and export subsidies, kept incentives down
to a minimum. Yet it is in Senegal, in particular, that there are signs of conflict over resource use between
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artisanal fishers catering primarily for the domestic market and industrial fishers producing for the export
market. This conflict may have been precipitated in part by the need to raise output to compensate for stagnant
or declining real prices of fish. Greater export incentives can only have the effect of enhancing friction and
putting even greater pressure on the resource base. Current plans for the sector seem not to recognize the
implications for artisanal/industrial competition, nor for the resource base. The plans to create a national trawler
fleet, in particular, while justified on the basis of an ageing fleet and a desire for a greater national presence in
this key industry, would have to be executed very carefully to avoid these problems and it is not clear that the
management capability exists to achieve this. In Chile there is growing competition between artisanal and
industrial sectors in the growing of seaweed.
It is to be noted that the age and condition of both the fleet and the processing factories is less a problem in
Chile where the export orientation of the industry has permitted high profitability and modernization. In both the
Philippines and Senegal, where export incentives have been more limited and where in the case of the former,
the local market is important in commercial fishing, real returns have fallen and capital investment i been a
problem which has not been addressed by macro economic policy. It is for this reason, perhaps, that declines in
productivity were more pronounced there than in Chile, at least until very recently. Now, as the resource limit
is approached, excess capacity is becoming evident both in Chile and the Philippines.
Lack of access to credit, both for short term working capital and for longer term capital purchases were
reported to be problems in all sectors of the industry in Senegal but less of a problem in Chile and the
Philippines. Complaints about high interest rates were common and may have had validity in the Philippines but
in Senegal, where rates were in any case much lower, there is no evidence of this being a major problem.
Austerity measures in adjustment programs had a noticeable impact on fish consumption in Chile 1973-75 and in
the Philippines 1983-86. In the former, removal of subsidies on fish consumption had a major impact but the
huge drop in real wages must also have been a factor. In the latter, falls in GDP and in real wages were the
cause. Once this phase was passed through, the fisheries sector grew steadily, contributing to output, foreign
exchange earnings and employment growth.
There are clear limits to how much light one can throw on the impact of structural adjustment measures on the
fisheries sector from secondary sources and brief on the spot visits. In the longer term, more systematic
research is needed. Priority areas would seem to be:
For Senegal -
(i) the implications for domestic consumption of fish of recent efforts to further stimulate
fish exports,
the distribution of income within the fisheries sector, and
how structural adjustment policies generally have affected fishing communities;
For the Philippines -
how best to reduce pressures on fish stocks,
the structure of costs and returns in different sub-sections of the industry, and
the distribution of income within the fisheries sector;
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For Chile -
the structure of costs and returns in different sub-sectors of the industry,
the distribution of ownership and income within the fisheries sector,
the strategies adopted by different sub-sectors in response to changing opportunities
and constraints, and
the identification of factors restricting incomes in the artisanal sector.
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The overall objective of the proposed study is to evaluate the impacts of SAPs on the fishery sectors of
Third World countries. Since the advent of the new ocean regime, coastal countries with significant
fishing resources have instituted measures to protect and at the same time obtain economic rent from
the exploitation of their fishery resources. This is even more so for Third World countries which have
come to depend on their fishery resources as a source of relatively cheap protein supply, employment,
and foreign exchange earner.
2. At the global level, fish supply plays an important role as a source of animal protein; and as the
world's population increases, and as other sources of animal protein supply become scarce, Third
World countries in particular will focus more on their fishery resources to meet their increasing
demand for animal protein. In the context of SAPs, there are some implications for the fishery
resources of Third World countries. Chief among these are: the risk of overfishing the major
commercial fish stocks because of the desire to provide food for increasing populations and to increase
foreign exchange earnings with all its biological and economic consequences, and the need to create a
balance between investment in the fishery sector and in other sectors given the nature of Third World
countries' economies. More specifically, the first section of the proposed study will:
Evaluate the importance of the fishery sector from a global perspective, and
then in terms of the economies of major seafood producing countries in the
developing regions. A number of indicators such as the volumes and values
of seafood production and trade, percentage contribution to animal protein
supply, employment creation, foreign exchange earnings and rural
development will be presented and discussed.
The link between seafood production, the availability and pricing of inputs
and the pricing of outputs will be discussed in terms of the impacts of the
policies of SAPs. Given that inputs are more expensive under SAPs due to
exchange rate re-alignment, it is important to know how this affects fish
production and whether there are any resulting input substitution. The
availability of foreign exchange for imported inputs is also of major concern.
This is directly related to the choice of technology and to the basic
organizational unit of operation and structure of the fishery sector.
Factors such as whether changes in production as a result of SAP policies
increases the fishery sector's contribution to GNP, and whether more foreign
exchange is generated (in the case of seafood exports) than that needed for
the imported inputs will be considered.
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Tariffs also increase the prices of imported inputs. This analysis will consider
whether there is evidence of any net social welfare benefit or loss as a result
of the liberalization of trade.
Overvalued currencies have also been given as one of the factors creating
disincentive to production increases. The proposed study will consider
whether SAPs policy in re-aligning exchange rates with respect to countries'
terms of trade create any incentive to increase production in the fishery sector
or whether other factors are more critical for production to increase. 'l'his
will be analyzed in terms of the open access and renewable nature of fishery
resources. It is also likely that high marketing and transaction costs lowers
the gains achieved from higher product prices due to exchange rate re-
alignment, thus reducing the intended impacts of this policy. This paper will
discuss whether trade liberalization merely shifts the incentive for rent
seeking and how it affects the fishery sector.
It is also important to analyze the socioeconomic structure of fishing
communities to determine how they are affected by SAPs. Three broad sub-
sectors can be distinguished: aquaculture, artisanal (small-scale) fisheries and
industrial fisheries. The impacts of SAPs are felt to varying degrees in these
sub-sectors because of the different nature of their activities. The aquaculture
sub-sector depends to a large extent on imported technology and is therefore
susceptible to the availability of such technology. The artisanal sub-sector is
labour intensive, in most cases uses significant imported inputs, and is
dispersed along isolated coastlines and river banks in rural areas. These
characteristics combine to make this sub-sector the most vulnerable of the
three sub-sectors when SAPs do not work well. The industrial sub-sector is
capital intensive and relies almost entirely on imported inputs. However, this
sub-sector has more flexibility to adjust to the impacts of SAPs policies
because for the most part foreign interests are involved. The proposed study
will concentrate mainly on analyzing the impacts on the first two sub-sectors.
Factors such as income distribution, appropriate technology, labour mobility,
migration, capital transfer, among others will be discussed. It will also
investigate how other external factors not related to SAPs policies affect the
performance of these sub-sectors.
3. The objectives of the second section of this proposed study will present case studies on the impacts of
SAPs policies on the fishery sector of three major fish producing countries in Africa (Senegal), Asia
(the Philippines), and Latin America (Chile). The case studies will include reviews of the performances
of the fishery sector in these countries prior to, and following the implementation of SAPs (if possible),
detailed evaluation of the sub-sectors in terms of annual trends in fish production and seafood trade
(domestic and foreign), returns to individual fishing units or groups, estimates of imported inputs in
terms of foreign exchange requirements, contribution to national income and employment, and
contribution to foreign exchange earmngs.
Bureau of Agricultural Statistics Department of
Agriculture, Quezon City, Metro Manila
Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Quezon City, Metro Manila
Marine Science Institute, University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila
ICLARM, Makati, Metro Manila
123
APPENDIX 2
LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED - PHILIPPINES
Organization Name(s
Bureau of Fisheries & Aquatic Resources Guillermo Morales
Department of Agriculture, Quezon City, Metro Head, Project Management




Chief, Support Services Division
Atty. Romeo de Sagun
Chief Legal Division
Ms Erlinda Ramos














National Commission of Women San Miguel, Mr. Rudy Aldiano
Manila, Metro Manila Administrative Officer
Ms Cherry Diaz
Environmental & Natural Resources Sector
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Navotas Fishing Port, Navotas, Metro Manila Mr. Jose Sapinoso
Assistant Port Manager
U.P. Marine Science Institute, Bolinao, Pangasinan Dr. Liana McManus
Head, Marine Station
University of Rhode Island (CRISP) Dr. John McManus
Bolinao, Pangasinan U.P. Marine Science Institute Scientist
Bolinao Fishermen and Fish Dealers Association Mr. Jesus Celeste
(BOFFIDA) President
Bolinao, Pangasinan
LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED - CHILE
U.S. Embassy Carlos Capurro
Santiago Natural Resources Advisor
PROChile Rose Marie Bedecarratz
Santiago Chief, Fishing Sector
CORPESCA Jose Rail Cannon




Food and Nutrition Research Institute Mrs. Patricia de Guzman






























Chief of Canning and Freezing
Eduardo Tarifeno
Escuela de Ciencias del Mar Maria Angela Barbieri




Direction de L'Ocan6graphie et des Pêches
Maritimes
Ministère de L'equipement, des Transports et de la
Mer
International Development Research Centre
Département de la Statistique, Gouvernement du
Sénégal
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Federación de Pescadores Artesanales, Puerto
Montt
Cooperativa "Mare nostrum" Pichicolo, Puerto
Montt
Smdicato Pescadores "Estapuilla", Puerto Montt
Sindicato Huelden, Linao, Chiloe
Federación Algueros de Ancud, Ancud, Chiloe
Sindicato Encarnadoras de "Calbuco", Calbuco
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World Bank Amar, Sangoné
Operations Officer
Groupement des Armateurs et Industriels de Ia Coulibaly, Dougoutigui
Pêche au Snégal Economiste - Gestionnaire, Secretaire Général
Permanent
Bureau Pour L'Afrique Occidentale - UNICEF Bérard, Jacques
Charge du Suivi et de L'vaIuation
Centre Recherches Ocanographiques de Dakar- Gueye, Lamine
Thiaroye Chef de Secteur - M'Bour
AB Consultants Tall, Cheikh Oumar Tidiane
Administrateur Délégue
Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique Vivasord, M.
Groupement des Amateurs et Industriels de la Seck, Saër
Pêche au SCnégal Secretaire Généal
Various fishers, buyers, processors
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(Groupement Intrt Economique) Mantulaay Géen
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